in litem

Respondent Jarius Piphus was a freshman at Chicago Vocational High School during the 1973-1974 school year. On January 23, 1974, during school hours, the school principal saw Piphus and another student standing outdoors on school property passing back and forth what the principal described as an irregularly shaped cigarette. The principal approached the students unnoticed and smelled what he believed was the strong odor of burning marihuana. He also saw Piphus try to pass a packet of cigarette papers to the other student. When the students became aware of the principal’s presence, they threw the cigarette into a nearby hedge. The principal took the students to the school’s disciplinary office and directed the assistant principal to impose the usual 20-day suspension for violation of the school rule against the use of drugs. Piphus was allowed to remain at school, although not in class, for the remainder of the school day while the assistant principal tried without success to reach his mother. A suspension notice was sent to Piphus’ mother, and a few days later two meetings were arranged among Piphus, his mother, his sister, school officials, and representatives from a legal aid clinic. The purpose of the meetings was not to determine whether Piphus had been smoking marihuana, but rather to explain the reasons for the suspension. Following an unfruitful exchange of views, Piphus and his mother as guardian ad litem filed suit against petitioners in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its jurisdictional counterpart 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Piphus was readmitted to school under a temporary restraining order after eight days of his suspension. Respondent Silas Brisco was in the sixth grade at Clara Barton Elementary School in Chicago during the 1973-1974 school year. On September 11, 1973, Brisco came to school wearing one small earring. The previous school year, the school principal had issued a rule against the wearing of earrings by male students because he believed that this practice denoted membership in street gangs and increased the likelihood that gang members would terrorize other students. Brisco was reminded of this rule, but he refused to remove the earring, asserting that it was a symbol of black pride, not of gang membership. The assistant principal talked to Brisco’s mother, advising her that her son would be suspended for 20 days if he did not remove the earring. Brisco’s mother supported her son’s position, and a 20-day suspension was imposed. Brisco and his mother as guardian ad litem filed suit in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief together with actual and punitive damages in the amount of $5,000. Brisco was readmitted to school during the pendency of proceedings for a preliminary injunction after 17 days of his suspension. Piphus’ and Brisco’s cases were consolidated for trial and submitted on stipulated records. The District Court held that both students had been suspended without procedural due process. The District Court also held that petitioners were not entitled to qualified immunity from damages under the second branch of Wood v. Strickland because they should have known that a lengthy suspension without any adjudicative hearing of any type would violate procedural due process. The District Court declined to award damages because plaintiffs put no evidence in the record to quantify their damages and the record is completely devoid of any evidence which could even form the basis of a speculative inference measuring the extent of their injuries. The court also stated that the students were entitled to declaratory relief and to deletion of the suspensions from their school records but for reasons that are not apparent the court failed to enter an order to that effect and instead simply dismissed the complaints. No finding was made as to whether respondents would have been suspended if they had received procedural due process. On respondents’ appeal the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. It first held that the District Court erred in not granting declaratory and injunctive relief. It also held that the District Court should have considered evidence submitted by respondents after judgment that tended to prove the pecuniary value of each day of school that they missed while suspended. The court said however that respondents would not be entitled to recover damages representing the value of missed school time if petitioners showed on remand that there was just cause for the suspensions and that therefore respondents would have been suspended even if a proper hearing had been held. Finally the Court of Appeals held that even if the District Court found on remand that respondents’ suspensions were justified they would be entitled to recover substantial non-punitive damages simply because they had been denied procedural due process. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether in an action under § 1983 for the deprivation of procedural due process a plaintiff must prove that he actually was injured by the deprivation before he may recover substantial non-punitive damages.

In 1976 appellees consisting of individual foster parents and the Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform filed a civil rights class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They acted on behalf of themselves and foster children who had resided in their homes for a year or more. They named as defendants various New York State and New York City child welfare officials. The suit sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the pre-removal procedures provided in state statutes and regulations. The District Court appointed independent counsel to represent the foster children to forestall conflicts. It also granted leave to natural mothers to intervene as defendants. The court certified a class of foster parents and children who had lived together for more than one year. A divided three-judge District Court held the existing pre-removal procedures constitutionally defective. It permanently enjoined their enforcement. Four appeals reached the Supreme Court from the New York City officials, New York State officials, independent counsel for the children, and intervening natural mothers. Under New York's foster care system most placements occur through voluntary written agreements. Natural parents and authorized agencies execute these agreements to transfer care and custody of the child to the agency. The agency then places the child in a licensed foster home under a contract allowing either party to terminate at will. Natural parents retain legal guardianship and an obligation to visit and plan for the child's future. Children may also enter foster care by court order following findings of abuse, neglect, or delinquency. When an agency decides to remove a child, state regulations require ten days' written notice to foster parents except in emergencies. Opportunities exist for conference and fair hearing. Additional procedures apply in New York City. Judicial review is available under § 392 after eighteen months. The record showed that the median duration of foster care in New York exceeded four years. Many children experienced multiple placements and limited contact with natural parents.

Catherine Wagner and the plaintiff, Robert Scherer, lived together for approximately fifteen years prior to Ms. Wagner’s death in January 1974. In 1970, the decedent and plaintiff were involved in an automobile accident in which decedent suffered facial wounds and a broken hip. Because of the hip injury, decedent’s physical mobility was substantially impaired. She was forced to give up her job and to restrict her activities. After the accident, plaintiff cared for her and assumed the sole financial responsibility for maintaining their household. During the weeks preceding her death, Ms. Wagner was acutely depressed. On one occasion, she attempted suicide by slashing her wrists. On January 23, 1974, she committed suicide by jumping from the roof of the apartment building in which they lived. On the morning of the day of her death, Ms. Wagner received a check for $17,400 drawn by a Pennsylvania attorney who had represented her in a claim arising out of the automobile accident. Plaintiff telephoned Ms. Wagner at around 11:30 a.m. that day and was told that the check had arrived. Plaintiff noticed nothing unusual in Ms. Wagner’s voice. At about 3:20 p.m., decedent left the apartment building and jumped to her death. The police, as part of their investigation of the suicide, asked the building superintendent to admit them to the apartment. On the kitchen table they found the check, endorsed in blank, and two notes handwritten by the decedent. In one, she described her depression over her physical condition, expressed her love for Scherer, and asked him to forgive her “for taking the easy way out.” In the other, she indicated that she “bequeathed” to plaintiff all of her possessions, including “the check for $17,400.00 .” The police took possession of the check, which was eventually placed in an interest-bearing account pending disposition of this action. Defendant, the Administrator ad litem of the Estate of Catherine Wagner, appeals from an Appellate Division decision, one judge dissenting, affirming a summary judgment by the trial court holding that Ms. Wagner had made a valid gift causa mortis of a check to plaintiff.

On April 22, 1974, Glen Gregos, a teenage boy, was injured while participating in a cross-country motorcycle race for novices sponsored by the American Motorcycle Association and the Viking Motorcycle Club. Glen's second amended complaint alleged that the American Motorcycle Association and Viking negligently designed, managed, supervised, and administered the race and negligently solicited entrants. Such negligence was a direct and proximate cause of his injuries, including a crushed spine resulting in permanent loss of the use of his legs. Glen's parents, acting as guardians ad litem, filed the underlying action against the American Motorcycle Association, the Viking Motorcycle Club, and the Los Angeles Coliseum Commission. The American Motorcycle Association answered the complaint, denying the charging allegations and asserting affirmative defenses that included a claim that Glen's own negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries. Thereafter the American Motorcycle Association sought leave of court to file a cross-complaint against Glen's parents. The first cause of action alleged that the parents knew motorcycle racing is dangerous, were knowledgeable about Glen's training, directly participated in his decision to enter the race by signing a parental consent form, and negligently failed to exercise their power of supervision over their minor child. The second cause of action sought declaratory relief. It asked for a declaration of the allocable negligence of Glen's parents so that any damages awarded against the American Motorcycle Association could be reduced by the percentage allocable to the parents' negligence. The trial court denied the American Motorcycle Association's motion for leave to file the cross-complaint. The American Motorcycle Association petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to grant the motion. The Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ. Ultimately the court granted a peremptory writ of mandate. Because of the statewide importance of the questions presented, the Supreme Court ordered a hearing in the case on its own motion.