preliminary questions

Respondent Francis Connelly approached Officer Patrick Anderson of the Denver Police Department on August 18, 1983, at approximately 2:40 p.m. and stated that he had killed someone and wanted to talk about it. Anderson immediately advised respondent of his Miranda rights. Respondent stated that he understood those rights but wanted to talk about the murder anyway. At this point, respondent stated that he had come all the way from Boston to confess to the murder of Mary Ann Junta, a young girl whom he had killed in Denver sometime during the month of November 1982. Respondent was then taken to police headquarters. A detective again advised him of his rights. After respondent answered that he understood them, he was asked to describe the murder in detail. Respondent gave a lengthy account including the location of the body, the date of the murder, the fact that he had used a blunt instrument in the killing, and that after killing the victim he had washed his knife in a nearby stream. After hearing this account, the detective arrested respondent for the murder of Mary Ann Junta. A search of the area where respondent said the body was located revealed the body of a young girl. The cause of death was determined to be a skull fracture. At a preliminary hearing, the psychiatrist who had examined respondent testified that at the time of the confession, respondent was clearly suffering from chronic schizophrenia and was in a psychotic state at least as of the time of his arrest. The psychiatrist testified that respondent's psychosis motivated his confession, that respondent was not capable of making a free and intelligent decision to confess, and that the confession was not voluntary. The trial court found that respondent's initial statement to Officer Anderson was involuntary and ordered that it be suppressed. The trial court also ruled that the subsequent statements made at the police station were tainted by the prior involuntary statement and ordered that they too be suppressed. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the suppression order. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether respondent's confession was obtained in a manner that violated the Due Process Clause.

In October 1981, The Investigator magazine published two articles entitled "The Private World of Willis Carto" and "Yockey: Profile of an American Hitler," along with a shorter introductory article. These articles portrayed respondent Liberty Lobby, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation and self-described citizens' lobby, and its founder Willis A. Carto as neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and Fascist. Respondents filed a diversity libel action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against petitioners Jack Anderson, the publisher, Bill Adkins, and the Investigator Publishing Co., alleging that 28 statements and 2 illustrations in the articles were false and derogatory. Following discovery, petitioners moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In support, they submitted an affidavit from Charles Bermant, the author of the articles, stating that he had spent substantial time researching from a wide variety of sources and believed the facts to be truthful, along with an appendix detailing sources for each allegedly libelous statement. Respondents opposed the motion, asserting inaccuracies and that Bermant had relied on patently unreliable sources, and presented evidence that editor William McGaw had told Adkins before publication that the articles were terrible and ridiculous. The District Court held that respondents were limited-purpose public figures to whom the New York Times standards applied. After reviewing the evidence, the District Court granted summary judgment to petitioners. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed as to 21 statements and reversed as to 9. It held that the requirement that actual malice be proved by clear and convincing evidence need not be considered at the summary judgment stage. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the holding conflicted with decisions of several other Courts of Appeals.

On June 14, 1960, at about 1 a.m., petitioner Nathan Jackson and Nora Elliott entered a Brooklyn hotel where Elliott registered for both. Jackson drew a gun, took money from the room clerk, ordered the clerk and others into an upstairs room, and left. He encountered Elliott and a policeman on the street. During a struggle both drew guns, the policeman was fatally wounded, and Jackson was shot twice in the body. Jackson hailed a cab and was taken to the hospital. A detective questioned Jackson at about 2 a.m. soon after arrival. Jackson stated his name, said he had shot the colored cop and got the drop on him, and admitted the hotel robbery. According to the detective, Jackson was in strong condition despite his wounds. At 3:55 a.m. Jackson, who had been shot in the liver and lung and had lost about 500 cc. of blood, was given 50 milligrams of demerol and 1/50 of a grain of scopolamine. Immediately thereafter an Assistant District Attorney questioned him in the presence of police officers and hospital personnel. The interrogation was recorded by a stenographer. Jackson again admitted the robbery and, in response to further questions, admitted shooting the policeman and firing the first shot. The interview ended at 4 a.m. An operation began at 5 a.m. and was completed at 8 a.m. Jackson and Elliott were indicted for murder in the first degree and tried together. The statements made by Jackson at 2 a.m. and 3:55 a.m. were introduced in evidence without objection by his counsel. Jackson took the stand in his own defense. His account of the robbery and of the shooting of the policeman differed in important respects from his confession. According to Jackson's testimony, there was a substantial interval of time between his leaving the hotel and the shooting, and the policeman attempted to draw his gun first and fired the first shot. As to the questioning at the hospital, Jackson recalled that he was in pain and gasping for breath at the time. He was refused water and told he would not be let alone until the police had the answers they wanted. He knew that he had been interrogated but could remember neither the questions nor the answers. The State offered testimony from the attending physician and others that Jackson was refused water because of the impending operation rather than his refusal to answer questions. On cross-examination of the doctor, Jackson's counsel, with the help of the hospital records, elicited the fact that demerol and scopolamine were administered to Jackson immediately before his interrogation. But any effect of these drugs on Jackson during the interrogation was denied. Although Jackson's counsel did not specifically object to admission of the confession initially, the trial court indicated awareness that counsel was questioning the circumstances of the interrogation. In closing argument counsel sought a verdict of second-degree murder or manslaughter rather than acquittal, stressing the interval between the robbery and the shooting and the evidence that the policeman fired first. Consistent with New York practice, the trial court submitted the voluntariness issue to the jury along with the other issues. The jury was instructed that if it found the confession involuntary it was to disregard it and determine guilt or innocence from the other evidence. If it found the confession voluntary it was to determine its truth or reliability and afford it weight accordingly. The jury found Jackson guilty of murder in the first degree and he was sentenced to death. Elliott was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree. Jackson's conviction was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals, whose remittitur was amended to show that it had necessarily passed upon the voluntariness of the confession and found no violation of constitutional rights. Certiorari was denied. Jackson then filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court claiming that the New York procedure for determining voluntariness was unconstitutional and that his confession was involuntary. After examining the state court record the district court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing, finding no clear and conclusive proof that the statements were extorted or given involuntarily and no constitutional infirmity in the New York procedure. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

On January 11, 1984, New York City police found the body of Ms. Thelma Staton murdered in her apartment. Facts gave the officers probable cause to believe that respondent Bernard Harris had killed her. On January 16, 1984, three police officers went to Harris' apartment to take him into custody without first obtaining an arrest warrant. When the police arrived, they knocked on the door while displaying their guns and badges, and Harris let them enter the apartment. Once inside, the officers read Harris his Miranda rights under Miranda v. Arizona, which he acknowledged understanding, and he agreed to answer their questions, reportedly admitting that he had killed Ms. Staton. Harris was then arrested and taken to the station house, where he was again informed of his Miranda rights and signed a written inculpatory statement. The police subsequently read Harris the Miranda warnings a third time and videotaped an incriminating interview between Harris and a district attorney, even though Harris had indicated that he wanted to end the interrogation. The trial court suppressed Harris' first and third statements, rulings the State does not challenge, but concluded that the second statement made at the station house was admissible. Following a bench trial, Harris was convicted of second-degree murder, and the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A divided New York Court of Appeals reversed, 72 N. Y. 2d 614, 532 N. E. 2d 1229 (1988). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the admissibility of the station house statement. 490 U. S. 1018 (1989).