Concept
Voting as a Fundamental Right
Right to Vote
The Right to Vote
Voting as a Fundamental Right
The Constitution never says that citizens have a right to vote, yet the Court treats voting as fundamental and examines laws that exclude people from the ballot more closely than almost any other election rule. The two facts fit together once you see what the Court protects. Under the original structure of the Constitution, states set voter qualifications and determined how federal elections would be conducted, except to the extent Congress stepped in to make or alter the rules for congressional elections.1 The Fourteenth Amendment adds a guarantee of equality: once a state grants the franchise, it may not draw lines that violate the Equal Protection Clause.2
That guarantee separates laws that exclude voters from laws that regulate voting. A classification restricting the franchise on grounds other than residence, age, and citizenship cannot stand unless the state shows a compelling interest, while a challenge to an election regulation calls for a more flexible balancing approach, which later units take up.3
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, the photo-identification case, shows why this baseline matters. Its lead opinion measured Indiana's requirement against the poll tax decision discussed below and asked whether a restriction on voting is related to voter qualifications.4 To follow that argument, you need four building blocks: where the protection comes from, what the wealth cases forbid, which stake-based exclusions the Court has struck down, and which eligibility limits it permits.
Where the Protection Comes From
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections identifies what the Court enforces when it invalidates an exclusion from the ballot. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, did not stop to canvass the relation between voting and political expression. It was enough, he said, that “once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”5 The protection is a right to equal treatment in whatever elections a state chooses to hold.
The structure of the Constitution explains why the protection takes that form. The Constitution does not expressly confer a general right to vote; it leaves the regulation of elections to the states and Congress.6 A state therefore makes two separate decisions. The first is whether to fill an office by election at all, and the Constitution does not control that choice: nothing in it would prevent Los Angeles from abolishing the popular election of its mayor and having the city council appoint the mayor instead.7 The second is how to distribute the ballot once the office is elective, and equal protection controls that choice, because the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to participate in the electoral process equally with other qualified voters.8 Residents of a town that appoints its dogcatcher have no constitutional complaint, but once the town makes the post elective, any restriction on the franchise must satisfy equal protection.9
Close review follows from what voting does. The Court has long called “the political franchise of voting” a “fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights,” as it said in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, and it has insisted that any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote be “carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”11 Voting is fundamental because it is essential in a democratic society: through the vote, the people choose their government and hold it accountable.12 A law that distributes the franchise selectively therefore does special damage, because it cuts its victims off from the political processes through which they could ordinarily expect to repeal undesirable legislation.13 That is why such laws are usually subject to strict scrutiny, which asks whether the exclusion is necessary to promote a compelling state interest.14
Plyler v. Doe states the consequence in terms of status. A citizen cannot hope to achieve any meaningful degree of individual political equality while holding an inferior right of participation, and those denied the vote are relegated, by state fiat, in a most basic way to second-class status.15
Four amendments add express protection by prohibiting the federal and state governments from selectively denying the franchise on particular grounds:16
- The Fifteenth Amendment forbids denial or abridgement of the vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
- The Nineteenth Amendment forbids denial or abridgement of the vote on account of sex.
- The Twenty-Fourth Amendment forbids denial of the vote for failure to pay a tax.
- The Twenty-Sixth Amendment forbids denial of the vote on account of age.
Each amendment names a forbidden ground for exclusion, and none confers an affirmative right to vote on all citizens.17 Rice v. Cayetano shows the Fifteenth Amendment at work: the Court struck down a Hawaii constitutional provision that limited the vote for trustees of a state agency to descendants of certain races, holding it “a clear violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.”18 A ground that no amendment names, such as wealth, falls to the Equal Protection Clause, which is why the next subsection turns to the poll tax cases.
Presidential electors mark the point where no right exists until a legislature creates one. In Bush v. Gore, the Court explained that when a state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental, and one source of that status is the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter.19 The state, after granting the franchise in this special context of Article II, can take back the power to appoint electors.20 The electors rule is the dogcatcher principle at the national level: the choice to hold an election creates the equality claim, and the choice not to hold one leaves none.
Poll Taxes and Wealth Tests
Harper applied that equality principle to wealth. The Court held that a state violates the Equal Protection Clause whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.22 Virginia's constitution directed the legislature to levy an annual poll tax of up to $1.50 on residents twenty-one and older, and it made payment of the tax a precondition for voting.23
The defect lay in relevance. When it comes to voting, the state's interest is limited to the power to fix qualifications, and wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process.24 A genuine qualification survives: the Court did not question a state's power to impose reasonable residence restrictions on the ballot.25 But to introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is to introduce a “capricious or irrelevant factor.”26
Because the defect is irrelevance, two defenses fail. A state cannot rescue a fee by shrinking it: the degree of the discrimination is irrelevant, and the Court reached the same result whether the voter had $1.50 in his pocket or nothing at all.27 A rational justification does not help either. As the Crawford lead opinion later described Harper, Virginia's justification for the tax was rational but invidious because it was irrelevant to the voter's qualifications.28 The argument from licensing fees fails for the same reason: a state may demand an equal fee for a driver's license, but its interest in voting is limited to fixing qualifications.29 The Court added that the principle denying a state the right to dilute a citizen's vote on account of economic status bars, by analogy, a system that excludes those who are unable to pay a fee to vote or who fail to pay it.30
Harper did not rest on racial discrimination under the Fifteenth Amendment.31 An earlier decision had described the Virginia poll tax as born of a desire to disenfranchise Black citizens, but the Court did not stop to determine whether the tax in its modern setting served the same end.32 The holding therefore reaches wealth conditions without regard to racial purpose.
Harper predates the modern tiers of scrutiny, but its standard is their forerunner. Where fundamental rights are asserted under equal protection, the Court said, classifications that might invade or restrain them must be “closely scrutinized and carefully confined.”33 That formulation is a precursor of what is now called strict scrutiny.34
Harper left taxation and literacy tests alone. The Court said it would say nothing to impair the validity of a levy by the poll, an old and familiar form of taxation, so long as payment is not made a condition to the exercise of the franchise, and it overruled Breedlove v. Suttles only to the extent that case had sanctioned a poll tax as a prerequisite of voting.35 The Court's own footnote offers an example of the permitted version: Maine collected a poll tax but made payment a condition of obtaining a motor vehicle license, not of voting.36 A literacy test marks the other edge of the rule. Harper distinguished Lassiter, which sustained a state literacy test, because the ability to read and write has some relation to standards designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot, while a poll tax has none; the Court repeated the warning that the result would differ if a literacy test, fair on its face, were used to discriminate against a class.37 In each case the question is whether the sorting criterion relates to voter qualifications.
The Twenty-Fourth Amendment prohibits poll taxes in elections for federal offices, and Harper reaches every other election through the Equal Protection Clause.38
The usual error is to ask whether the fee is large enough to burden the poor. Harper makes the amount irrelevant and asks only whether the condition relates to voter qualifications.
The poll tax cases also set the terms for the photo-identification debate. The Crawford lead opinion read Harper to mean that even rational restrictions on the right to vote are invidious if they are unrelated to voter qualifications, and then added that, under Anderson v. Celebrezze, evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself are not invidious.42 Applying Harper, it said that the fact that most voters already hold a valid driver's license or other acceptable identification would not save the statute if the state required voters to pay a tax or fee to obtain new photo identification. Indiana's cards, however, were free, as other states provide free voter registration cards, and for most voters who needed them the inconvenience of a trip to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, gathering the required documents, and posing for a photograph did not qualify as a substantial burden on the right to vote or a significant increase over the usual burdens of voting.43 Later units ask which side of Harper's line an evenhanded identification rule falls on.
Stake-Based Exclusions
States often defend an exclusion by arguing that the excluded people lack a sufficient stake in the election. Oregon v. Mitchell states the standard that defense must meet: when exclusions from the franchise are challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, scrutiny is not confined to whether the exclusion may reasonably further a permissible state interest, “a more exacting standard obtains,” and the Court must determine whether the exclusions are “necessary to promote a compelling state interest.”45 The Court draws that test from Kramer v. Union Free School District and Cipriano v. City of Houma.46
Carrington v. Rash shows the state's usual defense and the Court's usual answer. Texas barred members of the armed services who moved to Texas from voting in state elections, however long they had lived there and whether or not they owned property.47 Texas argued that it could keep military voters from overwhelming the local civilian community and keep transients out of local elections.48 The Court rejected both arguments: a state cannot fence out bona fide residents for fear of their presumed political views, and it cannot use an imprecise categorical rule to avoid the burden of deciding who is in fact a bona fide resident.49 The Texas rule failed because it forbade a soldier ever to controvert the presumption of nonresidence, and occupation used to bar a person from voting is the invidious discrimination that equal protection condemns.50 The residence requirement itself survived; what Texas lacked was a more precise way to test claims of residency than the classification it had used.51
Kramer applied the exacting standard to a school-district franchise and reversed. The challenged classifications permitted inclusion of many people with at best a remote and indirect interest in school affairs and excluded others with a distinct and direct interest in the school meeting decisions.52 A line that misses its own target in both directions cannot be necessary to the goal of enfranchising those with a stake, which is why a stake-based line of that kind fails the compelling-interest test.
The Kramer dissent shows how much turned on the choice of standard. It would have asked only whether the classification is rationally related to a permissible legislative end, thought the statute clearly valid on that question, and observed that the majority did not really argue the contrary.53
Nor does the owners' tax burden justify an owners-only vote on a bond issue. The Court has held that nonproperty owners are not “substantially less interested in the issuance of these securities than are property owners,” and that presumptively “when all citizens are affected in important ways by a governmental decision subject to a referendum, the Constitution does not permit weighted voting or the exclusion of otherwise qualified citizens from the franchise.”54 That holding comes from Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, on which the Court later relied in summarily affirming a decision about a Louisiana rule that gave a vote on municipal bond issues only to “property taxpayers.”55
The strict standard has a boundary. In Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, the Court declined to apply the Kramer line to a landowner-only vote for the board of a water storage district, treating the district as a special limited-purpose body whose activities fell disproportionately on landowners.
The question to ask, then, is whether the particular line, drawn among bona fide residents, includes the directly affected and excludes the remote. A state's label of “stake” or “interest” does not answer it.
Eligibility Limits the Court Allows
Strict scrutiny of franchise exclusions has recognized exceptions, and the Court's own formulation shows where they lie. In Hill v. Stone, the Court said that “any classification restricting the franchise on grounds other than residence, age, and citizenship cannot stand unless the … State can demonstrate that the classification serves a compelling state interest.”57 Read in reverse, that sentence names the three grounds on which a state may limit the electorate without making the compelling-interest showing: residence, citizenship, and age.58 Felony status falls outside the list but has its own textual footing, discussed after the residence rules.
Residence and citizenship identify the community whose government is at stake. States and cities may restrict the vote to citizens and bona fide residents, and a denial of the franchise to nonresidents and noncitizens receives only rational basis review.59 Governments have a legitimate interest in limiting the vote to those with a stake in the community; otherwise the fate of a state or a town could be decided by busloads of outsiders who swarm in on election day.60 Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa is the usual illustration of the deferential review that governs the exclusion of nonresidents.61 A citizenship requirement does discriminate against noncitizens, but the political function exception applies to the act of voting, so strict scrutiny is not triggered.62 Age appears on Hill's list as well, although the Twenty-Sixth Amendment separately forbids denying the franchise on account of age.63
A durational residency requirement is different. It does not screen out outsiders; it temporarily denies the vote to people who in fact live in the jurisdiction, so it draws strict scrutiny.64 Dunn v. Blumstein invalidated a Tennessee law that conditioned the vote on residence in the state for one year and in the county for three months.65 The Court gave three reasons: the requirement impaired both voting and the right to travel, other means existed to determine bona fide residence, and mass communications let newcomers learn about local affairs quickly.66 Mitchell reached a consistent analysis. A durational requirement penalizes only those who have exercised their right of interstate migration, so it can withstand scrutiny only on a clear showing that the burden is necessary to protect a compelling and substantial governmental interest.67
Strict scrutiny does not invalidate every delay. The Court has upheld a fifty-day restriction, and a restriction of less than two months may be necessary to verify voter lists or records and prevent fraud.68 Mitchell shows where that interest runs out. The only fraud the state asserted was dual voting, and the Court saw no reason why a thirty-day gap between the close of new registrations and the election would not leave adequate time, in light of modern communications, to guard against it.69
A short registration cutoff and a year-long wait are both residence rules in name, and the usual exam error is to treat the label as the answer. A requirement that voters be bona fide residents screens out outsiders and receives rational basis review, while a waiting period for people who already live in the state denies bona fide residents the ballot and receives strict scrutiny. The question to ask is whether the delay matches what verification takes.
Richardson v. Ramirez rejected a claim that disenfranchising felons violates the Equal Protection Clause. The Court relied on Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which reduces the congressional representation of a state that denies the vote to adult male citizens “except for participation in rebellion, or other crime,” and it understood that language to permit states to deny the vote to citizens convicted of a crime.72
The textual permission does not shelter a law adopted to exclude voters by race. The Court later clarified, in Hunter v. Underwood, that the Constitution bars felon disenfranchisement laws adopted with racially discriminatory intent.73 Impact alone does not carry that burden: in challenges under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment, statistical proof of a voting rule's discriminatory impact is relevant but not determinative, and a challenge fails without proof that the rule was created or maintained for a racially discriminatory purpose.74
Because Richardson permits felon exclusions rather than requiring them, a state can restore the vote, and a restoration can be undercut at the implementation stage. One legislature required people to pay off court-imposed financial obligations before it would re-enfranchise them, a barrier that has proved insurmountable for many.75