Concept
Public Officials and Actual Malice
Constitutional limits: public officials, public figures, and private plaintiffs
Public Officials and Actual Malice
The Restatement (Second) of Torts states the rule for a plaintiff who holds public office. Under § 580A, one who publishes a false and defamatory communication about a public official or public figure, in regard to his conduct, fitness, or role in that capacity, is subject to liability if, but only if, he knows that the statement is false and that it defames the other person, or acts in reckless disregard of those matters.1 The words “if, but only if” make the publisher's state of mind a condition of recovery. A plaintiff who proves only that a statement was false and damaging has not yet reached liability.
The rule asks a question the common law never put to the plaintiff: what did the speaker know when publishing? The common-law baseline presumed falsity, malice, and damage and left the defendant to prove truth. The constitutional rule turns the inquiry to the speaker's knowledge. A critic who honestly believes a charge against a mayor or a police commissioner, and states it in good faith, escapes liability even if a jury later decides the charge was wrong, because the official cannot show knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard. A speaker who invents a charge, or who publishes one while ignoring obvious signs that it is untrue, remains answerable. Citizens most need to discuss conduct in office, and a rule that made every critic guarantee each factual detail would silence true criticism along with false.
Two features of the Restatement language frame what follows. The first is the limiting phrase: the heightened standard attaches to statements about the official's conduct, fitness, or role in that capacity. For a private person, or for an official in relation to a purely private matter, § 580B allows liability when the publisher acts negligently in failing to ascertain that the statement is false and defamatory.2 Together the sections sort plaintiffs into tiers. A public official or public figure must prove that the defendant published a knowing or reckless falsehood, although states remain free to permit presumed damages.3 A private person suing over a matter of public concern must prove falsity, some fault by the defendant (usually negligence), and actual injury, a fault requirement that Gertz adopted after Justice Harlan had urged it in dissent in Time, Inc. v. Hill.4 The Gertz limits that confine such a plaintiff to compensation for actual injury, absent knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity, do not apply when the statement involves no matter of public concern.5 Later sections develop the lower tiers. The second feature is that § 580A also reaches public figures, whose treatment follows this section, so the focus here stays on officials.
The subsections below treat the rule as the plaintiff's burden, ask which government actors qualify as officials, define actual malice (a term of art whose legal sense departs from everyday speech), and show how a plaintiff proves it and how courts review the findings.
The Sullivan Rule
The Restatement's “if, but only if” turns the constitutional rule into a statement of what the plaintiff must establish before liability can exist at all.6 The publisher must know that the statement is false and that it defames the plaintiff, or must act in reckless disregard of those matters.7 The source is New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, which held that a public official may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to official conduct unless the official proves actual malice, meaning knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.8 The Court reasoned that a rule forcing critics to prove the truth of their charges would deter them even when the charges are true, because they doubt whether they can prove them in court or fear the expense of trying.9 Actual malice is the Court's label for the required state of mind; a later subsection takes the label apart. For now, treat it as a condition of recovery that the plaintiff must prove. The elements the common law presumed in the plaintiff's favor, falsity and malice among them, therefore become matters the official must establish.
Falsity at step three means falsity of a factual assertion. In general, if an opinion discloses the facts on which it rests, and those facts are true or known to the reader, the statement is not actionable; but an opinion that depends on unstated facts that are false or incomplete may imply a false assertion of fact.13 Later sections return to opinion.
The proof must be strong as well as pointed. The Court required falsity and actual malice to be shown with convincing clarity, a standard later equated with clear and convincing evidence, which sits above the preponderance used in most civil cases and below proof beyond a reasonable doubt.14 The Court also disposed of the presumptions that had made Alabama's rule so favorable to plaintiffs. Alabama presumed malice whenever general damages were at issue, and the Court held that the presumption conflicts with the federal rule, because the showing of malice is a matter for proof by the plaintiff.15 A plaintiff who proves only publication, defamatory meaning, and falsity has therefore not reached liability.
Each half of the rule answers a different problem. The first half puts the burden of proof on the official. Under a rule that made the critic prove truth, would-be critics would hold back statements they believe and that are in fact true, from doubt whether they could prove them in court or fear of the expense of trying.16 Moving the burden to the plaintiff removes that deterrent at its source, since a critic whose statement is true faces an official who cannot show it false. The second half conditions liability on the speaker's state of mind. Erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and it must be protected if expression is to have the breathing space it needs to survive.17 A knowing or reckless falsehood adds nothing to good-faith public debate, so it can remain actionable.18 The majority's protection is therefore qualified. Three concurring Justices, Black, Douglas, and Goldberg, would have gone further, and Justice Black described the privilege he favored as an “absolute, unconditional privilege to criticize official conduct despite the harm which may flow from excesses and abuses.”19 The speaker who knows better stays answerable under the majority's rule.
The advertisement in Sullivan shows how much work the state-of-mind condition does. It contained real errors: it said the police had “ringed” the campus in connection with the State Capitol demonstration when they had only been deployed near it, and it said Dr. King had been arrested seven times when he had been arrested four.20 Under Alabama's rule, once the statements were libelous per se, the defendant's only answer on the facts was to prove them true in every particular, and general damages were presumed.21 Under the federal rule those errors were only a first step, because an official recovers only by proving falsity and actual malice with clear and convincing evidence.22 The record showed that the Times ran the advertisement without checking it against the news stories in its own files. The presence of those stories in the files did not establish that the Times “knew” the advertisement was false, because the required state of mind had to be brought home to the people responsible for publishing it, and those people relied on the good reputation of many of the sponsors.23 The Court held that this proof lacked the convincing clarity the constitutional standard demands.24 The failure to check showed at most negligence in failing to discover the misstatements, and negligence does not amount to the recklessness that actual malice requires.25 The individual petitioners whose names appeared on the advertisement fared no better: even assuming they authorized the use of their names, nothing showed that they were aware of any erroneous statement or reckless in that regard.26 Falsity, reputational harm, and a careless publisher together did not add up to liability.
A second ground on which the Court found the evidence deficient marks the outer edge of the rule. The advertisement never named Sullivan or described his position, and although its statements might be taken as referring to the police, they did not on their face make even an oblique reference to him as an individual.27 Sullivan relied on the words of the advertisement and the testimony of six witnesses to connect it to himself, and the connection depended on his position as the commissioner in charge of the police. Alabama's courts had treated criticism of a city department as criticism of the commissioner who controls it. The Court held that such a proposition may not constitutionally be used to establish that an otherwise impersonal attack on governmental operations was a libel of the official responsible for those operations.28 Because the proposition was the only thing relied on, and nothing else tied the statements to Sullivan, the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to show that they referred to him. Otherwise criticism of any agency would amount to libel of whoever runs it.
The holding settles what cannot supply the connection between an impersonal attack and an official: a supervisory title. A frequent exam error is to treat a false, damaging statement about a department as the director's own claim and go straight to actual malice, when the first question is whether the statement points to the plaintiff individually. Only after that threshold is met does the analysis turn to the four steps above.
The Sullivan standard follows the plaintiff and the speech, not the name of the tort. In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, a well-known televangelist sued over a particularly nasty parody, and the underlying tort was intentional infliction of emotional distress rather than defamation. The Sullivan standard still applied, and recovery could be premised only on the plaintiff's proof of falsity and actual malice.29 A later section takes up the parody itself.
Who Is a Public Official
Section 580A attaches the actual malice requirement to a public official but never says who counts as one.31 Sullivan left the question open. The plaintiff there was an elected city commissioner in charge of the police department, and the Court expressly declined to decide how far down into the lower ranks of government employees the designation extends, or where the boundaries of “official conduct” lie.32 Every later claim by someone on a government payroll therefore begins with a status question. The answer decides whether the plaintiff must prove that the publisher knew the statement was false or recklessly disregarded its falsity, or need prove only fault, usually negligence.33
The Court answered the open question in Rosenblatt v. Baer, which involved comments about the supervisor of a county recreation area. Whether a plaintiff is a public official, it held, is a question of federal law, not state law.34 The designation applies, the Court said, at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, “substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.”35 The position must also carry such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of whoever holds it, beyond the general public interest in the performance of all government employees.36 Two features of that formulation matter. Because the test reaches positions that appear to carry substantial responsibility, a position's visible power counts alongside its formal powers. And because the Court described the group it named as a minimum, positions it has not yet considered can still qualify.
The test follows control over public affairs rather than job title because of why Sullivan exists. The rule shelters critics of those who run government, since citizens need room to discuss how public power is used and a critic forced to guarantee every factual detail will hold back true criticism along with false. That need tracks the power a position confers. A person with real authority over public affairs draws exactly the criticism the rule protects, whatever the person's rank on a civil-service chart, while a person whose job carries no such authority gives the public no comparable reason to speak.
Federal law, not a state's own label for the job, controls the classification, so a state definition of “official” for other purposes does not decide the question.40
Some plaintiffs qualify without difficulty. An elected official, like the commissioner in Sullivan, does. So does a candidate: in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, a newspaper column called a senatorial candidate a “former small-time bootlegger,” and the Court held that publications about candidates receive at least as much protection as those about occupants of public office.41 A former officeholder remains covered for statements about conduct in office, unless the person is so far removed from the old position of authority that comment on how the duties were performed no longer carries the interest that justifies the rule.42 The county recreation-area supervisor in Rosenblatt shows that the question concerns the importance of the position rather than election to it.
Beyond those cases the boundary blurs. Rosenblatt spoke of the hierarchy of government employees with substantial responsibility, which implies that not every government employee is an official.43 Justice Douglas asked pointedly in Rosenblatt whether a night watchman would count, and he suggested that the content of the charge mattered more than the plaintiff's status.44 The lower courts have filled the gap unevenly. The largest division concerns public school teachers without a supervisory position. A teacher has considerable discretion and power over students' lives, and the public scrutinizes teachers' conduct, but teachers do not administer laws and directives with which individuals and businesses must comply, and a classroom teacher's freedom to decide what and how to teach is limited by control from above.45 Courts also divide over persons and businesses performing services under government contracts, a question that depends heavily on the facts.46 In McGuire v. Bowlin, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a public high school girls' basketball coach, accused in parents' complaints of swearing at players, touching them inappropriately, and flirting with them, was not a public official.47 The defensible way to resolve a borderline plaintiff is to argue from the test's own two considerations, the position's real or apparent control over public affairs and the public's independent interest in it, rather than from a memorized list of titles.
A tempting argument treats any plaintiff who has touched a public event as an official, and the Court rejected it in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. The plaintiff there was an attorney who had served briefly on housing committees appointed by the mayor of Chicago but had never held a remunerative government position. The publisher argued that his appearance at a coroner's inquest made him a “de facto public official.” The Court answered that its cases recognize no such concept and that the suggestion would sweep all lawyers under the Sullivan rule as officers of the court, distorting the category beyond recognition.48 The Court examined the same lawyer as a possible public figure and found the label unmet on the facts: he played a minimal role at the inquest, and his participation related solely to his representation of a private client.49 A plaintiff who fits neither category is a private person and falls under the lower tier described above.50 The same reasoning explains why a court-appointed bankruptcy trustee was held not to be a public official. The trustee was neither elected nor appointed to a government position and did not exercise substantial control over the conduct of governmental affairs, even though trustees are an integral part of the judicial process.51
Status settles only half of the question, because § 580A confines the heightened standard to statements about the official's conduct, fitness, or role in that capacity.52 The courts read that limit generously: the standard reaches anything that might touch on an official's fitness for office, a formula drawn from Garrison v. Louisiana.53 In Monitor Patriot the jury found for the candidate on the ground that the bootlegging charge belonged to his private life, and the Court reversed, holding that a charge of criminal conduct, no matter how remote in time or place, is never irrelevant to an official's or a candidate's fitness for office.54 A narrower nexus would force critics to guess, at their own risk, which charges a court would later call private, and that guess is the very deterrent Sullivan was meant to remove. Section 580B leaves a public official under the negligence standard only for a purely private matter that does not affect conduct, fitness, or role, which leaves little room.55 Dropping to the negligence standard because an official's lapse happened long ago or in private life is the characteristic misstep.
Meaning of Actual Malice
Section 580A frames the fault a public official or public figure must prove as two alternative mental states: the publisher either knows that the statement is false and that it defames the plaintiff, or acts in reckless disregard of those matters.57 Those clauses restate what Sullivan called actual malice. Under Sullivan, malice means deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for whether the fact asserted is true or false.58 The phrase is a term of art, a label the Court attached to one particular state of mind, and its everyday sense of spite misdescribes it. The usual error is to answer an actual malice question by asking whether the publisher disliked the plaintiff, when the constitutional focus is what the publisher believed about the truth.59
The first alternative, knowledge, is the clearest case. A publisher who states a fact aware that it is false, and aware that it injures the plaintiff's reputation, has published the kind of falsehood the Constitution leaves open to liability, and the Court reiterated that only the knowing or reckless falsehood may be sanctioned.60 The second alternative, reckless disregard, reaches the publisher who lacks certainty yet publishes despite serious doubts. A plaintiff needs only one of the two, and recklessness is the fallback when the plaintiff cannot prove actual knowledge.
The constitutional standard has nothing to do with spite. Actual malice does not carry malice's usual tort meaning, a motive of ill will, spite, or desire to cause harm; it means knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth or falsity.61 A defendant therefore cannot be held liable to a public official or public figure on proof that the statement was published out of ill will or a desire to cause harm.62 Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. observed that the phrase can confuse as well as enlighten and recommended that jury instructions refer to publication with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard as to truth or falsity instead.63 The Court has also rejected instructions that allowed liability on an intent to inflict harm without requiring that the harm be inflicted through falsehood, as in Henry v. Collins, and has distinguished the Sullivan test from malice in the traditional sense of ill will, as in Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks.64
Spite describes the speaker's attitude toward the plaintiff, and critics of public officials often dislike the people they criticize. If hostility could carry liability, a jury could punish a critic for the intensity of the criticism even though the critic believed every word, and the chill Sullivan set out to remove would return. Focusing on the speaker's attitude toward the truth separates the liar from the honest but hostile critic. One case can still use the word in both senses: a court may apply the reckless-disregard meaning to decide whether an official may recover compensatory damages at all, and a spite-based meaning when state law tests whether punitive damages are available.65
Recklessness has a precise meaning that departs from ordinary negligence. In St. Amant v. Thompson, the Court explained that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent person would have published, or would have investigated before publishing.66 There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the publication, and publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.67 A plaintiff who shows only that a careful publisher would have investigated has shown negligence, not recklessness.68 Garrison v. Louisiana supplied a companion phrase, a high degree of awareness of probable falsity, which the Court treats as the same subjective awareness.69
The standard is subjective: it asks what this publisher actually believed, not what a careful publisher would have done.70 The reason traces to the chill Sullivan targeted. An objective negligence test would force every critic of official conduct to predict how a jury will later judge a careful newsroom's habits, and that uncertainty would drive out true criticism along with false.
Because the test turns on awareness of falsity, circumstances that feel like proof of bad faith will not carry the plaintiff's burden when offered alone:
- Failure to investigate before publishing, even where a prudent publisher would have investigated.
- Reliance on a single source whom the publisher did not verify.
- Ill will toward the plaintiff.
- A profit motive, such as the hope of increasing circulation.
- An extreme departure from the professional standards of responsible publishers.
Each has been held insufficient on its own, because none shows what the publisher actually believed about the truth.71 Wanting to sell newspapers is common to every publisher and says nothing about whether this one believed the story. Negligence, however serious, belongs on the same side of the line. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, five Justices declined to let a public figure recover on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct, in essence gross negligence.72
A defendant cannot guarantee a favorable verdict by testifying that the publication was believed to be true, since the factfinder decides whether it was in fact made in good faith. Professions of good faith will be unlikely to persuade where the story was fabricated, where it rests wholly on an unverified anonymous telephone call, where its allegations are so inherently improbable that only a reckless person would circulate them, or where the publisher had obvious reasons to doubt the informant or the accuracy of the informant's reports.73 Those examples fit with the rule that failure to investigate is not itself reckless, because the failure matters only when it is a symptom of doubt. Actual malice might also be found when the defendant deliberately decided not to acquire knowledge of facts that might confirm the falsity of what it was about to publish, a principle called purposeful avoidance of the truth.74 Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton shows circumstantial proof at work. Before the story ran, the charges against the plaintiff had been denied by the plaintiff and five other witnesses. The most serious charge was highly improbable and inconsistent with the fact that the plaintiff had arranged a lie detector test for a witness and then delivered the tapes to the police. The newspaper knew all of this before publication.75
Sullivan itself marks the line. The Times published an advertisement containing errors without checking it against its own files, and the Court held that proof insufficient, because carelessness in failing to discover the errors does not show knowledge or serious doubt.76
The two papers publish the same false accusation and may feel the same hostility toward the candidate, so the only difference that matters is what each editor actually knew or doubted. Careless, hostile, and profit-minded publishing, standing alone, leaves a public official or public figure short of liability under both clauses of § 580A.
Proof and Appellate Review
The Sullivan rule works through procedure as much as through the definition of actual malice, and the opinion itself shows how. The Court rejected Alabama's presumption of malice and required proof from the plaintiff.78 It then examined the proof of actual malice and concluded that it lacked the “convincing clarity” the constitutional standard demands.79 Four procedural consequences follow from that opinion and the decisions built on it. The plaintiff carries the burden on falsity and on actual malice, that burden is heavy, the plaintiff may look into the editorial process to meet it, and appellate judges examine the record independently instead of deferring to the jury.
At common law falsity was presumed and truth was the defendant's defense, so the constitutional rule reverses the allocation. The plaintiff-official must prove that the statement was false and must also prove actual malice, each by clear and convincing evidence, a standard that sits above a preponderance and below proof beyond a reasonable doubt.80 Some authorities nevertheless treat the burden on falsity as a mere preponderance, and Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps carried the plaintiff's burden on falsity into some suits by private persons, a development later sections take up.81
The reason for a burden above the usual one lies in what an error costs. An ordinary civil case uses a preponderance standard because a mistaken verdict for the plaintiff and a mistaken verdict for the defendant are treated as roughly equally regrettable. A mistaken verdict against a speaker costs more, because it tells every other critic that an honest statement can end in a judgment, and critics then withhold true criticism along with false. A heavier burden moves the risk of a close call onto the plaintiff, so evidence that is no more than evenly balanced on knowledge or recklessness loses. The concurring Justices in Sullivan raised a second worry: actual malice, especially its recklessness element, is an elusive, abstract concept, hard to prove and hard to disprove, and local juries might let their views of the speaker decide it.82 The higher burden answers part of that worry at trial, and independent appellate review, discussed below, answers the rest.
Because actual malice is a state of mind, the plaintiff needs some way to learn what the publisher was thinking, and Herbert v. Lando supplies it. The Court recognized no First Amendment privilege barring a libel plaintiff from inquiring into the editorial process, so the plaintiff may depose editors and reporters about what they believed and why they decided as they did.83 Because intent is the element in dispute, the plaintiff may ask about the ultimate fact directly instead of relying only on inferences from objective circumstances.84 There is likewise no privilege for conversations among editors, and the plaintiff need not first prove a prima facie case of falsity before asking.85 A partial dissent would have protected predecisional communication among editors by an editorial privilege.86 Even that privilege would have been qualified: it would yield if a public-figure plaintiff demonstrated to a trial judge's prima facie satisfaction that the publication is a defamatory falsehood.87
Discovery gives the plaintiff access to the newsroom, and summary judgment, a pretrial ruling that ends a case when no genuine factual dispute requires a jury, then tests what the plaintiff found. In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., the Court held that the judge's inquiry follows the standard of proof at trial: where the clear-and-convincing requirement of Sullivan applies, the question is whether the evidence is such that a jury applying that standard could reasonably find for either the plaintiff or the defendant.88 The plaintiff therefore must offer more than a scintilla of evidence; the issue is whether a reasonable jury might find actual malice shown with convincing clarity.89 The defendant bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of fact exists, but a plaintiff who wants to survive the motion must present affirmative evidence that would support a jury verdict, even where the evidence is likely in the defendant's possession, so long as the plaintiff had a full opportunity to conduct discovery. Resting on the denials in the pleadings is not enough.90 The early screen matters because the cost of a full trial itself deters speech.
The first commissioner offered evidence about what the editor believed, which is the element in dispute. The second offered hostility and a profit motive, and neither shows doubt about the truth, since neither ill will nor the hope of higher circulation proves a knowing or reckless falsehood.91
A verdict that survives trial faces a form of appellate review that sets these cases apart. Actual malice marks the boundary between speech the Constitution protects and speech a state may punish, so the finding is treated as a constitutional fact, meaning a fact whose determination fixes the limit of constitutional protection and is therefore reviewed independently. Under Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, appellate judges must “exercise independent judgment and determine whether the record establishes actual malice with convincing clarity.”92 If each jury's finding were final, juries in different places would draw the line between protected and unprotected criticism in different places, and a critic could never know in advance where it fell. The practical effect has been large: research in the 1980s found that fewer than a third of libel verdicts against media defendants survived independent appellate review.93
The independence has a limit. The reviewing court must consider the factual record in full and examine for itself the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they were made, but credibility determinations, meaning the jury's choices about which witnesses to believe, are reviewed only for clear error because the trier of fact had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor.94 Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton shows the two layers working together. The jury's findings resolved the credibility disputes in the plaintiff's favor, and the Supreme Court considered those findings alongside the undisputed evidence, including the six denials and the highly improbable central charge. When it did, the conclusion that the newspaper acted with actual malice inexorably followed.95
Review of that kind does not let an appellate court substitute its own reading of a witness's demeanor for the jury's. It does let the court decide, as a matter of law, whether the facts the jury must have found add up to a high degree of awareness of probable falsity.96 The usual exam errors are to treat independent review as a fresh weighing of credibility, which the clearly erroneous standard forbids, and to equate convincing clarity with proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a level the standard sits below.