Concept
Redressability
Standing
Redressability
Under Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the third element of standing requires the plaintiff to show that it is likely, not merely speculative, that a favorable decision will redress the injury.1 Causation asks whether the defendant’s conduct produced the injury; redressability asks whether a court order could change the state of affairs that produces it. The two inquiries often turn on the same facts, yet the Court treats them as separate requirements, so a complete answer addresses both.2
The element exists because a court that cannot change the situation causing the injury can only give advice. A decision in that position would be an advisory opinion, so federal jurisdiction reaches only matters in which the court can make some remedial difference, and the remedy must address “the inadequacy that produced the injury-in-fact that the plaintiff has established.”3 The element also serves the broader idea that only parties with a concrete stake in the case may bring a dispute to federal court.4 Injury and causation pit the injured party against the person alleged to have caused the injury, and the availability of redress through damages shows that the case can be resolved by a court and is not a hypothetical dispute.5
The requirement follows a case upward. A party seeking relief in a court of appeals or the Supreme Court must show that a ruling in its favor would redress whatever injury it suffered from the adverse lower-court ruling, because a ruling that corrected no cognizable injury would be purely advisory.6 Standing must therefore be satisfied at the appellate level and not only in the district court.7 The party must also have an injury of its own to redress: a would-be defender of a state statute who could assert no injury of his own could not maintain litigation the State had abandoned.8
Redress is also tested claim by claim and remedy by remedy. A plaintiff whose past injury supports a claim for damages may still lack standing to seek an injunction, because any threatened future injury may be too speculative.9
Some plaintiffs satisfy the element without difficulty. Money damages for a past injury redress it, and an injunction that changes the defendant’s own conduct toward the plaintiff readily does so as well.10 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the injury was a deportation order resting on a one-house veto, and if the veto was unconstitutional and severable the order would be canceled, so a favorable decision was likely to relieve the injury. The harder cases arise in four settings, which the subsections below take in turn: relief that would help only if someone outside the case acts, a violation that is already over, an injury consisting of exclusion from an equal competition, and a procedural right granted by Congress.
Redress Through Third Parties
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife is the model of redress that fails because it depends on someone outside the case. The plaintiffs challenged a regulation that left overseas projects outside the consultation requirement, and they sued only the Secretary. The agencies that actually funded the projects were not parties. A ruling in the suit would not have remedied the plaintiffs’ injury even if the District Court had resolved the legal question, because the agencies “were not parties to the suit, and there is no reason they should be obliged to honor an incidental legal determination the suit produced.”12 An injunction directing the Secretary to publish the regulation the plaintiffs wanted would help only if the funding agencies treated it as binding, and the Court saw no ground for that confidence when the Justice Department, presumably after consulting the agencies, had taken the position that the regulation was not binding.13
A second gap compounded the first. The agencies generally supply only a fraction of the funding for a foreign project, and for the Mahaweli project the agency involved had provided less than 10 percent. The plaintiffs offered nothing to indicate that the projects would be suspended, or would do less harm to listed species, if that fraction were eliminated, so it was “entirely conjectural whether the nonagency activity that affects respondents will be altered or affected by the agency activity they seek to achieve.” The Court concluded that redress of the only injury the plaintiffs claimed required action by the individual funding agencies, and that relief against the Secretary was not likely to produce that action.14 The plaintiffs had also chosen a programmatic target. Instead of attacking the separate decisions to fund particular projects, they challenged a more generalized level of government action, the consultation rules, whose invalidation would affect all overseas projects, an approach with obvious practical advantages and obvious difficulties of proof on causation and redressability.15 The lesson is that a judgment binds the parties before the court, so a plaintiff whose relief depends on a nonparty must name the actor who controls the source of the injury or produce facts, not assumptions, about how the nonparty will respond.
Redressability was one of several obstacles in Lujan. The Court accepted that the desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest, and it granted the “questionable” assumption that the projects abroad would threaten the species, yet the affidavits showed only “‘some day’ intentions” to return, with no concrete plans or even a date.16 It also called it “pure speculation and fantasy” to say that anyone who observes or works with an endangered species anywhere in the world is appreciably harmed by a single project affecting some portion of that species with which he has no more specific connection.17 A Lujan-style problem can therefore fail on injury, on redress, or on both, and an answer should test each element separately.
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization fits the same pattern. Plaintiffs who were not receiving free medical care challenged an IRS regulation, and the Court asked whether they had “an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” It found it purely speculative whether their injury could be traced to the regulation and whether, if the regulation were changed, hospitals would take on the burden of caring for the indigent and not do without charitable contributions.18 In Linda R.S. v. Richard D. an unwed mother challenged a Texas policy of prosecuting the fathers of legitimate children for nonsupport and not the fathers of illegitimate children, but a prosecution would not have ensured that support was paid, so her relief turned on the conduct of an absent third party. Speculation about what a government actor will do defeated the plaintiffs in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA as well, where the Court held, 5–4, that the plaintiffs could not show an injury fairly traceable to the surveillance statute because it was speculative whether the Government would target their communications on an imminent basis.19
Third-party involvement does not by itself defeat redress. In Utah v. Evans, a State claimed that a census miscount cost it a congressional seat, and the Court found the claim redressable even though a corrected count would add a seat only if other officials acted on it. The difference from Lujan lies in how predictable the nonparty’s response is: the Lujan plaintiffs offered only conjecture about what the funding agencies would do.
The causation cases draw the same line. A regulated party that challenges a restriction on its own activities readily shows that the restriction caused its injury, while a plaintiff who relies on the government’s regulation of others has a “substantially more difficult” time, because third parties can sever the link between government action and injury.20 Since the same facts usually drive both elements, the contrast carries over to redress.21 A stem that asks a court to assume what nonparties will do, as the driver’s suit does, presents the Lujan and Simon problem, while a plaintiff who is the object of the challenged action usually has no gap to fill, because an injunction that changes the defendant’s own conduct toward the plaintiff readily redresses the injury.22
Relief for Past Wrongs
Relief counts only if it remedies the plaintiff’s own injury, so a remedy aimed at a violation that is already over does not help the plaintiff. A plaintiff whose past injury supports a damages claim may still lack standing for prospective relief, because a threatened future injury may be too speculative, and damages themselves redress the past harm adequately.24 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons shows the limit on the forward-looking side. To establish an actual controversy over an injunction against police control holds, Lyons would have had to allege not only that he would again encounter the police but also that all Los Angeles officers always choke any citizen they encounter, or that the City ordered or authorized them to do so. An allegation that the City authorized control holds where deadly force was not threatened did not explain why he was realistically threatened by officers acting within the City’s policy.25
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment applies the principle where the violation ended before the court could act. A citizens’ group sued a manufacturer that had failed to file required toxic-chemical reports, and the manufacturer then filed all of its overdue reports, with no allegation that the violation was continuing or likely to recur. The Court assumed the group had suffered an informational injury and asked whether any requested remedy would relieve it. A declaration that past reports were late would not, and civil penalties payable to the Treasury would only vindicate the rule of law and not remedy the group’s own injury. As the majority put it, “psychic satisfaction is not an acceptable Article III remedy because it does not redress a cognizable Article III injury.”
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services reached the opposite result on a similar remedy because the violations there continued after the suit was filed. The company had repeatedly exceeded its mercury discharge limits, so penalties payable to the government could deter further violations and thereby redress the plaintiffs’ future injury. Justice Scalia, who wrote Steel Co., dissented, reasoning that penalties paid to the government do not relieve the plaintiff’s injury, so the deterrence rationale has critics on the Court. What separates the two decisions is whether the illegal conduct is ongoing or likely to recur, since only then can a penalty paid to the government help this plaintiff.
A completed violation can still be redressed when the relief runs to the plaintiff. In Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, two college students challenged campus speech policies after officials stopped one of them from sharing his faith, the college then rescinded the policies, and the students argued that their request for nominal damages kept the case alive. The Court agreed that a request for nominal damages satisfies redressability when the claim rests on a completed violation of a legal right, relying on the common-law view that every violation imports damage. The holding goes only to redressability, so the plaintiff must still establish injury and causation, and it shows how standing and mootness fit together: standing asks whether the personal stake exists at the outset, and mootness asks whether it survives. Chief Justice Roberts dissented, arguing that nominal damages do not alleviate any harm and that the ruling would require federal courts to issue advisory opinions whenever a plaintiff asks for a dollar. The contrast with Steel Co. lies in who receives the money, since nominal damages are paid to the plaintiff for the plaintiff’s own completed injury, while the penalties in Steel Co. would have gone to the Treasury.
Unequal Treatment as the Injury
A plaintiff excluded from a competition is often asked whether she would have won the benefit had the barrier not existed. For a plaintiff whose injury is the denial of an equal opportunity to compete, that question does not matter, because relief that restores equal treatment redresses the injury. The Court has long recognized the inability to compete on an equal footing as a cognizable injury.27 In Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, a discriminatory city contracting policy was challenged by a contractor who did not have to prove that it would have won a contract. It needed only to allege that it was able and ready to bid and that the policy prevented it from competing on an equal basis, because its injury in fact was the unequal treatment, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.28
The same reasoning explains why a rejected applicant need not prove admission. If each applicant had to show that he would have been admitted but for the challenged program, only those who could prove that counterfactual would have standing, and many injured applicants who simply wanted to compete on an equal footing could obtain no relief.29 The reasoning traces to Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, where the applicant had a cognizable interest in competing on an equal footing for places in the entering class. When a member of one group claims that the government has erected a barrier that makes it harder for her to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, she need not prove that she would have obtained the benefit but for the barrier, because her real objection is the denial of equal treatment. The characterization of the injury therefore controls the redress analysis: a plaintiff who defines the injury as the lost benefit must show what would have happened in the competition, while one who defines it as unequal treatment needs only an order that restores a fair process.30
The equal-footing theory gets a plaintiff into court without guaranteeing a judgment. If the plaintiff alleges no ongoing or imminent constitutional violation, the government’s conclusive demonstration that it would have made the same decision absent the alleged discrimination precludes any finding of liability. In Texas v. Lesage, the plaintiff, an African immigrant of Caucasian descent, had applied to the University of Texas, which considered applicants’ race, offered admission to at least one minority, and rejected him along with about 90 percent of the other applicants.31
Procedural Rights and Partial Redress
A plaintiff who holds a procedural right gets a relaxed showing on this element. Lujan said that a litigant vested with a procedural right “can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy,” and Massachusetts v. EPA applied that statement. The litigant has standing if there is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant.33 The D.C. Circuit has put the point this way: a litigant who alleges deprivation of a procedural protection never has to prove that the substantive result would have been altered had he received the procedure, and all that is necessary is to show that the procedural step was connected to the substantive result.34 A procedure is a means to a result, so an omitted procedure injures a plaintiff whose concrete interests the decision affects, and an order requiring the procedure redresses that injury even though the procedure cannot guarantee a different outcome. For example, a neighbor of a proposed federal facility who is denied the environmental review a statute requires may seek an order directing the review, even though the review might not stop the project.
The relaxation protects only procedures that guard a concrete interest of the plaintiff. Lujan stressed that its case was not one in which plaintiffs sought to enforce a procedural requirement the disregard of which could impair a separate concrete interest of theirs.35
Massachusetts v. EPA applied the relaxed burden. A statute gave the Commonwealth a right to challenge agency action unlawfully withheld.36 The EPA argued that regulating greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles would have only a small impact on global emissions, and the majority answered that agencies may not avoid their statutory obligations by noting that their regulations will have only a small incremental effect, because a reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increases no matter what happens elsewhere.37 The Court rejected the assumption that a small incremental step can never be attacked in a federal forum, and it observed that although regulating vehicle emissions would not by itself reverse global warming, it did not follow that the Court lacked jurisdiction to decide whether EPA had a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it.38 Partial redress therefore suffices, because relief that lessens the harm is enough even if it does not eliminate it. One commentator summarizes the majority’s reasoning this way: “Every little bit helps, so Massachusetts can sue over any little bit.”39
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent found redressability even more problematic than causation. About 80 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions originate outside the United States, developing countries such as China and India are poised to increase their emissions substantially, and any decreases produced by the petitioners’ desired standards were likely to be overwhelmed many times over by increases elsewhere.40
The majority also stressed that the party seeking review was a sovereign State and not, as in Lujan, a private individual.41 Commentators have asked whether that special solicitude is justified: are States more or less likely than individuals to have a concrete stake in such a case, and is it desirable to give them greater latitude to drive the national regulatory agenda?42 The dissent replied that Article III does not treat public and private litigants differently and that the century-old decision the majority relied on, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., drew a line between a State and private litigants solely with respect to available remedies and had nothing to do with standing.43 Because the point is contested, an answer should rest on the procedural right and on partial redress and treat the plaintiff’s status as a State, at most, as an additional consideration.
Steps two and five do most of the sorting. A plaintiff whose relief depends on a nonparty has not passed step two merely by showing a serious injury, and a plaintiff who frames the injury as unequal treatment still must show that the government itself erected the barrier.