Concept
Judicial Immunities
Executive, legislative, and judicial immunities
Judicial Immunities
A court faces two threats, and the law answers each one differently. The first comes from the losing litigant, who may sue the judge over the ruling. The second comes from a legislature that dislikes a result and wants it undone. Personal immunity answers the first. The rule of Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. answers the second: Congress may not require federal courts to reopen cases in which final judgments have been entered, although it may change the substantive law that governs cases that are not final.
Personal immunity follows function, not title. The Court applied that rule to the President in Clinton v. Jones, which held that a sitting President has no immunity from civil suit in federal court for unofficial conduct that occurred before taking office.1 The same sorting by function decides which acts of a judge, and which acts of other officials who decide disputes, fall inside the protection. Plaut works at a different level: it protects the finished judgment, whoever the judge was. Both protections serve judicial independence, and neither puts judges beyond accountability, since the Constitution provides that “all civil Officers of the United States” shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.2
The subsections that follow take up the judge’s personal immunity and its limits, then Plaut, then the line between changing the law and deciding a case.
Judges and Quasi-Judicial Officers
A person injured by official action can ordinarily sue for the damage. In the classic formulation, the objection that such a suit is “political” is “little more than a play upon words” when the plaintiff seeks to recover for private damage, and the right to recover that damage in a suit at law “hardly has been doubted for over two hundred years.”3 Absolute immunity departs from that baseline. The Court built the doctrine as federal common law,4 and it reserves complete protection for “officials whose special functions or constitutional status requires complete protection from suit.”5
Harlow v. Fitzgerald lists the officials who qualify. The absolute immunity of legislators in their legislative functions and of judges in their judicial functions is “well settled,” and earlier decisions extended the same immunity to prosecutors and similar officials, to executive officers engaged in adjudicative functions, and to the President.6 Each entry on that list is defined by a function.
Judges and prosecutors have no counterpart to the Speech or Debate Clause. As Justice White observed in dissent in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Constitution provides “no hint” that they should be so protected; their absolute immunity derives from the common law and public policy, which recognize the need to protect them from harassment.7 A protection built by courts reaches only as far as its reason. Absolute immunity, the Court has said, “has extended no further than its justification would warrant.”8 Harlow used that principle to refuse the President’s aides an “undifferentiated” absolute immunity, which could not be reconciled with the “functional” approach of the Court’s immunity decisions. Butz v. Economou had already rejected a blanket absolute immunity for high federal officials, holding that federal officials generally have the qualified immunity that state officials hold, while reaffirming that judges and prosecutors, “because of the special nature of their responsibilities,” “require a full exemption from liability.”9
Within its function, a judge’s protection is complete. A judge is absolutely immune from damages for acts within the scope of the office even when the judge acted in bad faith, as Pierson v. Ray held for judges and Tenney v. Brandhove held for legislators.10
The reason lies in the judge’s work, which produces a loser, and the loser is the likeliest plaintiff. In Ferri v. Ackerman, the Court explained that the prosecutor and the judge represent the interest of society as a whole, that their duties “may adversely affect a wide variety of different individuals, each of whom may be a potential source of future controversy,” and that the point of immunity is “to forestall an atmosphere of intimidation that would conflict with their resolve to perform their designated functions in a principled fashion.”11 Motive cannot be the test. If it were, every losing party could allege bias, and because it is “impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried,” every contested ruling would carry the prospect of a trial about the judge’s state of mind. Exposing all officials, “the innocent as well as the guilty,” to that burden would “dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible.”12
The concern with trial itself explains a procedural rule. A district-court order denying qualified immunity, so long as it turns on an issue of law, “conclusively determine[s]” that the defendant must bear the burdens of discovery, is “conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff’s claim,” and would prove “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment,” so the defendant may appeal at once under the collateral-order doctrine.13
Immunity removes one remedy and leaves others. Judges are absolutely immune from damages “only when performing a judicial function, and even then they are subject to criminal liability.”14 The immunity for judicial and prosecutorial functions also bars only claims for damages, and it attaches “no matter how blatant or willful the violation may have been.”15
Courts read “judicial act” by the kind of act performed, not by whether it was authorized or wise. In Stump v. Sparkman, a state judge approved a mother’s petition, presented in chambers, to have her fifteen-year-old daughter sterilized. The proceeding was never docketed and no guardian was appointed for the girl, yet the Court upheld absolute immunity, because entertaining such petitions is a function judges normally perform and the mother had come to the judge in a judicial capacity.16 In Mireles v. Waco, a judge who ordered that a person be taken from another courtroom and brought before the judge was likewise absolutely immune.17 A narrower reading would defeat the immunity, since a plaintiff who could escape it by showing that the judge exceeded authority or acted badly would turn every immunity question into a trial of the merits.
The same person can also do work that is not judging. Forrester v. White denied absolute immunity to a judge who discharged a court employee, because managing employment relations is administrative work.18 A judge’s absolute immunity “does not extend to actions performed in a purely administrative capacity,” because immunities are grounded in “the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.”19 Set Stump beside Forrester and the controlling fact stands out. Approving a petition decides a matter a party has brought to the judge, and an aggrieved person keeps the ordinary remedy of review. Discharging an employee is something any employer does, and giving the task to a judge adds no decision-making function that needs protection. Chief Justice Burger drew the general line in his concurrence in Nixon v. Fitzgerald: judges, like Members of Congress and prosecutors, are “not immune for acts outside official duties.”20
The executive branch has advocates and adjudicators whose work resembles a court’s, and the same logic reaches them. Imbler v. Pachtman recognized absolute immunity for prosecutors,21 and Butz extended absolute immunity to prosecutors and similar officials in the executive branch and to executive officers engaged in adjudicative functions.22 Butz also supplies the contrast: a cabinet official sued for allegedly opening an investigation of a critic in retaliation received only qualified immunity.23 The difference lies in the function and not in the branch, since prosecutors, like judges, represent the interest of society as a whole and take actions that can adversely affect many individuals, each a potential source of later controversy.24
Because the protection follows the function, one prosecutor can hold absolute immunity for one act and only qualified immunity for the next. In Burns v. Reed, a prosecutor who presented evidence to a court in support of a search-warrant application was absolutely immune, but the same prosecutor was not absolutely immune for advising the police that they could question a suspect, which is a police function.25 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons draws the line between prosecutorial functions, which receive absolute immunity, and investigative or administrative ones, which do not; federal executive officials otherwise have only a qualified immunity from civil damages actions that is “virtually identical” to that of state and local officials sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.26 Out-of-court statements to the press, work done as an investigator rather than as an advocate, and, in Kalina v. Fletcher, executing a certification for a probable-cause determination likewise draw only qualified immunity.27 Harlow anticipated the limit in a footnote. Imbler had reserved whether absolute immunity reaches the aspects of a prosecutor’s work “that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer,” the courts of appeals had generally said no, and the Court had implicitly drawn the same line for executive officials engaged in quasi-prosecutorial functions.28
Absolute immunity also reaches those who take part in the judicial process without deciding anything. The absolute privilege extends to “judges, prosecutors, witnesses, and other persons acting ‘under color of law’ who perform official functions in the judicial process,” and Briscoe v. LaHue applied it to a police officer sued over allegedly perjured testimony that led to the plaintiff’s false conviction.29 Government officials who testify before a grand jury or at trial are covered as well.30 A witness who feared a damages suit over every answer would have reason to shade the answers, and courts depend on candid testimony.
Local officials meet the same sorting problem. Conventional wisdom treats rezonings as legislative acts, but a number of courts look behind the “amendment” label and, when the action was in fact quasi-judicial, deny it the full presumption of validity that legislative acts receive.31 The label matters for immunity too, because a city official who acts judicially or quasi-judicially holds absolute immunity. Members of zoning boards of appeal who take testimony, make credibility determinations, and apply the law to their findings, who are free from direct political influence, and who must observe procedural due process, receive absolute quasi-judicial immunity, and the same protection has reached members of legislative bodies when they act judicially.32 As the Third Circuit put it, “regardless of his job title, if a state official must walk, talk, and act like a judge as part of his job, then he is as absolutely immune from lawsuits arising out of that walking, talking, and acting as are judges who enjoy the title and other formal indicia of office.”33
Two errors recur. The first treats the label as the answer: calling the defendant a judge or a prosecutor does not decide which immunity applies, and a judge who fires an employee or a prosecutor who coaches the police stands where any executive official stands. The second asks whether the act was lawful or well motivated, which is the inquiry absolute immunity exists to keep out of the case. The only question is whether the act belongs to the protected function.
Final Judgments and Plaut
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. holds that Congress may not require federal courts to reopen cases in which final judgments have been entered, although Congress may change the substantive law that governs cases that are not final. The case began when the Court’s decision in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson shortened the limitations period for private securities-fraud actions. In accord with that decision, several lower federal courts dismissed pending securities cases and entered final judgments against the plaintiffs, and no appeals were taken. Congress then adopted legislation that permitted a longer limitations period for such cases.37 Section 27A(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 let plaintiffs in a defined class of dismissed suits move to have their cases reinstated, and the Court held it unconstitutional to the extent that it required federal courts to reopen final judgments entered before its enactment.38
The Court knew of no earlier instance in which Congress had enacted retroactive legislation requiring an Article III court to set aside a final judgment, “and for good reason”: the Constitution’s separation of legislative and judicial powers denies Congress that authority.39 The text of the Constitution does not say so in terms. The Court derived the rule from structure, reasoning that inherent in the “judicial power” that Article III confers is the limit that Congress may not compel the courts to reopen final judgments.40 A critical attribute of the independent federal judiciary is “the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy.”41
History explains the rule. During the Confederation, state legislatures exercised judicial power, and the Framers were well acquainted with the danger of subjecting the determination of one person’s rights to the “tyranny of shifting majorities.”42 The mechanism is easy to trace. If a legislature could reopen a judgment whenever it preferred another result, a winning litigant would hold the judgment only at the legislature’s pleasure, and the legislature would become the real court of last resort.
Neither the statute’s breadth nor Congress’s motive saves it. Separation of powers, the Court explained, is “a structural safeguard rather than a remedy to be applied only when specific harm, or risk of specific harm, can be identified”; it is “a prophylactic device, establishing high walls and clear distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict.”43 The reach of § 27A(b) over a class of cases rather than a single suit therefore changes nothing, and neither does a sincere belief that the earlier judgments were wrong. Legislated invalidation of judicial judgments, the Court concluded, deserves the same categorical treatment that Chadha gave to congressional invalidation of executive action.44
The Court distinguished United States v. Sioux Nation as resting on a line of precedent that lets Congress waive the res judicata effect of a prior judgment in the government’s favor on a claim against the United States, and it described that holding as “as narrow as the precedent on which we had relied.”45
Hayburn’s Case supplies the executive-branch analogue. Congress had directed the federal circuit courts to hear pension claims, and an executive officer could revise their findings. Before the Supreme Court could decide the case, Congress amended the legislation to provide other relief, and the Court dismissed on grounds of mootness.46 A reporter’s footnote recorded the views of the Justices, who as circuit judges, including Chief Justice Jay and Justice Cushing, held that the duties under the original pension act were not judicial and so could not be performed in their capacity as judges.47
Hayburn guards the judiciary against being drafted into non-judicial work, and Plaut guards its judicial work against being undone. Clinton v. Jones shows what a case looks like when neither concern is present. Nothing there asked the Federal Judiciary to perform an “executive” function: the plaintiff merely asked the courts “to exercise their core Article III jurisdiction to decide cases and controversies,” and litigating the President’s unofficial conduct posed “no perceptible risk of misallocation of either judicial power or executive power.”48 The two threats differ in route. In Hayburn an officer outside the judiciary sat in review of the court’s decision; in Plaut no other department reviewed anything, and Congress commanded the courts to reopen their own judgments. Both rest on one premise: once a court has finally decided a case, the decision is the last word of the judicial department, and no other branch may sit above it.
The limit on the rule is the line between final and non-final judgments. Congress can always revise judicial outcomes in one sense: when a new law makes clear that it is retroactive, an appellate court must apply it in reviewing judgments still on appeal and must alter the outcome accordingly. The petitioners argued that the line between judgments pending on appeal and judgments that are final is drawn by statute, as with the 30-day appeal period in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a), and so cannot be a constitutional line. The Court answered that the distinction is implicit in what Article III creates: not a batch of unconnected courts, but a judicial department composed of “inferior Courts” and “one supreme Court.” Within that hierarchy, the decision of an inferior court is not, unless the time for appeal has expired, the final word of the department as a whole.49
An exam will therefore ask whether the judgment was final when Congress acted. Suppose a plaintiff’s federal discrimination suit is dismissed because the statute does not yet reach the alleged conduct, and Congress then amends the statute to cover it and directs that the amendment govern all pending suits and all suits dismissed in the previous six months. If the plaintiff filed a timely appeal and the case sits in the court of appeals when the amendment passes, that court must apply the amended statute, even if doing so reverses the dismissal. If the plaintiff let the appeal period run, the dismissal is a final judgment, and the direction to reopen it commands what Plaut forbids.50 Only the appeal differs between the two versions, so finality alone carries the answer.
Not every Justice reasoned as the majority did. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment but wrote more narrowly: a statute that reopened an otherwise closed judgment while supplying some of the assurances against “singling out” that ordinary legislation provides, such as prospectivity and general applicability, might present a different case.51 The majority answered that the concurrence’s “delphic alternative” simply “prolongs doubt and multiplies confrontation,” and its categorical rule controls.52 An exam answer should state the majority’s rule and may add that the concurrence leaves room for a differently built statute.
The usual error is to ask whether the new statute is retroactive, general, or fair. Congress may make a law retroactive for cases still on appeal, the breadth of the reopening provision made no difference in Plaut, and good motives do not cure the problem. The question that decides the answer is whether the judgment was final when Congress acted.
Congress and Pending Cases
Plaut leaves Congress real room to act. A court reviewing a judgment still on appeal must apply a new law that clearly makes itself retroactive, even if the outcome changes,53 and Congress does not violate Article III when it “changes the law.”54 Limitations that stem from the nature of the judicial process, moreover, do not apply to Congress, which legislates rather than adjudicates.55 The permission has an edge, though. Congress may change the law on which a pending case turns, and it may not decide the case itself. The work of this subsection is locating that edge.
United States v. Klein marks the forbidden side. A claimant seeking the return of confiscated property had received a presidential pardon, and under settled principles of law the pardon entitled the claimant to recover. While the government’s appeal was pending, Congress made evidence of a pardon inadmissible in any case seeking a return of confiscated property and divested the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over any case in which proof of a pardon had been submitted. In practical effect, the statute divested the Court of jurisdiction at the moment when, under settled principles, the Court was prepared to rule against the government.56
The Court looked past the jurisdictional wording to what the statute did. It asked what the statute was “but to prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way,” and whether the Court could follow it “without allowing one party to the controversy to decide it in its own favor.”57 The party in question was the government, so a command to rule against every claimant who offered a pardon would let one litigant, acting through its legislature, write the judgment against its opponent. Congress had “passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power,” and it was “of vital importance that these powers be kept distinct.”58 Congress holds a power to make exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction,59 but Klein shows that the exceptions power cannot be used to usurp the judicial function of deciding cases, and in the pardon setting the statute also encroached on the President’s pardon power.60
The jurisdictional form did not save the statute, because Congress withdrew jurisdiction only as a means to a result. A measure that removes jurisdiction over a whole subject whatever the outcome presents a different question, because jurisdiction there is not predicated on potential outcomes but on the subject matter of the suit.61 Nor does finality explain Klein, for the case was still on appeal, the stage at which Plaut leaves Congress its greatest freedom. Later decisions read Klein to bar Congress from directing the judiciary in decision making under an existing law while leaving Congress free to adopt a new one.62
A statute that adopts new law stands on the permitted side. In Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, an appropriations act set new rules for the management of specified federal lands and expressly named two pending lawsuits, declaring that management under the new provisions would satisfy the statutory requirements on which those suits rested. The Court rejected the argument that Congress was directing the outcome of the litigation: Congress had changed the law itself, without directing findings or results under the old law.63 The court still performs its own task, which is to find the facts and apply the law as it now stands, and the law is what Congress was entitled to change.
Bank Markazi v. Peterson pushes the same reasoning further than many students expect. More than a thousand victims of Iran-sponsored terrorism held default judgments against Iran and sought turnover of about $1.75 billion in bond assets alleged to belong to Iran’s central bank. Congress then enacted a statute making a designated set of assets available to satisfy judgments in a specific case identified by docket number, and the bank argued that the statute directed a result in the pending enforcement proceeding. The Court, by a vote of 6 to 2, held that the statute did not violate the separation of powers. Article III bars Congress from telling a court how to apply preexisting law to particular circumstances, but Congress may amend a law and make the amendment retroactive in pending cases, and the statute did that by requiring a court to apply a new legal standard in a postjudgment enforcement proceeding that was still pending. A statute does not become invalid because it makes the result a “foregone conclusion,” nor because it prescribes a rule for a single pending case identified by caption and docket number, since it directs courts to apply a new legal standard to undisputed facts. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented on the ground that Congress had “decided this case by enacting a bespoke statute tailored to this case.”64
The usual exam error is to ask whether the statute makes the outcome inevitable or targets one case. Klein and Bank Markazi both left the court with a predetermined result, and what separates them is the mechanism. Klein’s statute told the Court what to conclude about a claim under the law as the Court had settled it, while the Bank Markazi statute supplied a new standard and left the court to apply it.
The mechanism is not always easy to see, and Patchak v. Zinke shows how divided the Justices can be when a tailored statute can be read either way. The plaintiff challenged the Secretary of the Interior’s authority to take land into trust for a tribal casino. After the Supreme Court held that Congress had waived sovereign immunity and remanded, Congress enacted the Gun Lake Act, which reaffirmed the property as trust land and provided that any action relating to it “shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.” The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal without a majority rationale. A four-Justice plurality stated the rule that Congress violates Article III when it “compel[s] ... findings or results under old law” and does not when it “changes the law,” and it concluded that the Act merely changed the law.65 Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor concurred in the judgment, reading the dismissal command as a permissible retraction of the earlier sovereign immunity waiver, which made the Klein question disappear, and three Justices dissented on the ground that Congress violates the separation of powers when it takes the judicial power for itself and decides a particular case. The plurality’s formulation is the most useful statement of the line, but it did not command a majority, so the boundary between changing the law and compelling results is a standard to argue from a statute’s text and effect and not a mechanical test.
Finality supplies the other boundary, and a continuing injunction sits on the pending side of it. A final money judgment is closed, and a later statute cannot affect the plaintiff’s right to the money. A decree granting prospective relief differs because the issuing court keeps supervisory authority over it and may modify it as circumstances of law or fact change, so the court has not made a final decision as long as the injunction remains in effect.66 When Congress changes the law that underlies such relief, the relief stops being enforceable to the extent that it conflicts with the new law.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act applied that reasoning. It allowed prospective relief in prison-conditions cases only if the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of a federal right, and is the least intrusive means of doing so. It applied the same criteria to existing decrees, required a court to grant a motion to terminate unless the relief met the new standards, and stayed the decree automatically if the court had not ruled within a fixed statutory period of at most 90 days.67 The Court upheld the stay in Miller v. French because the stay directs no outcome: it places a temporary hold on an earlier injunction while the district court decides whether the new standards are met, and that decision remains the district court’s. The Court left open whether a congressionally imposed time limit so severe that it impaired judicial independence would raise a separate problem, because the lower courts had not addressed the sufficiency of the period.68
Step one separates this subsection from the last, and step three is the contested one: the Gun Lake Act produced a plurality, a concurrence resting on sovereign immunity, and a three-Justice dissent.