Also known as: authorities to consent · power to consent · consent authority
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
The legal power of a third party to grant valid consent to an interference with another's property or privacy rights. This power exists when the third party shares common authority over the premises or chattel or otherwise holds the ability to permit the interference. Consent from such a person binds the owner or occupant even if the owner later objects.
Kirk, a utility technician, entered Dominic's fenced backyard after Regina, the next-door neighbor, assured him that Dominic was away and entry was fine. Regina had no access rights or control over Dominic's property. Dominic later sued Kirk for trespass. The court held Kirk liable because Regina lacked authority to consent on Dominic's behalf.
Detectives investigating fraud arrived at an apartment shared by Vernon and Queen. Queen, who paid half the rent and held a key, invited the officers inside and unlocked a home office door using a spare key from a common drawer. Vernon later moved to suppress evidence seized from the office. The court ruled Queen's common authority over the premises made her consent effective against Vernon.
In February 1971, William Matlock was indicted for robbing a federally insured bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113. A week later he filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from a home in Pardeeville, Wisconsin, where he had been living. Suppression hearings followed in the District Court. On November 12, 1970, Matlock was arrested in the yard in front of the home leased by Mr. and Mrs. Marshall. Living in the home were Mrs. Marshall, several of her children including her daughter Gayle Graff, Graff's three-year-old son, and Matlock. Three arresting officers went to the door, were admitted by Graff, told her they were looking for money and a gun, and asked if they could search the house. Graff consented voluntarily to the search of the house, including the east bedroom on the second floor which she said was jointly occupied by Matlock and herself. The east bedroom was searched and $4,995 in cash was found in a diaper bag in the only closet in the room. Graff made statements to the officers that she and Matlock occupied the east bedroom together, shared the dresser, and had slept together regularly in the room including the early morning of November 12. Other evidence showed Matlock and Graff had lived together in a one-bedroom apartment in Florida from April to August 1970, lived at the Marshall home from August to November 12, 1970, were seen going up or down stairs together, and that the east bedroom contained evidence it was lived in by a man and a woman. At the suppression hearings the District Court excluded as inadmissible hearsay Graff's out-of-court statements about joint occupancy as well as statements by both Graff and Matlock that they were husband and wife. The court concluded the remaining evidence was insufficient to prove to a reasonable certainty that Graff and Matlock were living together in the east bedroom at the time of the search. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court judgment in all respects. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseAgents tracking a beeper inside a can obtained consent from a commercial storage facility manager to enter the locker area. The manager had no authority over the specific locker rented by the defendants. The court held that the manager's consent did not validate the search of the defendants' locker.
In 1980 Drug Enforcement Administration agents learned that respondents James Karo, Richard Horton, and William Harley had ordered fifty gallons of ether from Government informant Carl Muehlenweg. With Muehlenweg's consent, agents substituted a can containing a beeper for one in the shipment and had all ten cans painted uniformly. Karo picked up the ether on September 20, 1980. Agents used both visual surveillance and beeper signals to track the can as it moved among residences in Albuquerque including Karo's house, Horton's house, and Horton's father's house. The signal later led agents to a commercial storage facility. There agents obtained a subpoena for rental records identifying locker 143 rented by Horton. Agents confirmed the can's presence through the beeper and the odor of ether. The can was subsequently moved to a second storage facility whose locker 15 was rented by Horton and Harley under an alias. On February 6, 1981, agents observed via closed-circuit video the removal of the cans from the second locker. The cans were loaded onto Horton's pickup truck. The truck traveled public highways to a house in Taos rented by Horton, Harley, and Michael Steele. Using the beeper, agents determined that the can remained inside the Taos house even after the truck departed. On February 7, the beeper revealed that the ether can was still on the premises. Agents noticed that the windows of the house were wide open on a cold windy day. On February 8, agents obtained a warrant to search the Taos residence based in part on beeper information. The warrant was executed on February 10, 1981. Horton, Harley, Steele, and Evan Roth were arrested. Cocaine and laboratory equipment were seized. Respondents were indicted under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The District Court granted their pretrial suppression motion. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the suppression order as to most respondents. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View casePolice sought to search a home for drug evidence. Janet Randolph consented, but her husband Scott Randolph, who was present, expressly refused. Officers searched anyway based on Janet's consent and found incriminating items. The court suppressed the evidence because one occupant's refusal overrides the other's consent when both are present.
In late May 2001, respondent Scott Randolph and his wife Janet separated when Janet left their marital residence in Americus, Georgia, and went to stay with her parents in Canada, taking their son and some belongings. In July 2001, Janet returned to the Americus house with the child. On the morning of July 6, 2001, Janet complained to the police that after a domestic dispute her husband had taken their son away, and when officers reached the house she told them that her husband was a cocaine user whose habit had caused financial troubles. Shortly after the police arrived, Scott Randolph returned and explained that he had removed the child to a neighbor's house out of concern that his wife might take the boy out of the country again; he denied cocaine use, and countered that it was in fact his wife who abused drugs and alcohol. One of the officers asked Scott Randolph for permission to search the house, which he unequivocally refused. The sergeant then turned to Janet Randolph for consent to search, which she readily gave. She led the officer upstairs to a bedroom that she identified as Scott's, where the sergeant noticed a section of a drinking straw with a powdery residue he suspected was cocaine. Sergeant Murray left to get an evidence bag and called the district attorney's office, which instructed him to stop the search and apply for a warrant. When he returned, Janet Randolph withdrew her consent. The police took the straw to the police station along with the Randolphs. After obtaining a search warrant, they returned and seized further evidence of drug use, leading to Scott Randolph's indictment for possession of cocaine. He moved to suppress the evidence as the product of a warrantless search unauthorized by his wife's consent over his express refusal. The trial court denied the motion. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View casePolice impounded a vehicle and conducted a routine inventory search without a warrant. The owner had not consented and was not present. The court upheld the search as reasonable under standardized procedures even without owner consent.
On December 10, 1973, a Vermillion, South Dakota police officer observed respondent Opperman's unoccupied vehicle illegally parked in a restricted downtown area between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m. The officer issued an overtime parking ticket and placed it on the windshield, warning that vehicles in violation could be towed. Later that morning, another officer issued a second ticket for the continuing violation, and the circumstances were reported to police headquarters. After inspection, the vehicle was towed to the city impound lot. From outside the car, an officer observed a watch on the dashboard and other personal property on the back seat and floorboard. The car door was unlocked, and using a standard inventory form pursuant to standard police procedures, the officer inventoried the contents, including the unlocked glove compartment, where marijuana was found in a plastic bag. All items were removed to the police department for safekeeping. Respondent Opperman was arrested on charges of possession of marijuana. His motion to suppress the evidence from the inventory search was denied. He was convicted after a jury trial and sentenced to a fine of $100 and 14 days in jail. The Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment.
View caseOfficers obtained consent from Mrs. Coolidge to search the family home and garage while her husband was absent. She had full access and control over the premises as a co-occupant. The court found her consent valid and binding on her husband.
In January 1964, fourteen-year-old Pamela Mason disappeared from her home in Manchester, New Hampshire, during a heavy snowstorm after receiving a telephone call about a babysitting job. Her body was discovered eight days later beside a major highway, prompting a massive police investigation. On January 28, officers visited Edward Coolidge at his home after learning he had been absent on the night of the disappearance. Coolidge produced three guns for inspection and agreed to take a lie-detector test. On February 2, while Coolidge was at the police station undergoing the test, two plainclothes officers arrived at his house and spoke with his wife. Mrs. Coolidge provided four guns belonging to her husband and some clothing she believed he might have worn on the night in question. Coolidge was held overnight on an unrelated charge but released the next day. Over the following two and a half weeks, the State accumulated evidence implicating Coolidge. On February 19, the results of the investigation were presented at a meeting between the police officers working on the case and the State Attorney General, who had personally taken charge of all police activities relating to the murder, and was later to serve as chief prosecutor at the trial. Coolidge was arrested at his home that day. His 1951 Pontiac automobile parked in the driveway was seized and towed to the police station two and a half hours later. The Pontiac was searched and vacuumed on February 21, again in January 1965, and a third time in April 1965. At Coolidge's subsequent jury trial for murder, vacuum sweepings from the car were introduced into evidence. One of the guns taken from the home was also introduced. Vacuum sweepings from the clothing were introduced into evidence. The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the conviction after upholding the admissibility of the evidence, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseA co-occupant has authority when the person has common authority over the premises through mutual use or joint access and control. Courts assess whether the consenting party could permit the search in their own right. Apparent authority also suffices if officers reasonably believe the person has such power.
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Yes. When a physically present co-occupant expressly refuses consent, that refusal controls and invalidates the search even if another occupant consents. The refusal demonstrates that the search is not based on mutual agreement among those with authority.
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No. Only the possessor or someone with actual or apparent authority to consent on the possessor's behalf may grant effective consent. A neighbor or other unrelated person lacks this power, so their consent does not protect an entrant from trespass liability.
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No. A parent with access to a room may consent to a search of the room itself but lacks authority over locked containers under the child's exclusive control. The container's separate privacy interest prevents the parent's consent from extending to it.
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