Also known as: non-discrimination · nondiscriminatory · nondiscriminate · nondiscriminating · anti-discrimination
Written by attorneys · grounded in primary & secondary sources — see below
2 senses
An obligation or rule that bars treating individuals or entities differently because of traits such as race, religion, disability, or sexual orientation. The obligation applies to government action and to private conduct in specified contexts. It yields when another constitutional interest, such as expressive association, outweighs the nondiscrimination interest.
An obligation or rule that bars treating individuals or entities differently because of traits such as race, religion, disability, or sexual orientation. The obligation applies to government action and to private conduct in specified contexts. It yields when another constitutional interest, such as expressive association, outweighs the nondiscrimination interest.
Select any source to read its text and confirm it supports the definition.
A dormant-commerce-clause principle that prohibits states from treating out-of-state economic actors less favorably than in-state actors. The principle permits a facially discriminatory law when it serves an important non-economic local interest and no reasonable nondiscriminatory alternative exists.
Select any source to read its text and confirm it supports the definition.
A dormant-commerce-clause principle that prohibits states from treating out-of-state economic actors less favorably than in-state actors. The principle permits a facially discriminatory law when it serves an important non-economic local interest and no reasonable nondiscriminatory alternative exists.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Naveen Nanda, an openly gay assistant scoutmaster, sought to remain in his leadership role with a local troop. The organization removed him after learning of his sexual orientation. Nanda sued under a state antidiscrimination statute. The court held that the statute could not compel his continued membership because the organization's expressive message would be significantly burdened.
Nestor Navarro, a bank employee, endured repeated unwelcome sexual advances from a supervisor. The bank maintained a general nondiscrimination policy but lacked any specific procedure for reporting sexual harassment. Navarro sued under Title VII. The court held that the bank's nondiscrimination policy did not insulate it from liability when the policy failed to address harassment.
Nigel Nelson, a Black applicant, was rejected for a position at a manufacturing plant after the employer cited subjective interview performance. Nelson showed that the stated reason was pretextual and that similarly situated white applicants were hired. He brought a Title VII claim. The court applied the burden-shifting framework to determine whether the employer's nondiscrimination obligation had been violated.
Noah Nakamura, a Black traveler, was denied a room at a motel that advertised nationally. The motel cited a policy of serving only local guests. Nakamura sued under federal civil rights legislation. The court held that the nondiscrimination requirement applied because the motel operated in interstate commerce.
Neville Norton and other female employees at a large retailer alleged systematic pay and promotion disparities. They sought to certify a nationwide class of all female workers. The court denied certification because the plaintiffs could not show a common policy of discrimination affecting the entire class in a uniform way.
A nondiscrimination statute cannot compel an organization to retain a member whose inclusion would significantly burden the group's ability to express its sincerely held moral values. The state's interest in nondiscrimination is insufficient to override that expressive autonomy when the burden is substantial.
Supporting sources
Modern statutes prohibit refusals based on disability or age when the applicant meets financial and business criteria. A landlord cannot justify rejection by citing building design or tenant fit when those reasons mask discrimination against a protected trait.
Supporting sources
Naomi Norton, an out-of-state supplier, attempted to import live baitfish into the state for sale to local anglers. State officials blocked the shipment under a statute that banned all such imports to protect native wildlife. Norton challenged the ban as unconstitutional discrimination against interstate commerce. The court upheld the statute because it served a legitimate non-economic ecological interest and no reasonable nondiscriminatory alternative existed.
Yes. A facially discriminatory law survives if it serves a legitimate and important non-economic local interest such as protecting ecological resources and no reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives exist.
Supporting sources
…13—3402(B)(1)—(3) (1989); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-22-317(3) (1985); N. M. Stat. Ann. §30-31-6(D) (Supp. 1989). But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be…