Concept
Suspect Classes and Fundamental Rights
Rational basis review
Suspect Classes and Fundamental Rights
Massachusetts required uniformed state police officers to retire at fifty, and a retired officer sued, claiming that the age line denied him equal protection. A three-judge federal court agreed: because “a classification based on age 50 alone lacks a rational basis in furthering any substantial state interest,” it declared the statute unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. The Supreme Court reversed in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia.1
The result can seem hard on the individual officer, but the Court did not begin by asking whether retirement at fifty was wise or fair to him. It asked first whether anything in the case called for review stricter than the default. Under San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, strict scrutiny of a legislative classification is warranted only when the classification interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class.2 Mandatory retirement at fifty, the Court held, involved neither situation.3
The threshold matters because governments classify people constantly. Laws decide who may practice law, who may drive, who may receive welfare, who may serve as a police officer, and who may hold a broadcast license, and any of them can be challenged as a denial of equal protection. Each receives rational basis review unless it discriminates on race, national origin, gender, alienage, or legitimacy, the only grounds for which the Court has approved intermediate or strict scrutiny.4 The oldest contrast in the cases is with race. Where distinctions are not drawn according to race, the Court “has merely asked whether there is any rational foundation for the discriminations, and has deferred to the wisdom of the state legislatures,” but a racial classification carries “the very heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required.”5
A challenger in the officer's position therefore needs one of two triggers, a fundamental right or a suspect class, and Murgia's claim failed on both. The next part takes up the claim that governmental employment is a fundamental right, and the part after it takes up the claim that age defines a suspect class. When neither trigger is present, the classification stays in the default tier, whose deferential test is developed later in this chapter.
Government Employment Is Not Fundamental
The Court disposed of the first trigger briefly. Its decisions, it said, “give no support to the proposition that a right of governmental employment per se is fundamental,” and a standard less than strict scrutiny “has consistently been applied to state legislation restricting the availability of employment opportunities.”6 The officer's classification therefore stayed in the default tier, however much the job meant to him.
The holding can seem to ignore the stakes, since few interests matter more to an adult than a livelihood. But importance to the person who loses an interest cannot be what makes it fundamental, because nearly every interest of this kind is important. Rodriguez posed the difficulty as a question: how is education “to be distinguished from the significant personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter”? The Court added that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed may well be among the least effective participants in the political process, so an argument tying education to political participation would reach those interests as well.7
The stakes explain why the Court holds back. A statute that invades a fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect class is subject to strict scrutiny, and a statute subject to strict scrutiny is always or nearly always struck down, so the only critical decision is whether to invoke strict scrutiny at all. The Murgia dissent made that observation itself, and it explains the Court's hesitancy: each new category of rights or classes invalidates virtually every classification bearing on it.8 Treating public employment as fundamental would have placed every rule about who may hold a government job under a review that almost none survive.
The Court's own list shows what the fundamental category contains: Roe v. Wade (a right of a uniquely private nature), Bullock v. Carter (the right to vote), Shapiro v. Thompson (the right of interstate travel), Williams v. Rhodes (rights guaranteed by the First Amendment), and Skinner v. Oklahoma (the right to procreate).9 The Warren Court's implication of fundamental interests under equal protection raised difficulties like those of substantive due process, so that some called the line “substantive equal protection,” but the Court has developed it in only a very few areas.10
Voting shows how the first trigger works. The right to vote in state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned in the Constitution, yet once a state grants the franchise it may not draw lines inconsistent with equal protection, and it violates the Clause “whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.” In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections the Court recalled that it had long ago called “the political franchise of voting” a “fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.”11 A state may attach conditions to both a police job and a ballot, but the two interests do not stand on the same footing: only the ballot is a fundamental right.
Welfare, housing, and education have fared no better than employment. The Court has refused to declare any of these four interests fundamental: governmental subsistence payments or welfare, housing, education, and government employment.14 In Dandridge v. Williams, for example, the Court treated a classification affecting welfare benefits as a matter of “economics and social welfare” and applied only the rational relationship test. The classification involved “the most basic needs of impoverished human beings,” yet the Court found “no basis for applying a different constitutional standard.”15
The tier follows the right a rule burdens, not the benefit it withholds. A durational residency requirement denies new residents a benefit until they have lived in the state for a set period, and if the benefit is sufficiently vital or important, the discrimination between new and old residents impinges on the right to travel and receives strict scrutiny.16 Saenz v. Roe involved a rule of this kind. A benefit that is not fundamental in itself can therefore draw strict scrutiny when the way it is withheld burdens travel.
Rejecting the first trigger leaves the second fully available to public employees. A government employer that discriminates against a suspect class must show that its discrimination is “narrowly tailored” to “compelling governmental interests,” while the same employer survives a challenge from a nonsuspect group by showing a rational basis.17 Qualifications for office and employment follow that map: discrimination based on race or color is generally invalidated, while minimum-age and maximum-age requirements stand if a rational basis supports the distinction.18 Age, the claim in Murgia, falls on the lenient side. The next part explains why, and it also takes up the dissent's contrary view.
The trap on an examination is the sympathetic fact pattern: a public employee, fully capable, loses a job and suffers real harm. Fitness and hardship bear on how well the state's means fit its ends, a question for the rational basis inquiry developed later in this chapter, but they do not make the job fundamental. The analysis turns on which trigger is present, a recognized fundamental right such as voting, interstate travel, First Amendment rights, procreation, or privacy, or a suspect class. If neither appears, the classification stays in the default tier.
Age Is Not a Suspect Class
The second trigger asks whether the law burdens a suspect class, and the officer lost on that question too. The Court took its definition from Rodriguez: a suspect class is one “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.”20 The three features are alternatives, and each points toward a group that ordinary politics is unlikely to protect. Sympathy is not the test; the group's history and political position are.
Older workers look like plausible claimants, because an age cutoff can end a career, and the Court conceded that the treatment of the aged “has not been wholly free of discrimination.” But the aged, “unlike, say, those who have been discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a ‘history of purposeful unequal treatment’ or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.”21 That last phrase carries the reasoning. Race tells nothing about what a person can do, so a law that sorts by race is likely to rest on prejudice. Ability does change with age, and the Court observed that physical ability generally declines with it, so a legislature drawing an age line may be responding to a real difference and not to a stereotype.22
The class before the Court consisted of uniformed state police officers over fifty. Even if the statute imposed a penalty on a class defined as the aged, the Court said, it would not impose a distinction “sufficiently akin to those classifications that we have found suspect to call for strict judicial scrutiny.” Old age does not even define a “discrete and insular” group, a phrase traceable to United States v. Carolene Products Co., in need of “extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process,” because it marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal span.23 The point is structural. A racial minority can be outvoted by the same majority year after year, but the legislators who set a retirement age expect to pass it themselves.
With both triggers absent, the Court asked only whether the classification rationally furthered the State's purpose, and it did. The legislature sought to protect the public by assuring the physical preparedness of its uniformed police, and because physical ability generally declines with age, retirement at fifty removes those whose fitness for the work “presumptively has diminished.” Nothing suggested that the rule excluded so few unqualified officers as to make age fifty a criterion wholly unrelated to that objective.24 The Court accepted the presumption even though some officers over fifty remain fit, a feature of the deferential standard that later parts of this chapter develop.
Maximum-age limits receive the same review. A limit stands if there is a rational basis for the distinction,26 and Gregory v. Ashcroft, which involved a state judicial retirement age, illustrates the point. The federal government as employer fares no differently. Equal protection binds it through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as Bolling v. Sharpe held,27 and in Vance v. Bradley the Court, with only one dissent, upheld a requirement that participants in the foreign service retirement system retire at sixty.28 The employees had argued that the distinction from the general federal retirement age of seventy for civil service personnel violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.29
The track record is uniform. The rational basis test is “so easy to satisfy” that the Court has never found an age classification to violate the Fourteenth Amendment, a point that mattered in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, where the question was whether the ADEA was a congruent and proportional remedy for state violations of the Equal Protection Clause.30
The Court applied the same logic to a different trait in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., where it declined to treat mental retardation as a quasi-suspect classification. The lesson it drew from Murgia is that when the members of a group have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State may pursue, courts are very reluctant to scrutinize closely the legislative choices about whether, how, and to what extent to pursue those interests, and the Equal Protection Clause then requires only a rational means to serve a legitimate end.31 The Court gave further reasons. A legislative response that could hardly have survived without public support negates any claim of political powerlessness, and if a minority's lack of direct control over the legislature were enough for higher scrutiny, “much economic and social legislation would now be suspect.” The Court also saw no principled way to distinguish the class before it from “the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm,” and it declined to set out on that course.32 Cleburne and Murgia thus reach the same tier by different routes, and refusing to label a group suspect still leaves the rational basis test to be applied, which later parts of the chapter show can be more or less demanding.
Justice Marshall's dissent supplies the competing view. “The elderly are undoubtedly discriminated against,” he wrote, and when legislation denies them an important benefit such as employment, the State must show “a reasonably substantial interest and a scheme reasonably closely tailored to achieving that interest.”33 That standard asks more than rationality and less than strict scrutiny, and it depends on weighing the importance of the interest affected, a step the majority's two-trigger test does not take. The majority answered with the categories: employment is not fundamental and the aged are not suspect, so the default tier governs.34
On an examination, the usual fact pattern is a sympathetic older person who loses a job, license, or benefit to an age cutoff. Identify the trait, place age outside the classifications that draw heightened scrutiny, and send the law to rational basis review. The Court has approved intermediate or strict scrutiny only for race, national origin, gender, alienage, and legitimacy.35 That rule does not leave older persons unprotected, because federal statutes forbid age discrimination in many circumstances, and a claim that fails under the Equal Protection Clause may still succeed under a statute.36 And if an age line burdens a fundamental right such as voting, the first trigger applies on its own terms and the analysis changes.