defense of entrapment

Defendant Sorrells was indicted on two counts for possessing and selling one-half gallon of whiskey on July 13, 1930, in violation of the National Prohibition Act. He pleaded not guilty and at trial relied on the defense of entrapment. Prohibition agent Martin visited Sorrells' home near Canton, North Carolina, on Sunday, July 13, 1930, accompanied by three local residents who knew Sorrells. Posing as an ex-service man and furniture dealer from Charlotte, Martin asked Sorrells multiple times to obtain liquor, eventually succeeding after invoking their shared World War experiences in the 30th Division; Sorrells returned with a half gallon for which Martin paid five dollars. Sorrells presented testimony from the three companions corroborating the repeated requests and his initial refusals, along with evidence of his steady employment since March 1924 and good character from multiple neighbors. The government offered rebuttal testimony that Sorrells had a reputation as a rum-runner, but introduced no evidence of any prior liquor transactions by him. The trial court denied a motion for directed verdict, refused to submit the entrapment issue to the jury, and ruled as a matter of law that there was no entrapment. Following a guilty verdict, the court sentenced Sorrells to eighteen months' imprisonment, and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury upon the issue of entrapment.

The petitioner was arrested in Chicago, Illinois, on the morning of January 16, 1964, for possession of narcotics. The Chicago police officers who made the arrest found a package containing heroin on his person and he was indicted for its unlawful possession. Prior to trial he filed a motion to suppress the heroin as evidence against him, claiming that the police had acquired it in an unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the petitioner testified that up until a half hour before he was arrested he had been at "a friend's house" about a block away, that after leaving the friend's house he had "walked with a lady from 48th to 48th and South Park," and that, as he approached 49th Street and Calumet Avenue, "[t]he Officers stopped me going through the alley." "The officers," he said, "did not show me a search warrant for my person or an arrest warrant for my arrest." The petitioner did not identify the "friend" or the "lady," and neither of them appeared as a witness. The arresting officers, Jackson and Arnold, then testified about receiving information from a confidential informant that morning. The informant, whom the officers had known for one to two years and who had provided reliable information leading to multiple arrests and convictions, stated that the petitioner was selling narcotics and had them on his person near 47th and Calumet. The officers drove to the area, the informant pointed out the petitioner, and after observing him separate from a woman, meet briefly with a man, and then hurry between two buildings upon seeing the police car, the officers approached, informed him of the information, placed him in the vehicle, and searched him, finding the heroin in a cigarette package. When defense counsel asked for the informant's name and address on cross-examination, the prosecution objected and the court sustained the objections. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The petitioner was convicted based on the heroin evidence. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the claim regarding the suppression hearing.

In 1955, in the Northern District of Illinois, petitioner Albert Roviaro was indicted on two counts by a federal grand jury. The first count charged that on August 12, 1954, at Chicago, Illinois, he sold heroin to one “John Doe” in violation of 26 U. S. C. § 2554 (a). The second charged that on the same date and in the same city he did then and there fraudulently and knowingly receive, conceal, buy and facilitate the transportation and concealment after importation of heroin, knowing the same to be imported into the United States contrary to law, in violation of Section 174, Title 21, United States Code. Before trial, petitioner moved for a bill of particulars requesting, among other things, the name, address and occupation of “John Doe.” The Government objected on the ground that John Doe was an informer and that his identity was privileged. The motion was denied. Petitioner, who was represented by counsel, waived a jury and was tried by the District Court. On the night of August 12, 1954, federal narcotics agents Durham and Fields and Chicago police officers Bryson and Sims met at 75th Street and Prairie Avenue in Chicago with John Doe. Doe and his Cadillac car were searched and no narcotics were found. Bryson secreted himself in the trunk of Doe’s Cadillac. Doe then drove the Cadillac to 70th Place and St. Lawrence Avenue, followed by Durham in one government car and Field and Sims in another. After an hour’s wait, at about 11 o’clock, petitioner arrived in a Pontiac, accompanied by an unidentified man. Petitioner immediately entered Doe’s Cadillac, taking a front seat beside Doe. They then proceeded by a circuitous route to 74th Street near Champlain Avenue. Durham saw petitioner alight from the Cadillac about 100 feet away, walk a few feet to a nearby tree, pick up a small package, return to the open right front door of the Cadillac, make a motion as if depositing the package in the car, and then wave to Doe and walk away. Durham went immediately to the Cadillac and recovered a package from the floor. Meanwhile, Bryson, concealed in the trunk of the Cadillac, had heard a conversation between John Doe and petitioner. He heard petitioner greet John Doe and direct him where to drive. At one point, petitioner admonished him to pull over to the curb, cut the motor, and turn out the lights so as to lose a “tail.” He then told him to continue “further down.” Petitioner asked about money Doe owed him. He advised Doe that he had brought him “three pieces this time.” When Bryson heard Doe being ordered to stop the car, he raised the lid of the trunk slightly. After the car stopped, he saw petitioner walk to a tree, pick up a package, and return toward the car. He heard petitioner say, “Here it is,” and “I’ll call you in a couple of days.” A field test of the powder having indicated that it contained an opium derivative, the officers, at about 12:30 a. m., arrested petitioner at his home and took him, along with Doe, to Chicago police headquarters. There petitioner was confronted with Doe, who denied that he knew or had ever seen petitioner. Subsequent chemical analysis revealed that the powder contained heroin. Petitioner was found guilty on both counts and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and a fine of $5 on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to pass upon the propriety of the nondisclosure of the informer’s identity and to consider an alleged conflict with decisions from other courts of appeals.

In January 2003, petitioner Keshia Dixon purchased multiple firearms at two gun shows. During the purchases, she provided an incorrect address and falsely stated that she was not under indictment for a felony. Dixon was indicted and convicted on one count of receiving a firearm while under indictment in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(n). She was also convicted on eight counts of making false statements in connection with the acquisition of a firearm in violation of § 922(a)(6). At trial she admitted that she knew she was under indictment when she made the purchases and that she knew doing so was a crime. Her defense was that she acted under duress because her boyfriend threatened to kill her or hurt her daughters if she did not buy the guns for him. In her request for jury instructions on the duress defense, Dixon asked that she have the burden of production and that the Government then be required to disprove duress beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court, finding itself bound by Fifth Circuit precedent, denied the request. Instead, the court instructed the jury that Dixon had the burden of proof to establish the defense of duress by a preponderance of the evidence. After her conviction, the Court of Appeals rejected Dixon's contention that the instructions were erroneous. Given contrary treatment by other federal courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.