Also known as: political questions · political question doctrine
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A question that a court declines to adjudicate because the Constitution textually commits it to a coordinate political branch or because no judicially discoverable and manageable standards exist for its resolution.
Piper Patel and other voters in an urban county sued the state elections board, claiming their districts had not been redrawn after decades of population growth and that their votes were thereby diluted. The board moved to dismiss on political-question grounds. The district court denied the motion and proceeded to the merits after finding none of the six factors that render a case nonjusticiable were present.
Pamela Phillips, a removed federal judge, challenged the Senate's decision to delegate evidence-taking to a small committee rather than conduct a full trial before the entire body. She argued the procedure violated constitutional trial requirements. The court dismissed the suit, holding that the Senate's sole power to try impeachments rendered the procedural choices nonjusticiable.
Priya Prasad and fellow citizens sued the governor, alleging that a new initiative process allowing voters to bypass the legislature entirely destroyed the state's republican form of government. The governor moved to dismiss. The court granted the motion, concluding that Guarantee Clause claims are committed to the political branches and are nonjusticiable.
Priscilla Parks and a coalition of voters sued the redistricting commission, alleging that the new congressional map packed their party's supporters into a few districts solely to entrench the opposing party. The commission moved to dismiss. The court granted dismissal, holding that claims resting exclusively on partisan effects present nonjusticiable political questions.
Pierce Patterson, an American importer, sued a Cuban bank to recover property seized under a foreign expropriation decree. The bank moved to dismiss, arguing that the validity of the foreign government's act was a political question. The court dismissed the claim, holding that recognition and the legal effect of foreign sovereign acts are committed to the political branches.
In February and July of 1960 respondent Farr, Whitlock & Co., an American commodity broker, contracted to purchase Cuban sugar free alongside the steamer from a wholly owned subsidiary of Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba (C. A. V.), a Cuban corporation whose capital stock was owned principally by United States residents, with payment to be made in New York upon presentation of shipping documents and a sight draft. On July 6, 1960, Congress amended the Sugar Act of 1948 to permit reduction of Cuba's sugar quota and President Eisenhower exercised that power the same day. Cuba responded by enacting Law No. 851, which authorized the President and Prime Minister to nationalize by forced expropriation property or enterprises in which American nationals held an interest. Between August 6 and 9 the sugar covered by the Farr, Whitlock contract was loaded onto the S. S. Hornfels at the Cuban port of Jucaro. On August 6 the Cuban President and Prime Minister issued Executive Power Resolution No. 1 pursuant to Law No. 851, ordering compulsory expropriation of C. A. V. and other listed American-owned companies. To obtain consent for the vessel to sail, Farr, Whitlock on August 11 entered identical contracts with Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, an instrumentality of the Cuban government, and the Hornfels sailed for Morocco on August 12. Banco Exterior assigned the bills of lading to petitioner Banco Nacional de Cuba, another Cuban government instrumentality, which instructed its New York agent to deliver the documents and a sight draft for $175,250.69 to Farr, Whitlock in exchange for payment. Farr, Whitlock refused the initial tender after receiving notice of C. A. V.'s claim to the proceeds, accepted the documents only after C. A. V. agreed to indemnify it, negotiated the bills of lading to its customer, received payment, and refused to remit the proceeds. The New York Supreme Court appointed respondent Sabbatino temporary receiver of C. A. V.'s New York assets and enjoined Farr, Whitlock from removing the funds from the state. Pursuant to court order Farr, Whitlock transferred the funds to Sabbatino to abide the event of a judicial determination as to their ownership. Petitioner then instituted this action in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York. Alleging conversion of the bills of lading, it sought to recover the proceeds thereof from Farr, Whitlock and to enjoin the receiver from exercising any dominion over such proceeds. The District Court sustained jurisdiction, found the sugar located in Cuba at the time of expropriation, concluded that the expropriation violated international law on three grounds, and granted summary judgment against petitioner. The Court of Appeals affirmed on similar grounds after considering two additional State Department letters, and this Court granted certiorari.
Pavel Petrov, an alien facing deportation, challenged a one-house legislative veto that overrode an executive suspension of his removal. The government moved to dismiss on political-question grounds. The court rejected the motion, holding that the claim presented a justiciable question of statutory and constitutional authority rather than a political question committed exclusively to another branch.
In 1966 Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya who held a British passport, was lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa that expired on June 30, 1972. In October 1973, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service informed Chadha that he had remained longer than permitted and was therefore deportable. Chadha conceded deportability but applied for suspension under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. On June 25, 1974, an Immigration Judge acting on behalf of the Attorney General suspended Chadha's deportation and adjusted his status to permanent resident after finding that he satisfied the statutory criteria of seven years' continuous presence, good moral character, and extreme hardship. A report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress as required by the Act. On December 16, 1975, the House of Representatives passed a resolution disapproving the suspension for Chadha and five other aliens on the ground that they did not meet the statutory requirements, particularly as to hardship. Pursuant to the House resolution, the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings. Chadha moved to terminate them on constitutional grounds, but the Immigration Judge ruled that he lacked authority to declare the resolution unconstitutional and ordered Chadha deported. Chadha appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which likewise held that it had no authority to pass on the constitutionality of the resolution and dismissed the appeal. Chadha then filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigration and Naturalization Service appeared and urged the court to hold the House resolution unconstitutional. After inviting briefs from the Senate and House as amici curiae, the Court of Appeals held the resolution unconstitutional because it was a legislative act that failed to satisfy the requirements of Article I, sections 1 and 7, and set aside the deportation order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the consolidated cases to address the constitutional question.
The Supreme Court has identified six factors, any one of which may render a case nonjusticiable: a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment to another branch, lack of judicially manageable standards, the need for an initial policy determination of a nonjudicial kind, the impossibility of independent resolution without disrespect to coordinate branches, an unusual need for adherence to a prior political decision, or the risk of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by different branches.
…of a nonjusticiable political question satisfies us that our assertion of jurisdiction over these cases does no violence to the political question doctrine. As identified in Baker v. Carr , 369 U. S. 186, 217 (1962), a political question may arise when any one of the following circumstances is present: "a textually demonstrable…
…this requires no less than to analyze representative cases and to infer from them the analytical threads that make up the political question doctrine. We shall then show that none of those threads catches this case. Foreign relations: There are sweeping statements to the effect that all
…claim, to have the case decided on the merits. Standing has become a barrier to access to the federal courts, just as "the political question" was in earlier decades. The mounting caseload of federal courts is well known. But cases such as this one reflect festering sores in our society; and the American dream teaches that if one…
…provide the basis for cases that, absent a standing question, could not readily be excluded from the federal courts as involving political questions, or as otherwise unsuitable for adjudication under the principles formulated for these purposes by the Court. Compare United Public Workers v. Mitchell , 330 U. S. 75, 94-96; Griswold v.…
…Navegacion Maritima, S. A. , v. The Navemar , 303 U. S. 68, 74. See generally Dickinson, The Law of Nations As National Law: "Political Questions," 104 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 451, 470-475 (1956).
No. Federal courts treat claims that a districting map was drawn to favor one political party over another as nonjusticiable political questions because no judicially manageable standards exist for deciding how much partisan advantage is too much.
No. Challenges to legislative apportionment that rest on equal-protection principles and present manageable population-based standards are justiciable. Only those lacking such standards or textually committed to another branch are barred.
No. The Constitution's textual commitment of the sole power to try all impeachments to the Senate renders challenges to the Senate's choice of procedures, including delegation of evidence-taking, nonjusticiable political questions.
No. Claims that a state has failed to maintain a republican form of government under the Guarantee Clause are classic nonjusticiable political questions committed to the political branches rather than the judiciary.