Also known as:reneges · reneged · reneging · back out · default on
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
To fail to keep a promise or commitment made in a transaction or agreement. The breach may trigger remedies such as specific performance, damages, or foreclosure depending on the surrounding legal framework.
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Common Examples
6
Mortgagor Stops Property Maintenance
Ryan Roberts borrowed funds from a bank secured by a mortgage on his commercial building. After the loan closed, Roberts stopped all repairs and allowed the roof to collapse, reducing the property value below the loan balance. The bank treated the neglect as waste and initiated foreclosure to recover its security.
Borrower Misses Cure Deadline
Ricardo Rojas received a foreclosure notice after missing several mortgage payments. Two days before the scheduled sale he attempted to tender payment by personal check rather than the required cashier's check or electronic transfer. The lender rejected the tender and proceeded with the sale.
Raymond Ramos pleaded guilty after the prosecutor promised to recommend a one-year sentence. At the hearing the prosecutor instead urged a five-year term. The court vacated the plea because the government had failed to honor its commitment.
Santobello v. New York404 U.S. 257 (1971)
The State of New York indicted Santobello in 1969 on two felony counts of Promoting Gambling in the First Degree and Possession of Gambling Records in the First Degree. Santobello initially entered a plea of not guilty to both counts. After negotiations, the Assistant District Attorney agreed to permit a plea to the lesser-included offense of Possession of Gambling Records in the Second Degree and promised to make no recommendation as to sentence.
On June 16, 1969, Santobello withdrew the not guilty plea and entered a guilty plea to the lesser charge. The court accepted the plea after Santobello confirmed it was voluntary and the facts described by the prosecutor were true. A series of delays followed, owing primarily to the absence of a pre-sentence report, so that by September 23, 1969, Santobello had still not been sentenced.
By that date petitioner acquired new defense counsel. Petitioner's new counsel moved immediately to withdraw the guilty plea. In an accompanying affidavit, petitioner alleged that he did not know at the time of his plea that crucial evidence against him had been obtained as a result of an illegal search. In addition to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, petitioner renewed the motion to suppress and filed a motion to inspect the grand jury minutes. These motions in turn caused further delay until November 26, 1969, when the court denied all three and set January 9, 1970, as the date for sentencing.
On January 9, 1970, Santobello appeared before a different judge because the original judge had retired. A new prosecutor replaced the one who negotiated the plea and recommended the maximum one-year sentence, citing Santobello’s criminal record and alleged links with organized crime. Defense counsel objected on the ground that the State had promised no sentence recommendation and sought an adjournment to prove the promise, though the State later conceded in subsequent proceedings that the promise had been made.
The sentencing judge imposed the maximum one-year sentence at the New York City Correctional Institution for men, stating that the prosecutor’s recommendation did not influence the decision. Santobello obtained a certificate of reasonable doubt and was admitted to bail pending appeal. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the conviction, and leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. Santobello then sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.
Roberto Reyes purchased state bonds issued to finance public works. After a change in administration the state legislature refused to appropriate funds for repayment. Reyes sued in federal court claiming the refusal impaired the obligation of contract.
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida517 U.S. 44, 106 (1996)
In 1988 Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes. The Act divides gaming on Indian lands into three classes. Class III gaming includes slot machines, casino games, banking card games, dog racing, and lotteries. Such gaming is lawful only when conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State.
The Act imposes upon the States a duty to negotiate in good faith with an Indian tribe toward the formation of such a compact. It authorizes a tribe to bring suit in federal court against a State in order to compel performance of that duty. The Seminole Tribe of Florida requested that the State of Florida enter into negotiations for a compact governing class III gaming on the Tribe's lands.
When the State refused to negotiate, the Tribe filed suit in September 1991 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida against the State and its Governor, Lawton Chiles. The Tribe invoked jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A), as well as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1362. It alleged that respondents had refused to enter into any negotiation for inclusion of certain gaming activities in a tribal-state compact, thereby violating the requirement of good faith negotiation contained in § 2710(d)(3).
The State moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the suit violated the State's sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. The District Court denied the motion. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. It held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the Tribe's suit against the State and that the doctrine of Ex parte Young did not permit a suit against the Governor to enforce the statutory duty. The Eleventh Circuit remanded with directions to dismiss the suit.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1995 to consider whether the Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes against States for prospective injunctive relief to enforce legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause and whether the Ex parte Young doctrine permits suits against a State's Governor for such relief.
Rebecca Ross owned shares in a steel company whose facilities the President ordered seized to avert a strike. The company had previously committed to continue operations under existing labor contracts. The seizure prevented performance of those commitments and led to litigation over executive authority.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer343 U.S. 579 (1952)
In the latter part of 1951, a dispute arose between steel companies including Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. and their employees represented by the United Steelworkers of America, C.I.O., over terms and conditions to be included in new collective bargaining agreements. Long-continued conferences failed to resolve the dispute. On December 18, 1951, the union gave notice of an intention to strike when the existing agreements expired on December 31. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service intervened without success. On December 22, 1951, President Truman referred the dispute to the Federal Wage Stabilization Board to investigate and make recommendations for fair and equitable terms of settlement.
The Board's report resulted in no settlement. On April 4, 1952, the union gave notice of a nationwide strike to begin at 12:01 a.m. on April 9. The President believed that the proposed work stoppage would immediately jeopardize national defense because steel is an indispensable component of substantially all weapons and other war materials. A few hours before the strike was to begin, on April 8, 1952, the President issued Executive Order 10340 directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of most of the steel mills and keep them running. The Secretary immediately issued possessory orders calling upon the presidents of the seized companies to serve as operating managers for the United States.
Obeying the Secretary's orders under protest, the companies brought proceedings against him in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Their complaints charged that the seizure was not authorized by an act of Congress or by any constitutional provision and asked the court to declare the orders invalid and to issue preliminary and permanent injunctions. The Government opposed the motion for a preliminary injunction, asserting that the President had inherent power supported by the Constitution, historical precedent, and court decisions. On April 30, 1952, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction restraining the Secretary from continuing the seizure and possession of the plants.
On the same day the Court of Appeals stayed the District Court's injunction. Deeming it best that the issues be promptly decided by the Supreme Court, the Court granted certiorari on May 3, 1952, and set the cause for argument on May 12.
Regina Robinson gave a reporter documents exposing city corruption on the condition that her identity remain secret. The newspaper later published her name. Robinson sued for breach of the promise that induced her disclosure.
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.501 U.S. 663 (1991)
On October 27, 1982, during the closing days of the Minnesota gubernatorial election campaign, Dan Cohen separately approached Lori Sturdevant of the Star Tribune and Bill Salisbury of the Pioneer Press Dispatch. Cohen, a political associate of IR candidate Wheelock Whitney, offered each reporter copies of two public court records concerning DFL lieutenant governor candidate Marlene Johnson: a 1969 record of three counts of unlawful assembly that were dismissed and a 1970 record of a petit theft conviction that was vacated about a year later. Cohen requested and received promises from both reporters that he would be treated as an anonymous source. His name would not appear in any material connected with the documents. The reporters would not pursue questions about his source.
The reporters were experienced and covering the gubernatorial election. They knew Cohen as an active Republican associated with the Wheelock Whitney campaign and promised to keep his identity confidential, intending to honor that promise at the time it was made. Cohen also met with reporters from the Associated Press and WCCO-TV, who likewise promised anonymity and received the documents. The Associated Press published the story while honoring its promise, while WCCO-TV did not run the story. After receiving the documents, both newspapers interviewed Johnson for her explanation. The Star Tribune assigned a reporter to locate the original court records, discovering that another Whitney supporter had checked them out the previous day.
Editors at both the Star Tribune and the Pioneer Press Dispatch independently decided to publish the stories while identifying Cohen as the source. On October 28, 1982, both newspapers published stories about Johnson's arrests and convictions. Both articles published Cohen's name, along with denials by the regular Whitney campaign officials of any connection with the published stories. The Pioneer Press Dispatch quoted Johnson as saying the release of the information was a last-minute smear campaign. Cohen was fired from his job at a Minneapolis advertising firm the same day. The Star Tribune subsequently published a column and cartoon criticizing Cohen's tactics.
Cohen sued Northwest Publications, Inc., publisher of the Pioneer Press Dispatch, and Cowles Media Company, publisher of the Star Tribune, for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract. The trial court ruled that the First Amendment did not bar the claims. The jury found liability on both claims and awarded Cohen $200,000 in compensatory damages jointly and severally against the defendants plus $250,000 in punitive damages against each defendant. The court of appeals upheld the jury's finding of a breach of contract and affirmed the award of $200,000 compensatory damages. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted petitions for further review from all parties.
What relief is available when a prosecutor fails to honor a plea agreement?
A defendant may obtain vacation of the plea or specific enforcement of the promise. Courts have uniformly granted some form of relief when the prosecutor reneges on a sentencing agreement made in connection with a plea bargain.
Supporting sources
Does a state renege on bond obligations when it refuses to appropriate repayment funds?
Yes. Refusal to pay state bonds after issuance constitutes an attempt to renege on contractual obligations and may raise Contract Clause issues even if sovereign immunity bars the suit.
Supporting sources
When may a mortgagee obtain damages for waste committed by a mortgagor?
Damages are available to the extent the waste impairs the mortgagee's security. The mortgagee may also foreclose or seek an injunction when the waste threatens the security interest.
Supporting sources
How does a borrower cure a monetary default before foreclosure?
The borrower must tender payment in cash, cashier's check, certified check, teller's check, electronic funds transfer, or money order in the required amount no later than two days before the scheduled sale.
Supporting sources
501 U.S. 1083 (1991)
…to reject this theory. Here, First American Bankshares, Inc. (FABI), and Virginia Bankshares, Inc. (VBI), retained the option to back out of the transaction if dissatisfied with the reaction of the minority shareholders, or if concerned that the merger would result in liability for violation of duties to the minority…
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