pre-meditation

In September 1994, a Wells Fargo armored van pulled up to the drive-up window of a bank in Glendale, Arizona. Inside the van were a driver, a guard, and a messenger carrying a bag with more than $270,000 in cash. As the van waited for the bank to open, a man armed with a rifle approached the driver's side of the van while another man armed with a handgun approached the passenger side. The man with the rifle shot and killed the driver. The man with the handgun shot at the guard but missed. The guard returned fire, shooting and wounding the man with the handgun. The wounded man with the handgun was later identified as Timothy Ring. Ring was indicted for first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, armed robbery, and other crimes. At trial, the prosecutor presented evidence that Ring and two others had planned to rob the armored van. The jury deadlocked on premeditated murder. It convicted Ring of felony murder occurring in the course of armed robbery. At the sentencing stage of the trial, the judge found two aggravating factors. The judge found that the murder was committed in expectation of pecuniary gain and in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner. The judge found one mitigating factor consisting of Ring's minimal criminal record. Finding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factor, the judge sentenced Ring to death. On appeal, Ring argued that Arizona's capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Apprendi v. New Jersey. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected that claim, relying on Walton v. Arizona, and affirmed Ring's conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether Walton can be reconciled with Apprendi.

On July 29, 1972, the body of Mary Houston Cole was discovered in a secluded church parking lot in Chesterfield County, Virginia. She had been shot twice at close range with a .38-caliber pistol. The victim had last been seen alive the previous evening in the company of petitioner Hugh Jackson, who was carrying a .38-caliber pistol. Jackson had befriended Cole while he was imprisoned on a disorderly conduct charge at the local county jail. After his release she arranged for him to live in the home of her son and daughter-in-law. On the day of the killing Jackson had been drinking and had spent considerable time shooting at targets with his revolver. Late in the afternoon he unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Cole to drive him to North Carolina. She instead drove him to a local diner where both were observed by several police officers. A deputy sheriff later observed Jackson and Cole preparing to leave the diner in her car. Jackson was in possession of his revolver and a kitchen knife was visible in the vehicle. Cole's body was found the following day and a half later, naked from the waist down with her slacks beneath her body. Six cartridge cases fired from Jackson's gun were recovered nearby. Jackson drove the victim's car to North Carolina, made a short trip to Florida, and was arrested several days later. In a post-arrest statement introduced at trial, Jackson admitted shooting Cole but claimed the shooting occurred accidentally during a struggle. He said the victim had attacked him with a knife when he resisted her sexual advances. He stated he had first fired warning shots into the ground and reloaded before the fatal shots. At trial he asserted self-defense or, alternatively, that intoxication had prevented him from forming the specific intent required for first-degree murder under Virginia law. The trial judge, sitting as factfinder, convicted Jackson of first-degree murder and sentenced him to thirty years in prison. Jackson's motion to set aside the judgment was denied. The Virginia Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of error alleging insufficient evidence. Jackson then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The District Court applied the Thompson v. Louisville no-evidence standard and granted relief after finding insufficient proof of premeditation. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed that judgment.

In 1969 William Henry Furman was convicted of murder in Georgia and sentenced to death under Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971), after which the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969). In the same year Lucius Jackson, Jr., was convicted of rape in Georgia and sentenced to death under Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1302 (Supp. 1971), and the same court affirmed that judgment in 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969). Also in 1969 Elmer Branch was convicted of rape in Texas and sentenced to death under Tex. Penal Code, Art. 1189 (1961), after which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment in 447 S.W.2d 932 (Ct. Crim. App. 1969). Each death sentence was imposed after a jury trial under a statute that left the choice between death and a lesser punishment to the uncontrolled discretion of the jury or judge, and the state courts upheld the convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, then consolidated the matters for argument in January 1972. The records showed that the three petitioners were Black men convicted of crimes against white victims. Furman had been diagnosed with mild mental deficiency and psychotic episodes associated with convulsive disorder, while Jackson and Branch had limited education and low intelligence scores. No standards guided the sentencing decision, and the penalty was imposed on only a trivial fraction of eligible offenders despite statutory authorization for these offenses.

James Tyrone Woodson and Luby Waxton were convicted of first-degree murder following their participation in an armed robbery of a convenience food store on June 3, 1974, during which the cashier was killed and a customer was seriously wounded. There were four participants in the robbery: Woodson, Waxton, Leonard Tucker, and Johnnie Lee Carroll. Tucker and Carroll testified for the prosecution after pleading guilty to lesser offenses, while the petitioners testified in their own defense. The prosecution established that the men had discussed the robbery for some time. On the day of the crime, Waxton struck Woodson to sober him up after heavy drinking, and the group armed themselves before proceeding to the store. Tucker and Waxton entered the store, where Waxton shot the cashier at point-blank range and took the money tray, with a second shot fired before they fled. The petitioners' testimony largely agreed with this account except that Waxton claimed Tucker had done the shooting. The petitioners were found guilty on all charges and, as required by North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute for first-degree murder, were sentenced to death. The statute had been enacted after the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Waddell severed the discretionary provision from the prior law in response to Furman v. Georgia. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentences in State v. Woodson, 287 N. C. 578, 215 S. E. 2d 607 (1975). The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to consider whether the imposition of the death penalties comported with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.