nondiscrimination

In 1974 Mechelle Vinson met Sidney Taylor, a vice president and branch manager of what is now Meritor Savings Bank. Taylor provided Vinson an employment application, hired her the next day as a teller-trainee, and supervised her subsequent promotions to teller, head teller, and assistant branch manager over four years at the same branch, all based on merit alone. In September 1978 Vinson notified Taylor she was taking indefinite sick leave. The bank discharged her on November 1, 1978, for excessive use of that leave. Vinson sued Taylor and the bank, alleging she had constantly been subjected to sexual harassment by Taylor throughout her employment. At the eleven-day bench trial Vinson testified that Taylor initially acted in a fatherly manner. He soon invited her to dinner and suggested they go to a motel for sexual relations, which she eventually agreed to out of fear of losing her job. She further testified that Taylor made repeated demands for sexual favors at the branch. They had intercourse some forty or fifty times over several years. He fondled her in front of other employees, followed her into the women's restroom, exposed himself, and forcibly raped her on several occasions. These activities stopped after 1977 when she began a steady relationship. Taylor denied all allegations of sexual activity or advances and claimed the accusations arose from a business dispute. The bank denied any knowledge of such conduct. The District Court denied relief without resolving whether a sexual relationship existed between Vinson and Taylor. It found instead that any such relationship would have been voluntary and unrelated to her employment, advancement, or promotions. The court concluded that Vinson was not the victim of sexual harassment or discrimination and determined that the bank lacked notice of Taylor's alleged actions and therefore could not be held liable. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings on a hostile-environment theory. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1985.

McDonnell Douglas Corp., an aerospace and aircraft manufacturer headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri, employed over 30,000 people. Percy Green, a black citizen of St. Louis, worked for the company as a mechanic and laboratory technician from 1956 until August 28, 1964. He was laid off in the course of a general reduction in the work force. Green, a long-time activist in the civil rights movement, protested vigorously that his discharge and the general hiring practices of the company were racially motivated. Green and other members of the Congress on Racial Equality illegally stalled their cars on the main roads leading to the plant. This blocked access to it at the time of the morning shift change. On July 2, 1965, a lock-in took place wherein a chain and padlock were placed on the front door of a building to prevent the occupants, petitioner’s employees working in the building, from leaving. The full extent of Green's involvement remains uncertain. Three weeks after the lock-in, on July 25, 1965, the company publicly advertised for qualified mechanics. Green promptly applied for re-employment. The company turned down Green. It based its rejection on his participation in the stall-in and lock-in. Shortly thereafter, Green filed a formal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. He claimed that the company had refused to rehire him because of his race and persistent involvement in the civil rights movement. This was in violation of sections 703(a)(1) and 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Commission made no finding on Green's allegation of racial bias under section 703(a)(1). However, it did find reasonable cause to believe the company had violated section 704(a) by refusing to rehire him because of his civil rights activity. After the Commission unsuccessfully attempted to conciliate the dispute, it advised Green in March 1968 of his right to institute a civil action in federal court within 30 days. On April 15, 1968, Green brought the present action. He claimed initially a violation of section 704(a) and, in an amended complaint, a violation of section 703(a)(1) as well. The District Court dismissed the claim of racial discrimination under section 703(a)(1) on the ground that the Commission had failed to make a determination of reasonable cause. The District Court also found that the company's refusal to rehire Green was based solely on his participation in the illegal demonstrations and not on his legitimate civil rights activities. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed that unlawful protests were not protected under section 704(a). It reversed the dismissal of Green's section 703(a)(1) claim. The court held that a prior Commission determination of reasonable cause was not a jurisdictional prerequisite. It ordered the case remanded for trial.

The appellant, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., owns and operates a 216-room motel located on Courtland Street in Atlanta, Georgia, two blocks from downtown Peachtree Street. The motel is readily accessible to interstate highways 75 and 85 and state highways 23 and 41. It solicits patronage from outside Georgia through national advertising media, maintains over 50 billboards and highway signs, accepts convention trade from outside the state, and approximately 75 percent of its registered guests are from out of state. The motel provides lodging to transient guests along with restaurant facilities and prior to the Act had followed a practice of refusing to rent rooms to Negroes. The United States filed suit against the appellant in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia under Sections 206(a) and 206(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complaint alleged that the appellant was operating a motel in which it refused to accept Negro guests solely because of their race. The appellant offered no evidence at trial, submitting the case on the pleadings, admissions, and stipulation of facts, though the appellees proved the refusal to accept Negro transients after passage of the Act. The District Court granted the government's motion for summary judgment and issued a permanent injunction restraining the appellant from continuing its discriminatory practices, citing 231 F. Supp. 393. The case reached the Supreme Court on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1252. The motel is located at the intersection of two major interstate highways and advertises in national magazines and on billboards directed at interstate travelers. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on July 2, 1964, following extensive hearings before Senate and House committees on bills including S. 1732 and H.R. 7152. The Act's Title II, set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq., provides that all persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation without discrimination on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. The appellant admitted that 75 percent of its guests come from out of state. The motel's policy of refusing to rent rooms to Negroes has the effect of impeding interstate travel by Negro citizens.

In 2001, three current or former female employees of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.—Betty Dukes, Christine Kwapnoski, and Edith Arana—filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of California alleging that the company had discriminated against them and other women in pay and promotions. Wal-Mart, the nation’s largest private employer with approximately 3,400 stores across the country and more than one million employees, delegated pay and promotion decisions to local store managers who exercised broad discretion in a largely subjective manner. The plaintiffs claimed that this discretion was exercised disproportionately in favor of men, resulting in lower pay and fewer promotions for female employees. They sought to represent a class of approximately 1.5 million current and former female employees who had worked at any Wal-Mart domestic retail store since December 26, 1998. To support their motion for class certification, the plaintiffs presented statistical evidence from experts Dr. Richard Drogin and Dr. Marc Bendick showing pay and promotion disparities between men and women, anecdotal evidence consisting of about 120 affidavits from female employees describing discriminatory experiences at only 235 of the company's 3,400 stores, and the testimony of sociologist Dr. William Bielby who analyzed Wal-Mart’s corporate culture. Betty Dukes began working at a Pittsburg, California store in 1994 as a cashier and was later promoted to customer service manager before being demoted; she alleged retaliation and that male greeters were paid more. Christine Kwapnoski worked at Sam’s Club stores and claimed a male manager yelled at female employees and told her to “doll up.” Edith Arana worked at a Duarte, California store from 1995 to 2001. She was denied opportunities for management training despite repeated requests. The District Court certified the class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), finding that the plaintiffs had presented significant evidence of a company-wide pattern of discrimination. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, substantially affirmed the certification order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the class certification was consistent with Rule 23(a) and (b)(2).