willful, deliberate and pre-meditated

Ronald Harmelin was convicted in Michigan state court of possessing 672 grams of cocaine. Michigan law imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for that quantity of the drug. Harmelin had no prior felony convictions. The Michigan Court of Appeals initially reversed the conviction because evidence supporting it had been obtained in violation of the Michigan Constitution. On petition for rehearing, the Court of Appeals vacated its prior decision and affirmed the sentence. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The quantity of cocaine at issue had a potential yield of between 32,500 and 65,000 doses. The sentencing court imposed the mandatory term without considering any individualized circumstances of the offense or the offender. Harmelin challenged the sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds, arguing both that it was grossly disproportionate to the crime and that the mandatory nature of the penalty was unconstitutional.

In September 1994, a Wells Fargo armored van pulled up to the drive-up window of a bank in Glendale, Arizona. Inside the van were a driver, a guard, and a messenger carrying a bag with more than $270,000 in cash. As the van waited for the bank to open, a man armed with a rifle approached the driver's side of the van while another man armed with a handgun approached the passenger side. The man with the rifle shot and killed the driver. The man with the handgun shot at the guard but missed. The guard returned fire, shooting and wounding the man with the handgun. The wounded man with the handgun was later identified as Timothy Ring. Ring was indicted for first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, armed robbery, and other crimes. At trial, the prosecutor presented evidence that Ring and two others had planned to rob the armored van. The jury deadlocked on premeditated murder. It convicted Ring of felony murder occurring in the course of armed robbery. At the sentencing stage of the trial, the judge found two aggravating factors. The judge found that the murder was committed in expectation of pecuniary gain and in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner. The judge found one mitigating factor consisting of Ring's minimal criminal record. Finding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factor, the judge sentenced Ring to death. On appeal, Ring argued that Arizona's capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Apprendi v. New Jersey. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected that claim, relying on Walton v. Arizona, and affirmed Ring's conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether Walton can be reconciled with Apprendi.

In 1969 William Henry Furman was convicted of murder in Georgia and sentenced to death under Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971), after which the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in 225 Ga. 253, 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969). In the same year Lucius Jackson, Jr., was convicted of rape in Georgia and sentenced to death under Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1302 (Supp. 1971), and the same court affirmed that judgment in 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969). Also in 1969 Elmer Branch was convicted of rape in Texas and sentenced to death under Tex. Penal Code, Art. 1189 (1961), after which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment in 447 S.W.2d 932 (Ct. Crim. App. 1969). Each death sentence was imposed after a jury trial under a statute that left the choice between death and a lesser punishment to the uncontrolled discretion of the jury or judge, and the state courts upheld the convictions and sentences. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, then consolidated the matters for argument in January 1972. The records showed that the three petitioners were Black men convicted of crimes against white victims. Furman had been diagnosed with mild mental deficiency and psychotic episodes associated with convulsive disorder, while Jackson and Branch had limited education and low intelligence scores. No standards guided the sentencing decision, and the penalty was imposed on only a trivial fraction of eligible offenders despite statutory authorization for these offenses.

Christopher Simmons was 17 years old and a junior in high school when he committed the murder of Shirley Crook in Missouri. Simmons planned the crime with two friends, Charles Benjamin and John Tessmer, discussing breaking into a home, tying up a victim, and throwing the victim off a bridge. On the night of the murder, Simmons and Benjamin entered Crook's home through an open window, bound her with duct tape, drove her to a state park, reinforced her bindings with electrical wire, wrapped her face in duct tape, and threw her from a railroad trestle into the Meramec River, where she drowned. Simmons was arrested the next day at his high school after bragging about the killing. Police read him his Miranda rights, and he waived his right to an attorney before confessing and agreeing to a videotaped reenactment at the crime scene. The State charged him with burglary, kidnapping, stealing, and first-degree murder. Because Simmons was 17 at the time of the crime, he fell outside Missouri's juvenile court jurisdiction under Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 211.021 and 211.031 and was tried as an adult. At trial the State introduced Simmons' confession, the videotaped reenactment, and testimony about his advance planning and later bragging. The defense called no guilt-phase witnesses. The jury convicted Simmons of first-degree murder. In the penalty phase the State presented victim-impact testimony from Crook's family and proved three aggravating factors. The defense presented testimony from Simmons' family and a juvenile justice officer about his lack of prior record and family relationships, and both sides addressed his age as a mitigating factor. The jury recommended death, and the trial judge imposed it. Simmons obtained new counsel and moved for postconviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance because trial counsel had not presented evidence of his immaturity, impulsiveness, difficult home environment, substance abuse, and poor school performance. The trial court denied the motion. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal and the denial of postconviction relief. Federal habeas relief was also denied. After this Court decided Atkins v. Virginia in 2002, Simmons filed a new state postconviction petition arguing that Atkins required the same categorical exemption for juvenile offenders. The Missouri Supreme Court agreed, set aside the death sentence, and resentenced Simmons to life imprisonment without parole. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

On June 14, 1960, at about 1 a.m., petitioner Nathan Jackson and Nora Elliott entered a Brooklyn hotel where Elliott registered for both. Jackson drew a gun, took money from the room clerk, ordered the clerk and others into an upstairs room, and left. He encountered Elliott and a policeman on the street. During a struggle both drew guns, the policeman was fatally wounded, and Jackson was shot twice in the body. Jackson hailed a cab and was taken to the hospital. A detective questioned Jackson at about 2 a.m. soon after arrival. Jackson stated his name, said he had shot the colored cop and got the drop on him, and admitted the hotel robbery. According to the detective, Jackson was in strong condition despite his wounds. At 3:55 a.m. Jackson, who had been shot in the liver and lung and had lost about 500 cc. of blood, was given 50 milligrams of demerol and 1/50 of a grain of scopolamine. Immediately thereafter an Assistant District Attorney questioned him in the presence of police officers and hospital personnel. The interrogation was recorded by a stenographer. Jackson again admitted the robbery and, in response to further questions, admitted shooting the policeman and firing the first shot. The interview ended at 4 a.m. An operation began at 5 a.m. and was completed at 8 a.m. Jackson and Elliott were indicted for murder in the first degree and tried together. The statements made by Jackson at 2 a.m. and 3:55 a.m. were introduced in evidence without objection by his counsel. Jackson took the stand in his own defense. His account of the robbery and of the shooting of the policeman differed in important respects from his confession. According to Jackson's testimony, there was a substantial interval of time between his leaving the hotel and the shooting, and the policeman attempted to draw his gun first and fired the first shot. As to the questioning at the hospital, Jackson recalled that he was in pain and gasping for breath at the time. He was refused water and told he would not be let alone until the police had the answers they wanted. He knew that he had been interrogated but could remember neither the questions nor the answers. The State offered testimony from the attending physician and others that Jackson was refused water because of the impending operation rather than his refusal to answer questions. On cross-examination of the doctor, Jackson's counsel, with the help of the hospital records, elicited the fact that demerol and scopolamine were administered to Jackson immediately before his interrogation. But any effect of these drugs on Jackson during the interrogation was denied. Although Jackson's counsel did not specifically object to admission of the confession initially, the trial court indicated awareness that counsel was questioning the circumstances of the interrogation. In closing argument counsel sought a verdict of second-degree murder or manslaughter rather than acquittal, stressing the interval between the robbery and the shooting and the evidence that the policeman fired first. Consistent with New York practice, the trial court submitted the voluntariness issue to the jury along with the other issues. The jury was instructed that if it found the confession involuntary it was to disregard it and determine guilt or innocence from the other evidence. If it found the confession voluntary it was to determine its truth or reliability and afford it weight accordingly. The jury found Jackson guilty of murder in the first degree and he was sentenced to death. Elliott was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree. Jackson's conviction was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals, whose remittitur was amended to show that it had necessarily passed upon the voluntariness of the confession and found no violation of constitutional rights. Certiorari was denied. Jackson then filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court claiming that the New York procedure for determining voluntariness was unconstitutional and that his confession was involuntary. After examining the state court record the district court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing, finding no clear and conclusive proof that the statements were extorted or given involuntarily and no constitutional infirmity in the New York procedure. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.