Also known as:certiorando · certiorari · writ of certiorari
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A writ ordering a sheriff to certify a fact.
See Our Sources· 8 primary sources
Statutes
How its tested
Common Examples
6
Sheriff Certification in Appeal
Denise Donovan appealed a district court judgment to the court of appeals. The record contained a minor clerical error in the transcript. The court examined the full record and determined the error did not affect substantial rights, so it affirmed the judgment after the sheriff certified the underlying fact via the writ.
Agency Rulemaking Review
Damian Decker challenged an agency rule in federal court. The court of appeals upheld the rule under deferential standards. A writ de certiorando issued to the sheriff to certify the administrative record before further proceedings.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984)
In 1967 the Atomic Energy Commission granted Vermont Yankee a construction permit for a nuclear power plant in Vernon, Vermont, after the required adjudicatory hearing and reviews. Vermont Yankee later applied for an operating license; NRDC intervened and objected to exclusion of fuel-reprocessing and waste-disposal impacts from the hearing. In November 1972 the Commission opened a separate rulemaking proceeding on those fuel-cycle issues, noticed two alternative approaches based on its Environmental Survey, and conducted a February 1973 hearing at which more than forty participants submitted comments but no discovery or cross-examination occurred. In April 1974 the Commission adopted a rule assigning numerical values to fuel-cycle impacts and applied it prospectively.
In January 1969 Consumers Power applied for permits to build two nuclear reactors in Midland, Michigan. After staff and ACRS review, Saginaw and Mapleton intervened and raised 119 environmental contentions, including seventeen on energy conservation. The Licensing Board held hearings on radiological issues, the staff issued a final environmental impact statement in March 1972, and further hearings occurred in May and June 1972; Saginaw declined to participate in the later hearings or submit proposed findings. The Licensing Board granted the construction permit, the Appeal Board affirmed, and the Commission declined further review. In November 1973 the Commission ruled in another case that energy-conservation evidence meeting threshold tests could be considered, but it later refused Saginaw's motion to reopen the Consumers Power record.
NRDC appealed the Vermont Yankee license and rule to the D.C. Circuit; Saginaw and others appealed the Consumers Power permit. In 1976 the Court of Appeals remanded both matters, holding the fuel-cycle rulemaking procedures inadequate, the Consumers Power environmental impact statement defective for omitting energy conservation, and the ACRS report insufficiently explained. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1977.
The Commission is the successor agency to the Atomic Energy Commission under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. All licensing proceedings followed the two-stage process of construction permit followed by operating license under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, with NEPA environmental reviews added after 1969.
David Dawson sued in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. The defendant moved to dismiss for improper service. The court applied federal procedural rules after the sheriff certified service facts through the writ.
Hanna v. Plumer380 U.S. 460 (1965)
On February 6, 1963, petitioner, a citizen of Ohio, filed her complaint in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts, claiming damages in excess of $10,000 for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident in South Carolina, allegedly caused by the negligence of one Louise Plumer Osgood, a Massachusetts citizen deceased at the time of the filing of the complaint. Respondent, Mrs. Osgood's executor and also a Massachusetts citizen, was named as defendant.
On February 8, service was made by leaving copies of the summons and the complaint with respondent's wife at his residence, concededly in compliance with Rule 4 (d) (1). Respondent filed his answer on February 26, alleging, inter alia, that the action could not be maintained because it had been brought contrary to and in violation of the provisions of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 197, Section 9.
On October 17, 1963, the District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the threat to the goal of uniformity of federal procedure posed by the decision below.
Diego Duarte faced deportation after a legislative veto. He petitioned for review. The court required certification of the legislative record via writ before addressing the separation of powers claim.
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Jagdish Rai Chadha462 U.S. 919, 954 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2785 n. 16, 77 L.Ed.2d 317
In 1966 Jagdish Rai Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya who held a British passport, was lawfully admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa that expired on June 30, 1972. In October 1973, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service informed Chadha that he had remained longer than permitted and was therefore deportable. Chadha conceded deportability but applied for suspension under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.
On June 25, 1974, an Immigration Judge acting on behalf of the Attorney General suspended Chadha's deportation and adjusted his status to permanent resident after finding that he satisfied the statutory criteria of seven years' continuous presence, good moral character, and extreme hardship. A report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress as required by the Act.
On December 16, 1975, the House of Representatives passed a resolution disapproving the suspension for Chadha and five other aliens on the ground that they did not meet the statutory requirements, particularly as to hardship.
Pursuant to the House resolution, the Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings. Chadha moved to terminate them on constitutional grounds, but the Immigration Judge ruled that he lacked authority to declare the resolution unconstitutional and ordered Chadha deported. Chadha appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which likewise held that it had no authority to pass on the constitutionality of the resolution and dismissed the appeal.
Chadha then filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigration and Naturalization Service appeared and urged the court to hold the House resolution unconstitutional. After inviting briefs from the Senate and House as amici curiae, the Court of Appeals held the resolution unconstitutional because it was a legislative act that failed to satisfy the requirements of Article I, sections 1 and 7, and set aside the deportation order.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the consolidated cases to address the constitutional question.
Destiny Davis published an article about a public official. The official sued for libel. The court ordered the sheriff to certify publication facts before applying actual malice standards to the record.
New York Times v. Sullivan376 U.S. 254 (1964)
L. B. Sullivan is one of three elected Commissioners of the City of Montgomery, Alabama. He has duties including supervision of the Police Department. He brought this civil libel action against the New York Times Company and four individual petitioners who were Alabama clergymen. The suit sought $500,000 in damages based on a full-page advertisement entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices" that appeared in the New York Times on March 29, 1960. A jury in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County awarded Sullivan the full amount claimed against all petitioners. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the judgment.
The advertisement was signed by the Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South. It described widespread non-violent demonstrations by Southern Negro students and an unprecedented wave of terror against them. Two paragraphs formed the basis of the claim. One alleged that after students sang on the State Capitol steps their leaders were expelled, truckloads of police ringed the Alabama State College Campus, and the dining hall was padlocked to starve students into submission. The other stated that Southern violators had bombed Dr. King's home, assaulted him, arrested him seven times, and charged him with perjury. The text appeared over the names of 64 persons. It was endorsed by the individual petitioners among others.
Sullivan contended that the references to police referred to him in his supervisory capacity. Six Montgomery residents testified that they read the statements as referring to him. However, several statements were inaccurate. The students sang the National Anthem rather than "My Country, 'Tis of Thee." The expulsions were for a different incident. The dining hall was not padlocked. Dr. King had been arrested only four times. The bombings occurred before Sullivan's tenure with police efforts to apprehend the perpetrators.
The Times published the advertisement for approximately $4800. It acted upon an order from a New York advertising agency. The agency provided a letter from A. Philip Randolph certifying authorization. The Times made no efforts to confirm its accuracy against its own news files.
Sullivan served written demands for retraction on the petitioners pursuant to Alabama law. None of the individual petitioners responded as they had not authorized use of their names. The Times did not retract. It published a retraction only upon demand by Governor John Patterson after learning more facts. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the separate petitions of the individual petitioners and the Times due to the importance of the constitutional issues involved.
Danielle Dixon purchased property subject to a racial covenant. Neighbors sought enforcement. The court directed certification of the covenant's recording through the writ to determine its validity.
Shelley v. Kraemer334 U.S. 1 (1948)
In February 1911, thirty out of thirty-nine owners of property fronting both sides of Labadie Avenue between Taylor Avenue and Cora Avenue in St. Louis signed a recorded agreement. The agreement restricted the use and occupancy of the properties for fifty years to persons of the Caucasian race. It excluded occupancy by people of the Negro or Mongolian race.
The district included fifty-seven parcels of land. The signers held title to forty-seven parcels. At the time, five parcels were owned by Negroes, with one occupied by Negro families since 1882.
On August 11, 1945, the Shelley petitioners, who are Negroes, purchased one parcel from Fitzgerald by warranty deed for valuable consideration without knowledge of the restriction. On October 9, 1945, respondents sued in the Circuit Court of St. Louis to restrain the Shelleys and divest title. The trial court denied relief, but the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and directed enforcement.
In June 1934, Ferguson and his wife executed a contract restricting their Detroit property to Caucasian occupancy. The restriction was effective only if at least eighty percent of the lots in the block were subjected to similar restrictions. The restrictions were to remain in effect until January 1, 1960. Similar agreements covered eighty percent of the lots.
By deed dated November 30, 1944, the McGhee petitioners, who were Negroes, acquired and occupied the Detroit property. On January 30, 1945, respondents sued in Wayne County Circuit Court. The court ordered them to move within ninety days and enjoined future occupancy. The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed.
Petitioners claimed that judicial enforcement violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
What does the writ de certiorando require the sheriff to do?
The writ directs the sheriff to certify a specific fact for the court record.
How does de certiorando differ from a writ of certiorari?
De certiorando orders certification of a discrete fact by the sheriff while certiorari seeks review of a lower court decision by a higher court.
When might a court issue a writ de certiorando in an appeal?
A court may issue the writ when it needs official confirmation of a fact from the sheriff to complete the record before deciding whether an error affected substantial rights.
410 U.S. 113 (1973)
…(1971). III It might have been preferable if the defendant, pursuant to our Rule 20, had presented to us a petition for certiorari before judgment in the Court of Appeals with respect to the granting of the plaintiffs' prayer for declaratory relief. Our decisions in Mitchell v. Donovan , 398 U. S. 427 (1970), and…