Concept
Other Claimed Fundamental Rights
Fundamental rights
Other Claimed Fundamental Rights
Equal protection condemns lines drawn for no good reason or for a bad one, and the fundamental-rights doctrine reserves a closer look for the few interests the Court treats as specially protected.1 Litigants have asked the Court again and again to lengthen that list, and nearly all have lost. The Court has never catalogued the interests it has refused to recognize, because that category is everything outside the rights already covered in this chapter. Four have drawn the most debate: subsistence payments, housing, education, and government employment.2
The recognized rights usually rest on firmer ground than these claims do. The vote, for instance, is shielded by the Fifteenth Amendment from denial or abridgment on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.3 Education, by contrast, is not among the rights the Constitution explicitly protects,4 and due process does not guarantee even an appeal from a criminal conviction.5 The two subsections below show how the Court treats claims without that footing. Access to the courts earns narrow protection, grounded in equality and due process although no right to appeal exists. Education and government employment earn none, because the Court asks whether the Constitution guarantees the interest and does not ask how much the interest matters.6
Access to the Courts
Due process does not guarantee an appeal from a criminal conviction, yet a state that offers appeals may not let poverty decide who receives an effective one.7 Griffin v. Illinois supplied the principle, which the Court later described as “a flat prohibition against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective an appeal as would be available to others able to pay their own way.”8 That description rules out balancing, because Griffin does not weigh the accused’s need against the interest of society. The Court reaffirmed the principle in 2005 in Halbert v. Michigan.9
The principle reaches past transcripts. Douglas v. California required appointed counsel on a first state appeal as of right, and the Court, per Justice Douglas, branded the state’s refusal “discrimination against the indigent” even as it conceded that “absolute equality” in access to justice is not constitutionally required.10 Ross v. Moffitt later declined to extend that holding to discretionary appeals. Mayer v. Chicago applied Griffin to a petty offender, an “impecunious medical student” fined a total of $500, who could not pay for a transcript. The State had to give him a record complete enough for fair appellate consideration although he faced no confinement, because the conviction could affect his professional prospects and possibly bar him from practicing medicine.11
Two features explain why this protection survives although no right to appeal exists. The first is political. A legislature tempted to deny appeals to a disfavored group of defendants would have a hard time justifying the distinction under an equality challenge and might have to withdraw appeals from everyone. That is politically unthinkable, since criminal charges against legislators, their families, and major donors are not unheard of, so insisting on equal access protects the appeal itself.12 The second feature is the remedy. Leaving an indigent defendant free to hire a lawyer or buy a transcript is not enough, because the state must supply financial help, which makes these cases a very limited right to welfare.13
The civil side of the doctrine connects to marriage, and a footnote in Zablocki v. Redhail offers it as further support for marriage’s fundamental importance.14 In Boddie v. Connecticut, the Court wrote that “marriage involves interests of basic importance in our society” and held that filing fees for divorce actions violated the due process rights of indigents unable to pay.15 The married couple there could not pay approximately $60 in court costs. Two features of marriage carried the result: its “basic position ... in this society’s hierarchy of values” and “the concomitant state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship.” Given both, due process bars a state from denying court access, solely because of inability to pay, to people who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages.16
A dissent called the Boddie holding strange. Absent some specific federal constitutional or statutory provision, it reasoned, marriage and divorce in this country are completely under state control. The power to grant divorces in Great Britain lay with Parliament and not with the courts, and as recently as 1888 the Court upheld in Maynard v. Hill a divorce granted by the legislature of the Territory of Oregon.17 Waiting periods before a divorce becomes available raise a separate question under the right to travel. Most states imposed waiting periods between six months and two years, and Iowa’s one-year period was the most common.18
United States v. Kras marks the boundary. The Court concluded there that filing fees in bankruptcy actions did not deprive indigents of due process or equal protection, observing that “Bankruptcy is hardly akin to free speech or marriage,” rights the Court has come to regard as fundamental.19 Kras and Boddie therefore differ in the importance of the interest the fee blocks and, as Boddie put it, in whether the state monopolizes the route to that interest.20 Ortwein v. Schwab reached a Kras-like result for a fee charged to seek judicial review of an adverse welfare determination.
Within family law, the protection has grown. Little v. Streater required a state to pay for blood grouping tests for an indigent defendant in a paternity action. M.L.B. v. S.L.J. is the leading example. A Mississippi chancery court had forever terminated M.L.B.’s parental rights to her two minor children, and Mississippi required her to prepay record preparation fees estimated at $2,352.36 to appeal.21 She could not pay, and her appeal was dismissed.22 The question was whether a state may, consistent with due process and equal protection, condition appeals from termination decrees on the parent’s ability to pay those fees. The Court held that it may not.23
Four features of the case drove that result. The stakes are “more substantial than mere loss of money.” Termination, unlike loss of custody, “irretrievably” destroys the parent-child bond. Mississippi’s own experience shows that the risk of error is considerable. And the state’s countervailing interest, as in Mayer, is only financial, the offsetting of court costs, in a tightly circumscribed category where appeals are few and unlikely to impose an undue burden.24
The Court has never settled which tier of review governs these claims. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion relied on Boddie in finding marriage and family life of “basic importance,” and it told courts to “inspect the character and interest of the individual interest at stake ... on the one hand and the state’s justification for its exaction ... on the other.” That comes close to endorsing a balancing test, but the opinion neither called family relationships “fundamental constitutional rights” nor precisely described its standard of review.25 An exam answer should therefore describe the heightened inquiry without attaching a formal label. The line also has critics. Justice Thomas, dissenting in M.L.B., argued that the Griffin cases announced “an equalizing notion of the Equal Protection Clause that would, I think, have startled the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers,” because the Court found violations from disproportionate effect on poor persons without seeking any purposeful discrimination.26
Both litigants are poor, and the same fee shuts out both. The answer turns on the interest at stake, so a fee-waiver problem is best worked in a fixed order.
Steps two and four do most of the work in civil problems. A divorce fee and a bankruptcy fee look alike at step one, and they come apart because only the divorce petitioner seeks an interest of basic importance and depends on the state to dissolve the marriage.
Education and Employment
The Court has refused to recognize a fundamental right to education, and San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez is the key case.28 The suit attacked the Texas system of financing public education. Mexican-American parents whose children attended the Edgewood Independent School District, an urban district in San Antonio, brought a class action for schoolchildren statewide who are members of minority groups or who are poor and live in districts with a low property tax base.29 The Court, per Justice Powell, employed rational basis analysis and held 5–4 that equal protection was satisfied.30
Texas’s scheme could have drawn strict scrutiny through either of two doors, and the Court closed both. The first is suspect classification. Justice Powell found no showing that the poor, as an identifiable class, live in property-poor districts. He found no “absolute deprivation of the desired benefit,” since equal protection “does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages,” and he found in district wealth “none of the traditional indicia of suspectness.”31 That result fits the Court’s wider refusal to treat wealth classifications as suspect, a refusal that matters for every claim in this subsection because those who bring such claims are often poor.32
The second door is a fundamental right, and the challengers pressed it hardest. The majority acknowledged that education may be the most important function of state government, but it held that the importance of a service the state performs does not decide whether the service is fundamental for equal protection purposes.33 Education “is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution,” and the Court found no basis for treating it as implicitly protected.34 The test is whether the Constitution explicitly or implicitly guarantees the right, because it is “not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.”35
Gating strict scrutiny on a constitutional guarantee keeps the inquiry from collapsing into a ranking of public services. If importance were the test, a court would have to compare education with subsistence, housing, and the right to travel. The majority asked how education could be distinguished from “the basics of decent food and shelter,” since the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed may be among the most ineffective participants in the political process.36 Comparisons of relative societal significance, the Court answered, do not reveal fundamental rights. The question is whether the Constitution guarantees the interest.37
The challengers’ best argument was a nexus theory: education bears so closely on speech and political participation, which the Constitution does protect, that it deserves heightened review. Efforts to link education to the First Amendment and to voting failed.38 The majority gave two reasons. Whatever merit the argument might have if a financing system caused an absolute denial of educational opportunity, it gave no basis for finding interference with fundamental rights where only relative differences in spending were involved. And no one could fairly charge that the Texas system failed to give each child an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills needed to enjoy the rights of speech and to participate fully in the political process.39 The opinion thus separates relative differences in the quality of schooling from an absolute denial of basic educational opportunity, and it left the second category open.
Plyler v. Doe shows the line in operation. The Court held that Texas’s failure to provide undocumented school-age children the free public education it provides to citizens and legally admitted aliens violates equal protection.40 Justice Brennan, a dissenter in Rodriguez, wrote for the Court. He acknowledged that “public education is not a ‘right’ granted to individuals by the constitution” and accepted that illegal aliens are not a suspect class. But he observed that “education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society” and that the children of illegal entrants are special members of an “underclass,” part of a “permanent caste” denied benefits provided to citizens and lawful residents.41 Read beside Rodriguez, the two cases differ in what the state did: one involved relative spending differences, the other a refusal to provide free public schooling to a group of children. The Court later declined to extend Plyler to a fee for school bus service, which it reviewed for rationality in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools. An exam answer should present Plyler as a limited exception and not as recognition of a fundamental right to education.
Education is one of four interests the Court has declined to recognize as fundamental. The others are welfare, housing, and government employment.42 No majority of the Court has held that there is a right to subsistence payments or welfare benefits, and the Justices treat such programs as general economic and social welfare measures reviewed under the basic rationality standard. Strict scrutiny applies only if a welfare program dispenses benefits on a suspect criterion, excludes persons on a status that deserves active judicial protection, or burdens another fundamental value such as the right to travel. Where a state has declared someone entitled to benefits, procedural due process gives a right to a hearing before termination, although the states remain free to decide on what basis they grant benefits and who is entitled to receive them.43 Housing follows the same pattern, as Lindsey v. Normet illustrates.44
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia supplies the employment half of the subsection. The case involved a state rule requiring uniformed police officers to retire at age fifty, challenged by an officer whose physical fitness was undisputed. The Court applied rational basis review. Government employment is not among the fundamental interests,45 and the Court has expressly confined discrimination based on age to rational basis review, along with disability, wealth, and sexual orientation, even though these classifications share much with the types that trigger heightened scrutiny.46 The officer’s individual fitness did not change the analysis. Equal protection condemns lines drawn for no good reason or for a bad one,47 and a fixed retirement age is a line with a plausible reason even though it misjudges some individuals. Under rational basis review the only question is whether a good reason exists.
Rodriguez and Murgia run the same sequence. Ask whether the Constitution guarantees the interest, ask whether the class is suspect, and defer if neither answer is yes. How much the interest matters to the claimant never enters the first question, which is why most challenges of this kind end once the interest is identified.
Steps one and four do most of the work in an essay. A claimant who answers step one with an argument about importance has not answered it, and a claimant who can describe a total deprivation, as in the hypothetical county or in Plyler, has found the opening the cases leave.