Concept
Exceptions to Mootness
Mootness
Exceptions to Mootness
Mootness applies when an injury that a court could have redressed at the start of a suit becomes irredressable later. An injury that no court could have redressed at filing is a standing defect instead.1 Four doctrines identify cases in which a dispute that looks finished still presents a live controversy: voluntary cessation, conduct capable of repetition yet evading review, collateral consequences, and class actions. They are frequently called exceptions, but the label misleads at least once. Voluntary cessation is not really an exception; it states the burden a party must carry to prove mootness.2
The four doctrines rest on two different ideas. Collateral consequences and class actions rest on the first: a real stake survives in a different form. Voluntary cessation and the capable-of-repetition doctrine rest on the second: if the defendant’s conduct or the passage of time could end the case, the challenged conduct might escape review altogether. A defendant who could stop when sued, win dismissal, and resume afterward could repeat the cycle “until he achieves all his unlawful ends.”3 Conduct that ends faster than litigation poses the same danger by another route. Human gestation takes only nine months, far less than the time needed to try a case, take an appeal, and petition for Supreme Court review.4 The capable-of-repetition exception gives courts a chance to decide cases that would otherwise be dismissed before a court, especially an appellate court, could reach them.5
These doctrines also rest on practical considerations—conserving judicial resources, deterring bad behavior, and ensuring individual fairness—and that creates a puzzle. Such considerations appear insufficient to expand the federal judicial power under Article III. If mootness meant only the absence of a case or controversy, a moot dispute would have to be dismissed whatever the consequences. Yet pragmatic limits on the mootness rule exist, which suggests that the rule is not jurisdictional after all, and the Court has not yet grappled with the problem.6 Mootness doctrine does explicitly embody practical considerations of a kind different from the Article III standing factors,7 and Chief Justice Rehnquist cited the exceptions, though not without controversy, to argue that mootness reflects prudential considerations rather than the more unyielding requirements of Article III. The Court’s own practice varies. In Roe v. Wade it recognized an exception and decided the merits; in DeFunis v. Odegaard it declined to apply one and dismissed the case as moot.8 History supplies part of the setting: in the nineteenth century, constitutional issues generally arose in traditional litigation—criminal cases and cases of trespass, breach of contract, or personal injury—and in the twentieth century the role of government shifted.9 On an exam, state the Article III baseline first, then identify which doctrine the facts trigger and which fact triggers it.
Voluntary Cessation
A defendant that stops the challenged conduct after being sued has not necessarily ended the case. A defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to decide the practice’s legality; otherwise the courts would be compelled to leave the defendant free to return to its old ways. The standard is stringent. A case becomes moot through the defendant’s own conduct only if subsequent events make it “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur,” and the party asserting mootness carries that heavy burden.10
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services applied the standard. The effect of the defendant’s compliance and of a facility closure on the prospect of future violations was a disputed factual matter, and the defendant still held its NPDES permit, so the Court left those questions open for remand instead of dismissing the case.11
Because the burden rests on the party seeking dismissal, voluntary cessation is better understood as a rule about proof than as an exception to mootness.12 The rule serves two purposes. It forecloses gamesmanship, since a defendant could otherwise “engage in unlawful conduct, stop when sued to have the case declared moot, then pick up where he left off, repeating this cycle until he achieves all his unlawful ends.”13 It also protects the public interest in a definitive settlement of the legal question and avoids duplicative litigation.14 And it prevents either party from creating a technical mootness as a sham to deprive the Court of jurisdiction.15
Courts therefore examine the quality of the change, not merely its occurrence. Three considerations recur:16
- When the change came in relation to the development of the lawsuit. A change that comes only after the Supreme Court has agreed to review a case is inherently suspect.17
- Whether the evidence supports or undermines permanence, such as whether formal process would be needed to enact a future change.
- Whether the party continues to defend the legality of its actions.
A binding legal commitment can do the same work as the disposal system. In Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., an unconditional and irrevocable covenant not to sue the plaintiff for trademark infringement mooted a suit seeking a declaration that the defendant’s trademark was invalid and unenforceable.18
Assurances the defendant can withdraw sit at the other end of the range. “[P]ostcertiorari maneuvers designed to insulate a decision from review by this Court must be viewed with a critical eye.”19 In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, the State announced a change of policy while the case was pending before the Court, and the Court did not treat the case as moot.20 Continued defense of the challenged conduct is equally damaging. In West Virginia v. EPA the Government “nowhere suggest[ed]” that it would refrain from reimposing emissions limits predicated on generation shifting if the litigation were resolved in its favor, and it “vigorously defend[ed]” the legality of that approach. The Court declined to dismiss the case as moot.21
Legislation carries more weight than an internal change of heart, but it is not conclusive. In New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York the Court found that legislation had more staying power than voluntary changes in a defendant’s internal policies, so the new legislation appeared to prevent the City from returning to its old ways.22 The speed with which the legislation was secured in the shadow of the Court’s grant of review nonetheless suggests that such laws and ordinances may be more malleable than usual,23 and dissenting Justices objected that the mootness decision encouraged legislative bodies to manipulate the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.24 Repeal followed by a substantially similar replacement does not moot the case at all. General contractors challenged a city ordinance preferring minority-owned businesses in awarding city contracts; the city repealed it and enacted another that still disadvantaged them, though to a lesser degree. The Court held the case was not moot.25
DeFunis v. Odegaard shows where the doctrine stops. The majority said that the voluntary-cessation decisions would be “quite relevant” if mootness had arisen from a unilateral change in the law school’s admissions procedures. Those procedures were the target of the suit, and a voluntary cessation of them could moot the case only if it could be said with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation the wrong will be repeated. Mootness instead depended “not at all” on voluntary cessation. It depended on DeFunis’s being in the final quarter of his final year and on the school’s settled and unchallenged policy of letting him complete the term.26 The majority added that it has been the Court’s settled practice, in contexts no less significant, fully to accept representations such as the school’s as parameters for decision.27 The dissent applied the doctrine to the school’s narrow promise. Because the school represented only that DeFunis could complete the term’s studies, it had not borne the heavy burden of showing that there was not even a “mere possibility” that he would again be subject to the challenged policy, and it remained “free to return to [its] old ways.”28 The disagreement shows what the doctrine tests: whether the defendant changed the challenged conduct, and whether recurrence can be ruled out. It does not reach a case mooted by the plaintiff’s own changed circumstances.
Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Review
Pregnancy is the classic example of a dispute that ends before courts can finish with it. Human gestation takes only nine months, far less than the time needed to try a case, take an appeal, and petition for Supreme Court review, and an individual woman may become pregnant again.30 In Roe v. Wade the Court observed that pregnancy “often comes more than once to the same woman” and “provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness,” because it “truly could be ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’”31 Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization later overruled Roe’s merits holding, but the mootness reasoning still illustrates the exception.32
The doctrine has two elements, and a case must satisfy both. The challenged action must be too short in duration to be fully litigated before it ceases or expires, and there must be a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again.33 The second element does the screening. A “physical or theoretical possibility” of recurrence is not enough, because otherwise any matter of short duration would be reviewable. The party needs a “reasonable expectation” or a “demonstrable probability” that the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party.34
Cases that satisfy the duration element fall into two groups. In the first, the challenged order is itself so brief that it normally expires before review can be had. Examples include short criminal sentences, short-term agency orders that usually will come up again, and short-term injunctions that may be repeated.35 In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart the dispute between the State and the petitioners who cover events throughout the State was “capable of repetition,” and declining to decide on mootness grounds would have let it evade review, since such orders are by nature short-lived.36 In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the criminal trial the appellants sought to attend had long since ended, yet the dispute was capable of repetition yet evading review.37 A fixed-term contract can play the same role. In Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States, two years, the duration of the contract and including the time King spent in administrative review, was too short to litigate fully in federal court. The Department disagreed with the GAO, so it would probably refuse to apply the Rule of Two in future procurements of the same services, and King, which had held earlier contracts for them, would probably bid again. The dispute was therefore likely to recur between the same parties in circumstances where the period of performance would again be too short.38
In the second group the order is not short, but time overtakes the facts that gave the plaintiff a stake. Election cases illustrate the problem. To beat the election clock, the Court may issue its decision before the election and write its opinion later, or it may decide the issue after the election if it is otherwise capable of repetition, yet evading review.39 In Moore v. Ogilvie, independent candidates for presidential elector challenged a state law imposing substantial ballot-access restrictions on them. The election had been held by the time the case reached the Court, but the challenged rule remained in place and would be applied in future elections, so the problem was “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”40
The reasoning extends beyond pregnancy and elections. In Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle the Court held that the request for declaratory relief was not moot, because if review depended on an economic strike’s being in progress, the case would be “the type presenting an issue ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’”41
DeFunis v. Odegaard supplies the contrast, because time ran out there as it did in Roe. DeFunis was in the last quarter of his final year of law school when his case reached the Court. The majority did not apply the exception. That this case reached the Court on the eve of graduation did not mean the issue would evade review in the future, since a later challenge to unchanged admissions procedures should reach the Court with relative speed now that the Washington Supreme Court had spoken.42 The second element points the same way: a student about to graduate will not face the admissions process again, whereas a woman may become pregnant again.
Recurrence that depends on the party’s own future violation of the law rarely satisfies the second element. In enforcement actions there is a strong presumption that a party will comply with the law and so will not be “subject to the same action again.” The Court applied that presumption in a criminal case in United States v. Sanchez-Gomez. It found the presumption rebutted in Honig v. Doe, where the plaintiff was unable to conform behavior to socially accepted norms.43
Short duration alone satisfies only half the exception, and an answer that stops once it notices an event ended quickly is incomplete. The remaining question is who the plaintiff is and whether that plaintiff will probably meet the same action again. The exception also differs from voluntary cessation. There the defendant changed the challenged conduct, and the question is whether the defendant could return to it. Here the defendant has changed nothing, the calendar ended the dispute, and the question is whether the same plaintiff will probably face the same action. The DeFunis majority kept the two inquiries apart: it said mootness depended not at all on voluntary cessation, and it then separately declined to apply the capable-of-repetition exception.44
The Court has not applied the second element uniformly. It has at times taken a cavalier attitude toward the element, though the generally accepted view is that both elements must be satisfied. Moore shows why one cannot assume the second element is always required: the Court rested on the continuing ballot rule without referring to the plaintiffs’ desire to run again, and the dissent criticized that omission.45 The Court has also drawn distinctions too subtle for many observers.46 The exception sits uneasily with Article III as well, because the unavailability of normal review does not make a matter any less moot or any more a constitutional controversy. The Court may in effect be treating the otherwise mooted plaintiff as the undeclared representative of an uncertified class of constantly shifting membership.47
Collateral Consequences
Even when the primary dispute has been settled by the passage of time, the controversy is not moot if collateral consequences to one of the parties remain, however minor.49 In Powell v. McCormack the Court defined a moot case as one in which the issues presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. It added that when one of several issues becomes moot, the remaining live issues supply the case or controversy that the Constitution requires.50 The collateral consequences doctrine applies that logic to the remnants of a dispute. The question is still whether a decree can do anything for someone, and a surviving consequence means that it can.
Criminal appeals present the clearest setting. A defendant who finishes the sentence while the appeal is pending seems to have nothing left to win, yet serving the sentence does not necessarily moot the case. A criminal case is moot only if there is no possibility that any collateral consequence will be imposed because of the challenged conviction.51 The older view, that an appeal became moot once the sentence was fully satisfied, is no longer enforced.52 The principle also runs the other way: the state may seek Supreme Court review of a lower court’s reversal of a conviction even if the defendant has already served the sentence, because if the conviction stands the state could impose collateral legal consequences on him.53
Sibron v. New York shows how little a defendant must show. That Sibron was already a multiple offender was not critical. Sentencing judges and trial juries might discount a certain number of prior transgressions, it was “impossible * * * to say at what point the number of convictions on a man’s record renders his reputation irredeemable,” and the Court could not “foretell what opportunities might present themselves in the future for the removal of [the] other convictions.”54 The Court also stressed that there was nothing “abstract or feigned” about the appeal, that the validity of the conviction could arise in “many [future] contexts,” and that it is “always preferable to litigate a matter when it is directly and principally in dispute.” Reviewing the conviction on direct appeal ensures that the dispute is litigated while it is “fresh,” before witnesses die or memories fade.55
The presumption attaches to convictions, not to every adverse event in the criminal process. In Spencer v. Kemna the Court refused to presume collateral consequences for a defendant who had served his sentence and challenged not his conviction but the revocation of his parole.56 It distinguished Sibron on two grounds. Sibron predated the tightening of Article III standing requirements, and while the presumption of significant collateral consequences “is likely to comport with reality” when a conviction is challenged, the same cannot be said of a parole revocation.57 The petitioner’s predicted harms were speculative. The violation would be only one factor among many in any future parole decision, and it would matter only if he later committed a crime and returned to prison. The Court likewise rejected as speculative his fears of impeachment or substantive use in a later prosecution, and it called possible employment or sentencing repercussions insufficient to keep the controversy alive.58 The harms from a completed revocation depend on further events, such as a new crime, while the presumption for convictions comports with reality. When a stem says the defendant has already served the sentence, first ask whether the challenge targets the conviction itself, where consequences are presumed, or something short of a conviction, where the plaintiff must point to real consequences that do not depend on future wrongdoing.
Powell supplies the civil version. The respondents argued that the case was moot, relying on Alejandrino v. Quezon for the proposition that a deprivation of salary was too insubstantial to keep a case from becoming moot. The Court held that Powell’s claim for back salary remained viable even though he had been seated in the 91st Congress, so it found it unnecessary to decide whether the other issues had become moot. One live claim was enough.59 Alejandrino, the Court explained, was dismissed not because the deprivation of salary was insufficiently substantial, but because the plaintiff’s failure to plead sufficient facts to establish his mandamus claim made it impossible for any court to resolve the request. Powell’s complaint, by contrast, named the official responsible for paying congressional salaries and asked for both mandamus and an injunction against that official.60 A residual claim therefore preserves the case only when it is pleaded in a form on which a court can actually grant relief. The Court had treated a salary claim the same way in Bond v. Floyd.61
The dissent saw the case differently. It treated the essential purpose of the suit as regaining the seat and concluded that this purpose became impossible when the 90th Congress passed into history and the 91st came into being on January 3, 1969.62 The majority looked instead at whether any live claim remained between adverse parties, and its approach controls. The same idea appears whenever a plaintiff seeks both equitable relief and damages. If retirement or a change in the law moots the equitable claim, the court retains jurisdiction over the damages claim; the damages claim is not technically a collateral consequence, but the idea is the same.63 A prisoner’s transfer or release likewise does not moot a claim for damages included in the complaint.64
Precedent supplies a second limit. A possible, indirect benefit in some future lawsuit cannot save an otherwise moot case. The Court rejected that theory in United States v. Juvenile Male on the ground that if the possible benefit of a favorable precedent were enough, no case would ever be moot. Every judgment has some precedential value for someone, so a precedent rationale would keep every dispute alive and erase the doctrine. The line falls between a consequence the judgment itself would change, such as a conviction set aside or wages ordered paid, and a benefit the plaintiff might gain later by citing the decision.
Class Actions
A properly certified class action may continue even if the named plaintiff’s claim becomes moot. The “class of unnamed persons described in the certification acquired a legal status separate from the interest asserted by [the plaintiff],” and the case can continue as long as class members have a live controversy.66
Sosna v. Iowa shows the rule at work. Sosna challenged Iowa’s one-year durational residency requirement for divorce. She sued on her own behalf and as representative of Iowa residents of less than a year who wanted to file for dissolution of marriage or legal separation, and the parties stipulated to class treatment, which the district court approved.67 By the time her case reached the Supreme Court she satisfied the residency requirement and had obtained a divorce elsewhere. Had she sued only for herself, those facts would have made the case moot and required dismissal.68
The Court nonetheless held the case live. Iowa officials might never again enforce the requirement against Sosna, but they would enforce it against the class she represented. State officials would continue to enforce the statute, and yet, because of the passage of time, no single challenger would remain subject to its restrictions for the period necessary to see a lawsuit to its conclusion.69 Once the district court certified the class, the unnamed members acquired a legal status separate from the interest Sosna asserted, and that status significantly affected the mootness determination.70 The holding is that, while there must be a live controversy at the time of Supreme Court review, the controversy may exist between a named defendant and a member of the class even though the named plaintiff’s claim has become moot.71 A prisoner’s departure from prison likewise does not moot a suit brought for a certified class.72
The reasoning resembles the capable-of-repetition doctrine, applied at the level of the class. The individual exception asks whether the same plaintiff will face the same action again. The class rule asks whether the class members will, and in Sosna state officials would “undoubtedly continue to enforce the challenged statute” against them.73 DeFunis, decided the year before Sosna, shows what happens without a class. Had DeFunis been a class action, the case would not have been moot.74 He sued for himself, and because he would complete his studies whatever the Court decided, the Court held that it could not consider the constitutional issues consistent with Article III.75
Protection attaches at certification, so the doctrine had to address representatives whose claims end first. Some claims are so inherently transitory that the trial court does not have even enough time to rule on a motion for class certification before the proposed representative’s individual interest expires. Gerstein v. Pugh, a challenge to pretrial detention, illustrates such a claim.76 A second gap arises when the district court denies certification. In United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty the Court held that an action brought on behalf of a class does not become moot upon expiration of the named plaintiff’s substantive claim, even though class certification has been denied. The proposed representative retains a “personal stake” in obtaining class certification sufficient to assure that Article III values are not undermined.77 If the appeal reverses the denial and a class is properly certified, the merits of the class claim may then be adjudicated under Sosna.78 The class certification can be treated as relating back to the original erroneous denial, so the mootness of the named plaintiff’s personal claim does not moot the controversy whether the class is certified before or after the personal claim ends.79
Some defendants try to end a proposed class action before certification by offering the named plaintiff full relief. In Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez the defendant filed a Rule 68 offer to pay Gomez his litigation costs and the maximum treble damages he could claim for each violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Gomez allowed the offer to expire. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that its offer mooted his individual claim by providing complete relief. The Court rejected that argument: the unaccepted offer did not moot Gomez’s claim, because he “remained emptyhanded” when the offer expired.80
The class-action rule does not extend to every representative suit. In Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, a damages collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act was moot when the plaintiff’s own claim became moot and no other plaintiff had opted in. A collective action reaches only employees who join, whereas a certified class has a legal status of its own.81 Nor does the rule reach individual suits that merely resemble class actions. In United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, the Court rejected the argument that individual challenges to courtroom restraints should be treated as functional class actions, so that the continued application of the policy to others would keep the moot claims alive.82 The Sosna rule depends on a certified class with a legal status of its own, and a suit that never became a class action has no such class.83