Also known as: pro se defendant · pro se · self-represented defendants · pro se litigants
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
An individual who appears in court to defend against charges or claims without retaining or being appointed counsel. The defendant must knowingly and intelligently waive the right to representation, after which the court holds the pro se party to the same procedural rules that govern represented litigants while construing filings liberally to avoid default or dismissal on technical grounds.
Lee, a residential tenant facing eviction for nonpayment, elects to proceed without counsel after a valid waiver. He appears at the hearing, presents evidence of repairs, and cross-examines the landlord's witnesses while the court applies ordinary rules of evidence and procedure to his filings.
Pierre Poulin is charged with felony theft and tells the court he wishes to represent himself. After the judge conducts a thorough colloquy confirming that Poulin understands the risks and the elements of the offense, the court accepts the waiver and allows the trial to proceed with Poulin questioning witnesses and making objections on his own behalf.
Anthony Faretta was charged with grand theft in an information filed in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California. At the arraignment, the Superior Court Judge assigned to preside over the case appointed the public defender to represent him. Two and a half months later, Faretta requested that the judge allow him to represent himself. The judge questioned him about his ability to conduct his own defense. Faretta replied that he had some experience with the law. He had once represented himself in a criminal prosecution. He had a high school education. The judge initially accepted Faretta's waiver of the assistance of counsel in a preliminary ruling. The judge indicated that he might reverse this ruling if it later appeared that Faretta was unable adequately to represent himself. Several weeks thereafter, the judge sua sponte held a hearing to inquire into Faretta's ability to conduct his own defense. The judge questioned him specifically about both the hearsay rule and the state law governing the challenge of potential jurors. After consideration of Faretta's answers, the judge observed his demeanor. The judge ruled that Faretta had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his right to the assistance of counsel. The judge also ruled that Faretta had no constitutional right to conduct his own defense. The judge reversed his earlier ruling and appointed the public defender to represent Faretta. Faretta's subsequent request for leave to act as cocounsel was rejected. His efforts to make motions on his own behalf were rejected. Throughout the subsequent trial, the judge required that Faretta's defense be conducted only through the appointed lawyer from the public defender's office. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Faretta guilty as charged. The judge sentenced him to prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's ruling that Faretta had no federal or state constitutional right to represent himself. A petition for rehearing was denied without opinion. The California Supreme Court denied review. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View casePreston Pratt is convicted and files a notice of appeal. Because he cannot afford a lawyer, he asks the state to appoint counsel for the appellate stage. The state denies the request under its rule that counsel is provided only at trial, forcing Pratt to prepare and file his own appellate brief without assistance.
Bennie Will Meyes and William Douglas were jointly tried and convicted in a California court on an information charging them with thirteen felonies including robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and assault with intent to commit murder. A single public defender was appointed to represent both men. The defender moved for a continuance at the start of trial, citing the complexity of the case, his daily handling of different defenses, and a conflict of interest between the defendants. The motion was denied. The defendants dismissed the defender and renewed their motions for separate counsel and a continuance, but these requests were also denied. A jury convicted both defendants on all thirteen counts, and each received a prison term. Meyes and Douglas appealed as of right to the California District Court of Appeal. That court affirmed their convictions. They then petitioned the California Supreme Court for further review, but the petitions were denied without a hearing. The defendants requested the assistance of counsel on appeal to the District Court of Appeal. The court denied their requests after reviewing the record and concluding that appointment of counsel would serve no useful purpose. The defendants were indigent at the time of these requests. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the case.
View casePablo Perez, an inmate, submits a handwritten petition challenging prison disciplinary sanctions that resulted in loss of good-time credits. The petition is not formatted as a formal complaint and lacks numbered paragraphs, yet the court treats it as a valid pro se filing that commences the action because it asserts a claim and requests relief.
Respondent Robert O. McDonnell, on behalf of himself and other inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex in Lincoln, Nebraska, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging several of the practices, rules, and regulations of the Complex. For present purposes, the pertinent allegations were that disciplinary proceedings did not comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, that the inmate legal assistance program did not meet constitutional standards, and that the regulations governing the inspection of mail to and from attorneys for inmates were unconstitutionally restrictive. Respondent requested damages and injunctive relief. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court granted partial relief in 342 F. Supp. 616 (Neb. 1972). Considering itself bound by prior Circuit authority, it rejected the procedural due process claim but held that the prison's policy of inspecting all incoming and outgoing mail to and from attorneys violated prisoners' rights of access to the courts and that the restrictions placed on inmate legal assistance were not constitutionally defective. The Court of Appeals reversed with respect to the due process claim in 483 F. 2d 1059 (CA8 1973), holding that the procedural requirements outlined by this Court in Morrissey v. Brewer and Gagnon v. Scarpelli should be generally followed in prison disciplinary hearings but left the specific requirements to be determined by the District Court on remand. With respect to a remedy, the court held that Preiser v. Rodriguez forbade the actual restoration of good-time credits in this § 1983 suit but ordered expunged from prison records any determinations of misconduct arrived at in proceedings that failed to comport with due process. The court generally affirmed the judgment with respect to correspondence with attorneys but ordered further proceedings to determine whether the State was meeting its burden under Johnson v. Avery to provide legal assistance to prison inmates, extending the duty to civil rights cases as well as habeas corpus proceedings. Nebraska statutes assign the chief executive officer of each penal facility responsibility for inmate discipline and provide for a range of possible disciplinary action. Except in flagrant or serious cases, punishment for misconduct shall consist of deprivation of privileges. In cases of flagrant or serious misconduct, the chief executive officer may order that a person's reduction of term as provided in section 83-1,107 be forfeited or withheld and also that the person be confined in a disciplinary cell, with each breach entered in the person's file. Prison regulations classify misconduct as major or minor, with major misconduct formally reported to an Adjustment Committee composed of the Associate Warden Custody, the Correctional Industries Superintendent, and the Reception Center Director. The Adjustment Committee reviews all misconduct reports, conducts investigations, makes findings, and imposes disciplinary actions, with sanctions including reprimand, restrictions, extra duty, confinement in the Adjustment Center, and withholding of good time. The District Court found that the procedures in effect included daily review of write-ups by the chief correction supervisor, a conference with the chief correction supervisor and the charging party, preparation of a conduct report sent to the Adjustment Committee, a hearing where the report is read and discussed, opportunity for the inmate to ask questions if denying the charge, additional investigations if desired, and imposition of punishment. The litigation also encompassed challenges to the opening and inspection of attorney mail without the inmate present and the adequacy of a single designated inmate legal advisor for assisting other inmates.
View casePavel Petrov is convicted and files a notice of appeal. The state provides no assistance in preparing the brief. Petrov submits an inartful pro se brief that raises several issues, and the court must decide whether the absence of counsel on appeal violates due process when the record is straightforward.
After his conviction for the felony of possession of marijuana, Anders moved the California District Court of Appeal to appoint counsel to represent him on appeal. The court granted the motion. Appointed counsel studied the record and consulted with Anders before concluding that the appeal had no merit. Counsel informed the court by letter of this conclusion and noted that Anders wished to file a brief on his own behalf. Anders requested the appointment of a different attorney, but the court denied this request. Anders proceeded to file a brief pro se, the State responded, and Anders filed a reply brief. On January 9, 1959, the District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. In 1965, Anders filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court of Appeal. He sought to reopen the case on the basis that he had been deprived of counsel on his original appeal due to the court's refusal to appoint new counsel. The court denied the application the same day in a brief memorandum, stating that it had reviewed the record and determined the appeal to be without merit, and that the procedure from In re Nash had been followed. Anders then submitted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme Court of California on June 25, 1965. That court denied the petition without opinion on July 14, 1965.
View casePierce Patterson, charged with drug distribution, elects to proceed without counsel after a valid waiver. The prosecutor approaches Patterson directly to discuss a possible plea agreement that would reduce the charge in exchange for cooperation, and the court later confirms on the record that Patterson understood the terms before entering the plea.
On August 1, 1991, San Diego Narcotics Task Force agents arrested Gordon Shuster after discovering a methamphetamine laboratory at his residence in Rainbow, California. Shuster agreed to cooperate with the agents. He placed a call to respondent Gordon Mezzanatto's pager a few hours later. When Mezzanatto returned the call, Shuster told him that a friend wanted to purchase a pound of methamphetamine for $13,000. Shuster arranged to meet Mezzanatto later that day. At the meeting, Shuster introduced an undercover officer as his friend. Mezzanatto produced a brown paper package containing approximately one pound of methamphetamine from his car. He also presented a glass pipe containing methamphetamine residue and asked the officer if he wanted to take a hit. The officer gave a prearranged arrest signal after leaving the car to retrieve the money. Mezzanatto was arrested and charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On October 17, 1991, Mezzanatto and his attorney asked to meet with the prosecutor to discuss cooperating with the Government. At the beginning of the meeting, the prosecutor stated that Mezzanatto would have to agree that any statements made could be used to impeach contradictory testimony at trial if the case proceeded that far. Mezzanatto conferred with counsel and agreed to proceed under those terms. He then admitted knowing the package contained methamphetamine while claiming he had dealt only in ounce quantities and had not visited Shuster's residence for at least a week. The Government confronted Mezzanatto with surveillance evidence showing his car on Shuster's property the day before the arrest. It terminated the meeting for failure to provide completely truthful information. Mezzanatto was later tried on the charge. He took the stand in his own defense. He testified that he thought Shuster used the laboratory to manufacture plastic explosives for the CIA and that he did not know the package contained methamphetamine. Over defense objection, the prosecutor cross-examined Mezzanatto about inconsistent statements from the October 17 meeting. The prosecutor called an attending agent to recount those statements. The jury found Mezzanatto guilty. The District Court sentenced him to 170 months in prison. A Ninth Circuit panel reversed over Chief Judge Wallace's dissent in 998 F. 2d 1452 (1993). The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the decision conflicted with the Seventh Circuit's ruling in United States v. Dortch, 5 F. 3d 1056 (1993).
View caseNo. A judge may give uncompensated advice or draft documents for family members but is prohibited from serving as their lawyer in any forum, including by arguing facts or examining witnesses on their behalf.
The defendant must knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel after the court conducts a thorough colloquy that ensures the defendant understands the risks and disadvantages of self-representation.
Courts construe pro se filings liberally and treat a document as an answer or complaint if it substantively responds to the allegations or asserts a claim, even when the caption or format is defective.
No. While filings receive liberal construction, a pro se defendant remains subject to the same rules governing numbered paragraphs, separate counts, and timely responses that apply to represented parties.
…Judith Resnik ; for the National Network to End Domestic Violence et al. by Bruce D. Sokler ; and for Joseph R. Biden, Jr., pro se . Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Alabama by Bill Pryor , Attorney General, John J. Park, Jr. , Assistant Attorney General, and Jeffrey S.…