Also known as:unemployment benefit · unemployment insurance · UI benefits
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Compensation provided by state programs to workers who lose their jobs through no fault of their own. Eligibility requires that the separation from employment not result from misconduct or a voluntary quit without good cause. Denial of these benefits may raise constitutional questions when the worker's conduct stems from sincerely held religious beliefs.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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Peyote Use Leads to Benefits Denial
Uri Underwood, a member of a Native American church, was fired after using peyote during a religious ceremony. State officials denied his claim for unemployment benefits under a neutral criminal prohibition on the drug. The denial stands because the law applies to all persons regardless of religious motivation.
Sabbath Observer Seeks Saturday Off
Una Ueda, a Seventh-Day Adventist, quit her job after her employer required Saturday work that conflicted with her faith. The state denied unemployment benefits on the ground that she left without good cause. A court requires the state to grant benefits because the denial forces a choice between religious observance and economic survival.
Appellant joined the Seventh-day Adventist Church in 1957 while working at a textile mill in South Carolina that permitted a five-day work week. In 1959 the employer changed the schedule to a six-day week that included Saturday shifts for all employees. Appellant was discharged because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath day of her faith.
After her discharge, appellant sought employment with three other mills in the Spartanburg area but found no suitable five-day work available. She filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act. The Employment Security Commission denied the claim, finding that her restriction on Saturday work made her ineligible for benefits.
The Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County sustained the Commission's decision. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas. The state supreme court rejected appellant's claim that the denial of benefits abridged her right to the free exercise of her religion under the First Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal. The case was argued on April 24, 1963, and decided on June 17, 1963.
Ugo Ucelli resigned after his factory converted to producing military equipment that violated his religious convictions. The state denied unemployment benefits, treating the resignation as voluntary without good cause. A court holds that the benefits must be paid because the refusal was motivated by sincere religious belief.
Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981)
Thomas, a Jehovah’s Witness, was hired by Blaw-Knox Foundry & Machinery Co. to work in its roll foundry fabricating sheet steel for industrial uses. On his employment application, Thomas listed his membership in the Jehovah’s Witnesses and noted his hobbies of Bible study and Bible reading, though he placed no conditions on his employment.
Approximately one year later, the roll foundry closed and Thomas was transferred to a department fabricating turrets for military tanks. On his first day there, Thomas realized the work was weapons related, checked the bulletin board, and found that all remaining departments at Blaw-Knox were engaged in weapons production. After his request for a layoff was denied, Thomas quit his job on November 6, 1975, because he believed his religious convictions prevented him from participating in the production of armaments.
Thomas then applied for unemployment compensation benefits under the Indiana Employment Security Act. At an administrative hearing, Thomas testified that he had consulted a fellow Jehovah’s Witness at the plant who advised that working on weapons parts was not unscriptural, but Thomas could not accept that view and concluded his own stricter interpretation of his faith precluded such work. The hearing referee found that Thomas had terminated his employment due to his religious convictions but determined that this did not constitute good cause in connection with his work.
The Review Board adopted the referee’s findings and denied benefits. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed and ordered benefits, but the Indiana Supreme Court vacated that decision and denied benefits. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutional issues presented.
Ulysses Ulrich was fired from a hospital after refusing an annual flu vaccine required by a neutral regulation that permitted only medical exemptions. The state denied unemployment benefits on misconduct grounds. The denial is upheld because the rule is neutral and generally applicable without targeting religion.
City of Boerne v. Flores521 U.S. 507 (1997)
St. Peter Catholic Church was built in 1923 in Boerne, Texas. Its structure replicates the mission style of the region's earlier history. The church seats about 230 worshippers, a number too small for its growing parish. Some 40 to 60 parishioners cannot be accommodated at some Sunday masses.
To meet the needs of the congregation, the Archbishop of San Antonio gave permission to the parish to plan alterations to enlarge the building.
A few months later, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the city's Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks and districts. Under the ordinance, the commission must preapprove construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a historic district.
Soon afterwards, the Archbishop applied for a building permit so construction to enlarge the church could proceed. City authorities, relying on the ordinance and the designation of a historic district which they argued included the church, denied the application.
The Archbishop brought this suit challenging the permit denial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The complaint contained multiple claims, but to this point the litigation has centered on RFRA and the question of its constitutionality. The District Court concluded that by enacting RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and now reverses.
Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith. RFRA prohibits government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability. Unless the government can demonstrate that the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, it must also show that the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The Act applies to all federal and state law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the enactment of RFRA.
Ursula Upton was discharged from military service for wearing a yarmulke that violated a neutral dress code. She sought unemployment benefits after the separation. The denial is sustained because the uniform policy is neutral and generally applicable to all service members.
Goldman v. Weinberger475 U.S. 503 (1986)
S. Simcha Goldman, an Orthodox Jew and ordained rabbi, was commissioned as a captain in the United States Air Force in 1981 after completing his Ph.D. in clinical psychology through the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program. He was assigned to serve as a clinical psychologist at the mental health clinic on March Air Force Base in Riverside, California. Upon commissioning, Goldman received the uniform clothing allowance and purchased the three standard Air Force uniforms. He completed basic officers training and performed his duties satisfactorily at the base hospital while complying with all Air Force regulations until the events at issue.
In 1973 Goldman had entered the scholarship program and remained on inactive reserve status during his studies at Loyola University of Chicago. After three years he entered active service to fulfill the program's service obligation. Until April 1981 Goldman wore his yarmulke on base without interference, remaining near his duty station indoors and covering it with his service cap when outdoors. In April 1981, after testifying as a defense witness at a court-martial while wearing his yarmulke but not his service cap, opposing counsel complained to Colonel Joseph Gregory, the Hospital Commander, that the practice violated Air Force Regulation 35-10.
Colonel Gregory ordered Goldman not to wear the yarmulke while on duty or in uniform outside the hospital. Goldman refused the order. After his attorney protested to the Air Force General Counsel, Gregory revised the order to prohibit the yarmulke even inside the hospital. Goldman’s request to report for duty in civilian clothing was denied. The next day he received a formal letter of reprimand warning that continued violation could lead to court-martial, and Gregory withdrew a prior recommendation that Goldman’s application to extend his active service be approved.
Goldman sued the Secretary of Defense and others in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that AFR 35-10 as applied to him infringed his First Amendment rights. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction and, after a full hearing, permanently enjoined the Air Force from enforcing the regulation against Goldman or penalizing him for wearing the yarmulke. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Uma Upadhyay, owner of a closely held corporation, objected on religious grounds to providing certain contraceptive coverage required by federal regulation. After the firm faced penalties, employees sought unemployment benefits following related job losses. The accommodation analysis turns on whether the mandate substantially burdens religious exercise under applicable statutes.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.573 U.S. 682 (2014)
In 2012 and 2013, three closely held for-profit corporations—Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., Mardel, Inc., and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp.—along with their owners, the Green and Hahn families, filed suits against the Secretary of Health and Human Services and other federal officials.
Hobby Lobby operates over 500 stores with more than 13,000 employees. Mardel runs 35 Christian bookstores with nearly 400 employees. Conestoga employs about 950 people in its woodworking business. The Green family owns and operates Hobby Lobby and Mardel. The Hahn family owns and operates Conestoga.
Both families hold sincere Christian religious beliefs that life begins at conception. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, employers with 50 or more full-time employees must provide group health insurance covering certain preventive services for women, including 20 FDA-approved contraceptive methods, without cost sharing. The Department of Health and Human Services issued regulations requiring coverage of all 20 methods. The Greens and Hahns object specifically to four methods because they believe these may prevent implantation of a fertilized egg, which they view as destroying an embryo in violation of their faith.
If the companies fail to provide the required coverage, they face penalties of $100 per day per affected employee, potentially reaching $475 million annually for Hobby Lobby, $33 million for Conestoga, and $15 million for Mardel. Alternatively, dropping coverage entirely could trigger penalties of $2,000 per employee per year. The companies and owners sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, seeking to enjoin the mandate as applied to the four objected-to methods.
The District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied a preliminary injunction to the Greens and their companies. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the corporations could assert RFRA claims. In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the District Court denied a preliminary injunction to the Hahns and Conestoga. The Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that for-profit corporations cannot exercise religion under RFRA. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases.
When does denial of unemployment benefits violate the Free Exercise Clause?
Denial violates the clause when a state withholds benefits because a worker refuses work that conflicts with sincere religious beliefs and the state lacks a compelling interest pursued by the least restrictive means. Neutral and generally applicable rules that only incidentally burden religion do not require exemptions.
Supporting sources
Does a worker's sincerely held belief need to be shared by others in the same faith?
No. Courts accept the individual's sincere religious explanation even if other members of the same denomination would accept the work. Judicial inquiry focuses on sincerity rather than orthodoxy of the belief.
Supporting sources
What happens when a neutral rule permits secular exemptions but not religious ones?
The rule may lose its claim to general applicability. Selective accommodation of nonreligious reasons while denying comparable religious accommodations can trigger strict scrutiny and require an exemption for the religious claimant.
Supporting sources
494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1990)
…Appeals Comm’n of Florida , 480 U. S. 136 (1987), in which we held that a State could not condition the availability of unemployment insurance on an individual’s willingness to forgo conduct required by his religion. As we observed in Smith I , however, the conduct at issue in those cases was not prohibited by law. We held that…