Also known as: search incident to arrest exception · searches incident to legal arrest exception · search incident to arrest · SILA exception · incident to arrest search
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A Fourth Amendment exception permitting officers to conduct a warrantless search of an arrestee and the area within the arrestee's immediate control. The exception exists to protect officer safety and preserve evidence. It applies only when the search is substantially contemporaneous in time and place with the arrest.
Officers arrested Sierra Santos at a rest area on suspicion of cargo theft and had her rig towed to a secured lot without searching the cab. The next afternoon detectives opened the cab and found hidden goods. The court suppressed the evidence because the search occurred far from the arrest scene after significant delay.
Scott Summers was stopped for erratic driving and officers saw a knife on the floorboard of his truck. They conducted a limited search of the cab for additional weapons before completing the stop. The search was upheld under Terry doctrine, not the search-incident-to-arrest exception, because no arrest had occurred.
In a rural area of Michigan one evening shortly after midnight, Deputies Howell and Lewis observed a car traveling erratically and at excessive speed. The officers observed the car turning down a side road, where it swerved off into a shallow ditch. The officers stopped to investigate. Long, the only occupant of the automobile, met the deputies at the rear of the car, which was protruding from the ditch onto the road. The door on the driver's side of the vehicle was left open. Deputy Howell requested Long to produce his operator's license, but he did not respond. After the request was repeated, Long produced his license. Long again failed to respond when Howell requested him to produce the vehicle registration. After another repeated request, Long, who Howell thought appeared to be under the influence of something, turned from the officers and began walking toward the open door of the vehicle. The officers followed Long and both observed a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the driver's side of the car. The officers then stopped Long's progress and subjected him to a Terry protective patdown, which revealed no weapons. Long and Deputy Lewis then stood by the rear of the vehicle while Deputy Howell shined his flashlight into the interior of the vehicle, but did not actually enter it. The purpose of Howell's action was to search for other weapons. The officer noticed that something was protruding from under the armrest on the front seat. He knelt in the vehicle and lifted the armrest. He saw an open pouch on the front seat, and upon flashing his light on the pouch, determined that it contained what appeared to be marihuana. After Deputy Howell showed the pouch and its contents to Deputy Lewis, Long was arrested for possession of marihuana. A further search of the interior of the vehicle, including the glovebox, revealed neither more contraband nor the vehicle registration. The officers decided to impound the vehicle. Deputy Howell opened the trunk, which did not have a lock, and discovered inside it approximately 75 pounds of marihuana. The Barry County Circuit Court denied Long's motion to suppress the marihuana taken from both the interior of the car and its trunk. He was subsequently convicted of possession of marihuana. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Long's conviction, holding that the search of the passenger compartment was valid as a protective search under Terry. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The court held that the sole justification of the Terry search, protection of the police officers and others nearby, cannot justify the search in this case. The marihuana found in Long's trunk was considered by the court below to be the fruit of the illegal search of the interior, and was also suppressed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the authority of a police officer to protect himself by conducting a Terry-type search of the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle during the lawful investigatory stop of the occupant of the vehicle.
View caseSerena Soto was arrested inside her home after officers entered without knocking. Evidence found in plain view during the arrest was admitted at trial. The court held that suppression was not required for the knock-and-announce violation. The ruling did not turn on the search-incident rationale.
Police officers obtained a search warrant authorizing a search for drugs and firearms at the home of petitioner Booker T. Hudson in Michigan. Upon arriving to execute the warrant, the officers knocked on the door and announced their presence. They waited only three to five seconds before turning the knob of the unlocked front door and entering Hudson's home. Inside the residence, officers discovered large quantities of drugs, including cocaine rocks in Hudson's pocket, and a loaded gun lodged between the cushion and armrest of the chair in which he was sitting. Hudson was charged under Michigan law with unlawful drug and firearm possession. He moved to suppress all the inculpatory evidence, arguing that the officers' premature entry violated his rights. The Michigan trial court granted the motion to suppress. On interlocutory review, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed that ruling, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Hudson was subsequently convicted of the possession charges. He renewed his suppression claim on appeal, but the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected it and affirmed the conviction. The Michigan Supreme Court again declined review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the case.
View caseSimone Sanders was arrested for driving on a suspended license and handcuffed in the back of a patrol car. Officers then searched her car and found drugs in the passenger compartment. The court suppressed the drugs because the arrestee could no longer access the vehicle.
On August 25, 1999, Tucson police officers Griffith and Reed responded to an anonymous tip that the residence at 2524 North Walnut Avenue was being used to sell drugs by knocking on the front door and speaking with Rodney Gant, who identified himself and stated that he expected the owner to return later. The officers left and conducted a records check revealing that Gant's driver's license had been suspended and that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest for driving with a suspended license. When the officers returned to the house that evening, they found a man near the back of the house and a woman in a car parked in front of it. After a third officer arrived, they arrested the man for providing a false name and the woman for possessing drug paraphernalia. Both arrestees were handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars when Gant arrived. Gant arrived in his car, parked at the end of the driveway, and got out. Officer Griffith recognized the car, confirmed Gant's identity with a flashlight, called to him, and arrested him 10 to 12 feet from the vehicle before handcuffing him. Because the other arrestees occupied the only patrol cars at the scene, Griffith called for backup. When two more officers arrived, they locked Gant in the backseat of their vehicle. After Gant had been handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car, two officers searched his car. One of them found a gun, and the other discovered a bag of cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat. Gant was charged with two offenses of possession of a narcotic drug for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia. He moved to suppress the evidence seized from his car on the ground that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. A jury found Gant guilty on both drug counts, and he was sentenced to a 3-year term of imprisonment. After protracted state-court proceedings, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the search of Gant's car was unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certiorari.
View caseSebastian Santos was arrested in his living room and handcuffed with his hands behind his back. Officers searched only the area immediately around his chair and found a weapon. The search was upheld because it stayed within the zone of immediate control.
On the afternoon of September 13, 1965, three police officers arrived at the Santa Ana, California home of Ted Steven Chimel with a warrant authorizing his arrest for the burglary of a coin shop. The officers knocked on the door, identified themselves to Chimel's wife, and asked if they might come inside. She admitted the officers, who waited ten to fifteen minutes until Chimel returned from work. When Chimel entered, an officer handed him the arrest warrant and asked if he had any coins or medals. Chimel replied that he did not. The officers then asked if he minded if they looked around. Chimel objected, but the officers advised him that on the basis of the lawful arrest they would conduct a search anyway. No search warrant had been issued. The officers looked through the entire three-bedroom house, including the attic, the garage, and a small workshop. In the master bedroom and sewing room the officers directed Chimel's wife to open drawers and move their contents so the officers could view any items. The search lasted between forty-five minutes and one hour and yielded numerous coins, medals, tokens, and other objects. At Chimel's subsequent state trial on two charges of burglary, the seized items were admitted into evidence over his objection that they had been unconstitutionally seized. He was convicted. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of conviction, and the California Supreme Court denied review. Both lower courts held that the arrest was lawful and that the search was justified as incident to that arrest. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the petitioner's constitutional claims regarding the scope of the search.
View caseSelena Singh was arrested while sitting in the driver's seat of her car. Officers searched the entire passenger compartment and found evidence under the seat. The search was upheld because the compartment remained within the arrestee's immediate control at the time of arrest.
On April 9, 1978, New York State Trooper Douglas Nicot stopped a vehicle traveling at an excessive speed on the New York Thruway. The car contained four men including respondent Roger Belton. Nicot smelled burnt marihuana and observed an envelope marked Supergold on the floor that he associated with marihuana. Nicot directed the men to exit the car and placed them under arrest for unlawful possession of marihuana. He patted each man down and separated them into four areas along the Thruway. Nicot then searched the passenger compartment and found a black leather jacket belonging to Belton on the back seat. Nicot unzipped a pocket of the jacket and discovered cocaine inside. He placed the jacket in his own vehicle and transported the four arrestees to a nearby police station. Belton was subsequently indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance. In the trial court Belton moved to suppress the cocaine. The motion was denied and he pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense while preserving his constitutional claim. The Appellate Division upheld the search and seizure. The New York Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA search becomes too remote when officers remove the arrestee from the scene, impound the property, and conduct the search hours or a day later at a different location. The exception requires substantial contemporaneity so that officer-safety and evidence-preservation concerns still exist.
No. A lawful arrest is necessary but not sufficient. The search must also be limited in scope to the area within immediate control and must occur substantially contemporaneously with the arrest.
The exception rests on the need to protect officers from weapons the arrestee might reach and to prevent the arrestee from destroying evidence. Once the arrestee is secured and removed, those concerns no longer justify a warrantless search.