Concept
State Involvement in Private Conduct
State action
State Involvement in Private Conduct
A private party can be held to constitutional limits even when it performs no governmental function, if the government has involved itself in the challenged conduct. This is the entanglement exception. It applies when the government affirmatively authorizes, encourages, or facilitates private conduct that violates the Constitution.1 The result runs in two directions: the government must cease its involvement with the private actor, or the private entity must comply with the Constitution.2 The public function exception, covered above, asks what the private party does. The entanglement exception asks what the government has done with respect to the private party's conduct.
Consider a state agency that could not itself exclude people from a program because of race. Suppose the agency instead publicly urges a private contractor to do the excluding and helps it carry the exclusion out. The contractor is the one turning people away, but the agency has encouraged and facilitated the exclusion. Under the entanglement exception, the Constitution reaches the conduct. The agency must withdraw its involvement, or the contractor must stop the practice.
The cases decided under this exception do not sort cleanly. Many involve all or most of the relevant government activities at once, and cases often involve both the public function exception and the entanglement exception.3 The groupings that follow are therefore admittedly arbitrary, but they are useful for studying the cases.4 The subsections take up symbiotic relationships between a state and a private business; regulation, monopoly, and funding; encouragement and authorization; judicial enforcement of private choices; joint participation; the peremptory challenge in Edmonson; and entwinement. Expect a single decision to illustrate more than one of them. The first grouping, symbiotic relationships, comes next.
Symbiotic Relationships
A state can be responsible for a private actor's conduct without having ordered it, if the state is tied closely enough to the actor's enterprise. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority is the model. A restaurant that leased space in a publicly owned parking building refused service to a customer solely because he was Black, and the Court held that the refusal fell within the Fourteenth Amendment. The State, it reasoned, had “so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with Eagle that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.”5 Courts call such an arrangement symbiotic: the state and the private actor each profit from the other's operation, and the state cannot pass as a bystander.
The holding rests on its facts, so they come in order. The Wilmington Parking Authority was created by the City of Wilmington under a Delaware statute that described it as “a public body corporate and politic, exercising public powers of the State as an agency thereof.”6 Its charge was to build and run parking facilities to relieve a shortage that threatened the community's welfare, and the statute let it lease parts of its garages for commercial use when leasing was necessary and feasible to finance and operate them.7 Its first project, a garage on Ninth Street, stood on land bought by negotiated purchase from private owners and paid for with city donations, loans, and revenue bonds.8 The Authority's advisers warned that parking revenue would not cover construction costs and that the bonds would not sell if they depended on parking revenue alone, so the Authority resolved to find long-term commercial tenants.9
In April 1957 the Authority signed a twenty-year lease, renewable for ten more years, with Eagle Coffee Shoppe, Inc., for a restaurant, dining room, banquet hall, cocktail lounge, and bar.10 Eagle paid $28,700 a year in rent.11 The Authority put signs on the building announcing its public character and flew the state and national flags from the roof.12 Burton parked in the garage, walked around to the restaurant's front door on Ninth Street, and was refused service, and it was admitted that the refusal rested solely on his race.13 The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, holding that Eagle “in the conduct of its business, is acting in a purely private capacity,” and denied Burton's Fourteenth Amendment claim.14 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed that judgment.15
The Delaware court relied on facts that pointed toward a private tenant. Only some 15 percent of the facility's cost had been advanced from public funds; three-fifths of the space was allocated to commercial leasing; parking was expected to produce under a third of the income; placing a restaurant in the building was a happenstance of the bidding; and the restaurant's public entrance faced Ninth Street, not the parking area.16 The Supreme Court accepted these as valid aspects of the enterprise but said they did not lead inescapably to the conclusion that state action was absent, because their persuasiveness diminished beside other factors.17 That is the weighing of circumstances the No Single Test discussion described, and the Court set five facts against the Delaware court's list:
- The land and building were publicly owned and dedicated to public uses in the performance of the Authority's essential governmental functions.18
- Land acquisition, construction, and maintenance were paid for from city donations, loans, revenue bonds, and rentals and parking fees, and upkeep and repairs were the Authority's responsibility, payable from public funds.19
- The leased space was not surplus state property but a physically and financially integral, indeed indispensable, part of the plan to operate the project as a self-sustaining unit.20
- The restaurant and the garage conferred mutual benefits: diners had a convenient place to park, the restaurant's convenience for diners could add demand for the garage, and Eagle's improvements could not raise its taxes because a tax-exempt agency held the fee.21
- Eagle itself alleged that serving Black patrons would injure its business, which meant that profits earned by discrimination were indispensable to the financial success of a governmental agency.22
No single item carried the result. The Court added them together: the Authority's activities, obligations, and responsibilities, the benefits both sides received, and the restaurant's operation as an integral part of a public building devoted to a public parking service showed the degree of state participation the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to condemn.23 The Court also felt the incongruity of the arrangement. In one part of a single building, erected and maintained with public funds to serve a public purpose, all persons had equal rights, while in another a Black customer was a second-class citizen who nonetheless enjoyed equal access to nearby restaurants in privately owned buildings. The Court called this “irony amounting to grave injustice.”24 By its inaction the Authority “has not only made itself a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination.”25
The Court was candid about how far this reasoning travels. Its conclusions were not universal truths by which every state leasing agreement is to be tested. Because government is large, a multitude of relationships might appear to fall within the Amendment's embrace, and differences in circumstances beget appropriate differences in law.26 What it held was that when a state leases public property in the manner and for the purpose shown, the lessee must comply with the Fourteenth Amendment as certainly as if its proscriptions were binding covenants written into the lease.27 The limit makes practical sense. The state stands behind nearly every private enterprise, so a rule that any public contact creates interdependence would reach almost every private actor, whereas a public landlord whose own building and finances depend on its tenant is involved in a way no ordinary regulator is.
The majority's method drew a sharp dissent. Justice Harlan objected that the Court had thrown together “various factual bits and pieces” and then undermined the structure with a vague disclaimer, leaving “completely at sea” what in the record satisfied the state action requirement.28
A private club in its own building shows where the line falls. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, a local branch of a fraternal organization refused service to a Black guest, and the guest argued that the lodge's state liquor license made the refusal state action.29 The Court found nothing approaching the symbiotic relationship of Burton. The lodge conducted its activities in a building on land it owned, took no public funds, announced that it was closed to the public, and did not perform a service the state would otherwise likely provide. Eagle was a public restaurant in a public building; Moose Lodge was a private social club in a private building.30 The Court also refused to treat any state benefit or regulation as enough. State-furnished services include electricity, water, and police and fire protection, and a rule reaching every actor that receives them would erase the line between private and state conduct drawn in the Civil Rights Cases.31 Both Eagle and the lodge had some formal tie to the state, so what moved the answer was whether the state was interdependent with the actor's enterprise, as a landlord whose project needed its tenant, or was only the actor's regulator.
Later cases confirm the narrow reading. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. found no state action in a regulated utility's cutoff of service.32 On the symbiotic theory, the Court recalled that Burton had cautioned that “a multitude of relationships might appear to some to fall within the Amendment's embrace,” and had limited its actual holding to lessees of public property.33 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn took up funding. A private school that received about 90 percent of its budget from the state and discharged a teacher stood in a mutually beneficial relationship with the state, yet the state derived no particular benefit from the personnel policies under challenge. The Court stressed that in Burton the state had profited from the restaurant's discriminatory conduct.34 That reading puts weight on the fifth Burton fact above, although Burton drew it from Eagle's own allegation about its business.35 The label survives, but its content has tightened.
Students most often err by listing every connection between the state and the defendant, such as a license, a tax exemption, or a subsidy, and calling the relationship symbiotic. A sound answer begins with what Burton actually had: a public landlord, a public building, and a tenant integral to the project's finances. It then asks whether the state benefits from, or is responsible for, the specific conduct challenged. That question returns to the close-nexus inquiry, since the modern Court imputes private activity to the state only when the state is responsible for the precise activity under attack.36 Connections that amount to regulation, licensing, or funding leave the answer with Moose Lodge, Jackson, and Rendell-Baker.
Regulation, Monopoly, and Funding
A customer’s electricity is shut off for nonpayment, and she gets no hearing first. The utility is privately owned, supervised closely by a state commission, and holds a partial monopoly in its territory. She argues that the Due Process Clause required a hearing, and the argument works only if the shutoff is state action. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., the Court held that it is not. A privately owned, heavily regulated utility with a monopoly does not become a state actor because of the regulation and the monopoly, and its termination of service under state-approved rules is not state action without more direct state involvement. Even extensive and detailed regulation does not by itself convert a business’s action into the state’s. The inquiry is whether a sufficiently close nexus links the state to the challenged action, so that the action may fairly be treated as that of the state itself.38 The earlier subsections covered Jackson’s facts and its public function holding. This one follows how the Court handled regulation, monopoly, and approval, because the same reasoning decides the other cases here.
The state has some version of each of these connections with nearly every business, so none of them can carry a claim alone. The Court said as much in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, taken up below: it has never held that discrimination by an otherwise private entity violates the Equal Protection Clause because the entity receives some benefit or service from the state or is regulated in any degree. State-furnished services include electricity, water, and police and fire protection, so such a holding would erase the line between private and state conduct drawn in the Civil Rights Cases.39 Each connection also fails for its own reason. Regulation shows that the state supervises an actor, not that it made a particular decision. A license shows that the state permits a business to operate and says nothing about the licensee’s own policies. A monopoly describes the market the actor serves, and funding describes who pays for its work. None of them shows whether the state stands behind the specific act the plaintiff challenges, and that is the question the nexus test asks.
Approval is not an order
The tariff in Jackson reserved the utility’s right to end service for nonpayment, and the Public Utility Commission had accepted it on a simple notice filing without examining that provision.40 The customer argued that this approval made the termination the state’s act. The Court disagreed. Approval by a state utility commission of a regulated utility’s request, where the commission “has not put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it,” does not turn a practice the utility initiated into state action. At most, the commission’s failure to overturn the provision amounted to a determination that a Pennsylvania utility was authorized to use it if it chose. When the initiative comes from the utility and not from the state, the utility’s exercise of a choice that state law allows is not state action.41
The line between ordering and allowing makes sense because regulated businesses must often ask permission for practices that an unregulated business would simply adopt. If approval made a practice the state’s, the amount of regulation would decide the constitutional question, and the more closely the state supervised an industry, the more of its conduct would belong to the state. Requiring an order separates a state that chose a practice from a state that merely allowed it.
Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak shows what more looks like. There the commission opened an investigation on its own motion, held a full hearing, and concluded that the transit company’s piped music was consistent with public convenience and tended to improve conditions for riders. The Jackson Court distinguished Pollak on that ground, noting that it was not entirely clear whether Pollak found state action or merely assumed it.42 The Jackson commission, by contrast, had put no such imprimatur on the termination practice and had never said whether customers would be better served by it, so the state had made no choice that the utility could be said to carry out.43
Licensing and Moose Lodge
In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, a local lodge of a fraternal order refused to serve a Black guest, and the guest argued that the lodge’s liquor license from the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board made the refusal state action. The lodge was a private club in the ordinary sense: it conducted its activities in a building it owned, took no public funds, and admitted only members and their invited guests.44 The Court found nothing approaching the interdependence between lessor and lessee that Burton presented. It also rejected the claim that pervasive regulation was enough, because regulation of that kind, however detailed, did not foster or encourage racial discrimination and did not make the state a partner or joint venturer in the club’s enterprise.45 The license tied the state to the lodge’s sale of alcohol. The challenged act was the exclusion of a guest, and, with one exception, the board played no part in setting or enforcing the club’s guest policies.46
One regulation made the difference. Pennsylvania required every club licensee to adhere to its own constitution and bylaws, and as applied to the lodge that regulation obliged it to follow the racially exclusionary rules of its own governing documents.47 A state that compels a private act is responsible for it. This regulation therefore made the discrimination the state’s in a way that the license and the rest of the licensing scheme did not, and the Court limited relief to that regulation.48 Moose Lodge thus holds both poles in one opinion: the licensing scheme as a whole was private conduct, and the regulation that required the challenged practice was not. Regulation turns otherwise private activity into state action when it mandates the specific activity being challenged.49
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan applied the same principle. Private workers’ compensation insurers withheld payment for medical treatment they judged unreasonable or unnecessary. The state regulated the insurers and created the system for resolving disputes, but it neither commanded nor approved the decision to withhold, so due process did not limit it.50
Monopoly and funding
A monopoly adds less than it first appears to. Jackson treated the utility’s partial monopoly as insufficient to connect the state to the termination.51 Moose Lodge fits the same pattern. Pennsylvania capped the number of club liquor licenses in each city, and the Court said the cap fell far short of conferring on club licensees a monopoly in dispensing liquor.52 A monopoly can still help a plaintiff at the margin, since the Court allowed that a heavily regulated utility with at least something of a governmentally protected monopoly will more readily be found to commit state acts than an entity lacking those traits.53 But a monopoly tells a court how many sellers a market has. The question is who decided to end this customer’s service.
Public funding raises the same problem. In Blum v. Yaretsky, privately owned nursing homes that received state reimbursement for Medicaid patients transferred patients to lower levels of care, and the patients claimed that the transfers, which reduced their benefits, denied them procedural due process. The state subsidized the homes’ operating and capital costs, licensed them, and paid the medical expenses of more than ninety percent of their patients. The Court still found no state action, because the transfer decisions rested on medical judgments made by private parties under professional standards that the state had not established.54 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn reached the same result for a private school that drew almost all of its income from public sources and was regulated by public authorities when it discharged employees. The Court compared the school to private corporations that depend on government contracts, whose acts do not become the government’s because of their significant or even total engagement in performing public contracts.55
A payment proves less than it seems. A government that pays for a service is a customer, and a customer does not thereby control how the provider runs its business. The money shows that the state wants the service performed. The challenged decision, a transfer or a discharge, belonged to someone else and followed standards the state had not set. The school and the state benefited each other, but the state drew no particular benefit from the personnel policies under challenge, which separates the case from Burton, where the Court stressed that the state profited from the restaurant’s discriminatory conduct.56 A broader rule would also place every government contractor, and every recipient of government aid, under the Constitution.57
Why the Court will not add the contacts together
Each of these decisions drew dissenters who would have added the state’s contacts together. In Jackson, Justice Marshall argued that utility service is a public function because “the State invariably either provides the service itself or permits private companies to act as state surrogates in providing it.”58 He relied as well on a state-sanctioned monopoly, an extensive pattern of cooperation between the utility and the state, and state approval of the very termination procedure under challenge. He objected that requiring the state to put its weight behind a practice by ordering it departed from earlier cases indicating that state authorization and approval of private conduct could support state action, and that the majority gave short shrift to the company’s dealings with the state by looking only at state support for the particular activity.59 The majority answered that the Pennsylvania statute imposes the duty to furnish service on regulated utilities and not on the state, and that the Pennsylvania courts have rejected the contention that furnishing utility service is a state function or a municipal duty.60
The dissents in the other cases follow the same pattern. In Moose Lodge, Justice Brennan stressed that the state dictated and continually supervised virtually every detail of a licensee’s business, and Justice Douglas found special circumstances in a quota that had been full for years in the lodge’s city. A group that wanted to form a nondiscriminatory club had to buy an existing club’s license at a monopoly price, so the state was putting the weight of its liquor license behind the discrimination.61 In Blum, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, argued that the nursing homes’ operations were so closely tied to state fiscal interests and regulations that the homes were interdependent with the state under Burton.62
The Jackson majority did add the contacts together and held that the sum fell short. All of the customer’s arguments showed no more than a heavily regulated, privately owned utility with at least a partial monopoly that elected to terminate service in a manner the commission found permissible under state law, and that does not connect the state to the termination.63 Adding works poorly as a method because every item describes the state’s general relationship to the actor, and nearly every business has some version of that relationship. The pile grows with the size of the regulatory state but never answers who made the challenged decision, so an actor would carry constitutional duties in proportion to the government oversight it receives. The majority counts each contact only for what it reveals about the state’s responsibility for the specific act, which is the nexus test’s concern with whether the action “may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”64 The dissenters’ worry has force, because a state that grants monopolies, cooperates closely with a company, and approves its procedures can look like a participant in what the company does, and the majority itself conceded that such features make a state act easier to find.65 The disagreement is over whether those features can stand in for a link to the act. The majority held that they cannot.
A weak answer to a problem about a regulated, licensed, or subsidized business lists every tie between the actor and the government and concludes that the state is entangled, which skips the question these cases ask. A strong answer works in three steps:
- Name the specific act the plaintiff challenges.
- Ask whether the state ordered or required that act, as the bylaw-adherence regulation did in Moose Lodge, or only approved, licensed, funded, or tolerated it, as in Jackson, Blum, and Rendell-Baker.
- Treat regulation, monopoly, and funding as supporting facts. They can raise the plaintiff’s chances at the margin, and they count for most when paired with the command, encouragement, or entwinement taught in the next subsections.
Encouragement and Authorization
A private choice becomes the state's when the link between the two is close enough that the choice "may fairly be said to be that of the state." The Court has converted that nexus inquiry into a question about what the state itself did: "a State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State."67 Blum v. Yaretsky, the source of that language, adds that mere approval of or acquiescence in a private party's initiatives does not justify holding the State responsible.68
That standard sorts state involvement into three grades. Command and significant encouragement attribute the act to the state, while permission leaves it with the private actor. The previous subsection closed by observing that regulation, licensing, and funding matter chiefly when paired with command or encouragement. This subsection takes up those two, and the line that separates them from permission.
A state answers for discrimination that a private party commits while acting under the requirements of state law, as when state law requires a restaurant owner to refuse service to minorities; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. supplies the rule.69 The reason is simple: a compelled actor makes no choice of its own. The state decided what would happen, and the private party carried out the decision. A statute or official order that requires the challenged act therefore ends the attribution inquiry, and the analysis moves to the merits. A license or an inspection does not do the same work, because the degree of regulation is only one factor unless the state has specifically approved the practice complained of.70
Encouragement is harder, because the state orders nothing and the question becomes how hard it pushed. The leading example is Reitman v. Mulkey. California had enacted fair housing laws in 1957 and 1963. In 1964 the voters adopted Proposition 14 through the initiative process, amending the state constitution to bar the state from denying any person's right to decline to sell, lease, or rent real property to whomever that person chose, in the person's absolute discretion. The Mulkeys sued Reitman, who had refused to rent them an apartment because of their race, and the California Supreme Court held that the amendment violated equal protection. The Supreme Court affirmed by a vote of five to four.71
Justice White's majority opinion conceded that the mere repeal of an antidiscrimination law is not unconstitutional state action.72 What carried the case was the California court's reading of the amendment: its intent was to authorize private racial discrimination, to repeal the fair housing laws, and to create a constitutional right to discriminate, and its likely effect was to encourage and significantly involve the state in private discrimination.73 The right to discriminate now sat in the state's basic charter, immune from legislative, executive, or judicial regulation at any level, and those who discriminated "need no longer rely solely on their personal choice."74 They could invoke express constitutional authority instead. Before the amendment, an owner who refused to rent exercised a private preference; afterward, the owner could point to the state's own charter as the source of the right, and no branch or level of government retained power to correct the refusal. The state had taken a side and had removed every public means of undoing it.
Justice Harlan, joined by three others, saw only a partial repeal that ran no more afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment than California's failure to enact the fair housing laws in the first place. He warned that "encouragement" was a "slippery and unfortunate criterion," because every act of private discrimination is either forbidden by state law or permitted by it, so a rule that treated passive permission as encouragement would taint all private discrimination.75 A second reading of the case rests on a different footing. Before a city or the state could enact open housing legislation, the state constitution would have to be amended, so the amendment burdened minorities' access to legislative remedies on the basis of race.76 Romer v. Evans later involved a state amendment that likewise barred antidiscrimination laws protecting a disfavored class.77 On either reading, Reitman is narrower than a free-floating test of whether the state "encouraged" private conduct.
The two scenes share a repeal, and what separates them is what the state did beyond repealing. California elevated the owner's discretion into a constitutional right and shielded it from every government body. The legislature in the box returned the law to a position of not forbidding the practice and left every public remedy available later. A neutral repeal lets private actors decide for themselves, and the state has endorsed nothing. A repeal that declares and protects a right to discriminate puts the state's authority behind the discrimination.
Acquiescence, by contrast, does not attribute private conduct to the state. In Flagg Bros., a warehouseman proposed to sell goods entrusted to him for storage in order to satisfy a lien under the Uniform Commercial Code, and the plaintiffs argued that the state had authorized and encouraged the sale by enacting the Code. The Court held that the sale was not state action and rejected the claim that the state had delegated to the warehouseman a power "traditionally exclusively reserved to the State."78 On the encouragement theory, the Court said it had "never held that a State's mere acquiescence in a private action converts that action into that of the State." It added that writing the permission into a statute made no difference, since a state court's decision to deny relief would be no less an authorization than a statute would be.79 If the denial of judicial relief were enough, every private deprivation of property would become a public act whenever the state declined to intervene. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices White and Marshall, dissented. In his view, the state power to order binding, nonconsensual resolution of a conflict between debtor and creditor made the label irrelevant, whether one called it "traditional," "exclusive," or "significant."80 The majority's position keeps the state responsible for choices it makes and not for every choice it leaves open.
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. draws the same line for a regulator's approval. A utility regulated in detail may frequently be required by the state scheme to obtain approval for practices that a less regulated business would be free to institute without any approval, so the commission's sign-off proves little.81 The Court contrasted an earlier case in which the District of Columbia Public Utilities Commission, on its own motion, investigated piped music on Capital Transit's vehicles, held a full hearing, and concluded that the practice was not inconsistent with public convenience and tended to improve conditions for riders.82 Metropolitan's practice, in contrast, received no such imprimatur.83 Where government regulation directly approves the challenged practice, state action is intertwined with it, because government that commands, encourages, or actively approves a practice answers for it.84 The word actively reconciles these authorities with the rule against acquiescence. Approval counts when the state itself took a position on the practice after weighing it, as California did with Proposition 14 and the Capital Transit commission did with its inquiry. It does not count when it consists of an unexamined filing or a decision not to prohibit.
The later decisions thus leave encouragement a narrow space. Blum still recognizes significant encouragement as a ground of responsibility, but Flagg Bros. and Jackson draw the dividing line at whether the state compelled the act or put its weight behind it, and a plaintiff who can show only that the state permitted the act usually loses.85 Reitman remains the high point. It left open whether authorization differs from a failure to prohibit what the state has power to prohibit, and whether the authorization rationale amounts to an affirmative duty on the state to prevent private discrimination.86 Those open questions are the reason to cite Reitman only when the facts show the state affirmatively endorsing and entrenching the practice.
The usual mistake is to stop at step three on the ground that the state allowed the practice and therefore encouraged it. Every private act is either forbidden or permitted by state law, so permission alone would erase the state action requirement. A good answer shows what the state did beyond allowing the conduct.
Judicial Enforcement of Private Choices
Private parties designed the discrimination in Shelley v. Kraemer, but judges were the ones who made it effective. That fact supplied a second route to state action: a court is part of the state, so a court order can carry a private preference into the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The case arose from restrictive covenants, which are promises recorded against land that limit who may own or occupy it. In the Missouri case, a 1911 agreement signed by 30 of the 39 property owners in the area restricted occupancy for 50 years to persons of "the Caucasian race" and excluded "people of the Negro or Mongolian race."88 The petitioners were African-Americans who had bought houses from white owners despite the covenants. Owners of other covered properties sued to enjoin the buyers from occupying their new homes, and the state courts granted that relief.89 The Supreme Court reversed.90
The Court's reasoning has two steps, and each answers a different objection. The first is that courts are the state. The Court called it a proposition long established that the action of state courts and judicial officers in their official capacities is action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it traced the principle to the earliest cases construing the Amendment.91 The idea has a close relative in the concept of acting "under color of law," under which a public official who acts within the ostensible scope of official authority engages in governmental action even when the conduct is unconstitutional.92
The second step answers the objection that the discrimination was private. The pattern of discrimination may have been defined initially by a private agreement, but the Court held that the Amendment is not ineffective on that account, and that judicial action is not immunized because it is taken under the state's common-law policy. State action refers to "exertions of state power in all forms," and when the effect of that power is to deny rights the Fourteenth Amendment protects, the Court must enforce the constitutional command.93
The willingness of the parties shows why this was enforcement and not mere abstention. The buyers wanted to buy, the owners wanted to sell, and contracts of sale were completed, so that but for the active intervention of the state courts the buyers would have been free to occupy the houses without restraint. These were not cases, the Court said, in which the States had "merely abstained from action," leaving private individuals free to discriminate. The States had instead made available to the neighbors "the full coercive power of government" to deny the buyers property rights on the ground of race. The Court put the stakes in the buyers' terms: the difference between judicial enforcement and non-enforcement was the difference between being denied property rights open to others in the community and enjoying those rights on an equal footing.94 The preference to exclude was private, and the force that made it effective was public. That is why the discrimination could be attributed to the state.
Shelley is not a public function case. That doctrine treats a private party as the state when it exercises what is clearly governmental power,95 but in Shelley no private party had to stand in for the government, because the actor was the state's own court.
Read as a slogan, Shelley proves too much. If every court order enforcing a private arrangement were state action, any party resisting a lease, a will, or a contract could demand that its terms satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment, and ordinary private law would become constitutional law. The Court has not carried the case that far. It has announced no clean limiting principle and has rarely relied on Shelley to find state action.96
What does the limiting work is the character of the order. The critical element in Shelley was that the judiciary stepped between a willing seller and a willing buyer and in effect forced the seller to discriminate on the basis of race. By compelling the seller, the court became complicit in an otherwise private act.97 Two questions should be kept apart. Whether the order is the state's act is easy, because a court is an official representative of the state and its order always is. The harder question is whether the order itself discriminates or requires someone else to discriminate. If it does neither, enforcing a private arrangement under neutral rules does not turn the underlying private motive into state action.98
Evans v. Abney marks the neutral side of that line. A testator had left land to a city for use as a park for whites only, and an earlier decision in the same litigation, Evans v. Newton, had held that the park could not be maintained on a segregated basis. When the whites-only condition could no longer lawfully be carried out, the state court applied ordinary trust and reverter rules and returned the land to the testator's heirs. The Supreme Court held that this order was not state action violating the Fourteenth Amendment.99 The court's order was neutral: it did not discriminate and did not require anyone else to do so.100 Abney and Shelley both involve a private instrument with a racial restriction, a judge, and a state-law remedy. What separates them is what the order did. In Shelley it compelled a willing seller and a willing buyer to exclude. In Abney it returned property under ordinary trust and reverter rules.
The speech cases run on the same logic. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court treated Alabama's common law of libel as state action that had to satisfy the First Amendment, even though the suit was a civil action between private parties. It explained that "the test is not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised."101 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. applied the same idea to a suit against a newspaper for breaking a promise of confidentiality, because "the application of state rules of law in state courts in a manner alleged to restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes 'state action'" under the Fourteenth Amendment.102 These cases fit the limit above for the same reason Shelley does. A damages judgment or injunction against a publisher is itself what is said to burden the speech, so the state action comes from the court's own order, and the private character of the dispute adds nothing to it. Finding state action only opens the constitutional question. Whether the First Amendment is actually violated is a separate matter.
The same idea, that a court taking part in carrying out a private choice is the state taking part, returns later in this part of the chapter with peremptory challenges. Expect overlap there, because the groupings in this part of the chapter are admittedly arbitrary. Cases often involve several kinds of government activity at once, including both public function and entanglement ideas.103
The third step does the real work. An answer that reasons "a court enforced the agreement, so the discrimination is state action" skips it and proves too much, because it would bring every will, lease, and contract that reaches a courtroom under the Constitution. A sound answer concedes that the court's order is the state's act and then asks whether the order itself did the discriminating.
Joint Participation
A private party who acts together with state officials in the conduct that deprives someone of a constitutional right is a state actor for that conduct. When an official and a private actor undertake concerted activity that operates to deprive another person of constitutional rights, the official's participation brings the state action doctrine into play, and the joint character of the venture carries the private partner's share with it.107 In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., allegations that a Kress employee had conspired with a police officer to deprive a schoolteacher of her Fourteenth Amendment rights were enough to state a claim against Kress, a private company.108 Lugar names this category when it counts as a state actor a party who "has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials."109 The attachment in Lugar fell inside the category because it required the participation of state officials.110 The cases below go beyond attachment procedures to conspiracies and cooperative ventures, and they also show where a weaker connection stops short.
The rule rests on how the harm is produced. A person whose home is searched, whose property is taken, or whose lawsuit is dismissed suffers the same loss whether an official acted alone or a private partner helped, and in each case the loss occurred because someone holding the state's authority took part. If the Amendment ignored the private partner's contribution, an official could route the unconstitutional part of an act through a cooperating private person, and the private person could borrow the state's power without taking on its limits. Attribution follows the state's power into the joint venture and closes both gaps, but only for the conduct the venture produced. That limit explains why the cases below demand real cooperation between official and private party, and why a looser link does not suffice.
The criminal civil rights cases show the principle at its fullest. In United States v. Price the first indictment charged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 242, which required that the accused act under color of law. Justice Fortas wrote for the Court that this requirement did not bar reaching private individuals, because private persons jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action act under color of law.111 It was enough that the accused was a "willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents."112 Relying on the reasoning of Burton, the Court observed that state officers were alleged to have taken part in every phase of the venture, from releasing the victims from jail through intercepting, assaulting, and murdering them. No private phase could be separated from the officers' participation, so those who took advantage of it answered for it. The second indictment charged a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 241, which reaches conspiracies of officials alone or in collaboration with private persons, and because state action was present, applying it raised no constitutional difficulty.113
The private partner's exposure does not depend on the official's. In Dennis v. Sparks a private party who had bribed a judge remained subject to the Fourteenth Amendment even though the judge was absolutely immune from civil liability.114 Judges, legislators, and prosecutors, among others, are absolutely immune from damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts within the scope of their duties, a protection the courts have supplied as a matter of policy.115 Immunity answers whether a particular official should be made to pay, and state action answers whether the state's power was used, so a judge's immunity leaves intact the fact that a judicial act occurred. A rule that carried the official's immunity over to the partner would reward the very scheme the doctrine targets, because anyone seeking an unlawful result would have every reason to recruit an immune official as the vehicle.
Ordinary facts show how far the principle reaches. A television reporter rides along with city police, persuades an officer to break into a suspect's home, and films the search. The reporter is a private citizen, but the officer's break-in and search are state action, and because the reporter acted in concert with a state actor, the reporter's participation is state action too.116
Property disputes show where the line falls between using a right the state created and acting with the state. In Flagg Bros., a warehouse operator sold a customer's goods under a state lien statute. The operator was not a state official, and the sale did not require an official's presence, so there was no joint activity; that state law had created the right to sell did not make the state answerable for the sale.117 The attachment in Lugar stands on the other side of the line because it required state officials to take part.118 Soldal v. Cook County stands there too. The owner of a mobile home park removed a resident's trailer from its foundation and towed it away, and deputy sheriffs protected the owner's employees during the removal although the deputies knew the owner had no lawful eviction order. The court of appeals found a conspiracy sufficient to establish state action, and the Supreme Court said it was not inclined to review that holding.119
Neither lender needs a better claim to the car than the other. What separates them is whether an official took part in the taking.
Describing a private party and a government agency as "joint participants" in some activity does not, standing alone, subject the private party to constitutional limits. In the cases that fail, government actors had not conspired with the private party to cause the harm.120 In Polk County v. Dodson the Court held that a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.121 The defender serves an essentially private function, adversarial to and independent of the state, and is not subject to administrative direction but must exercise independent judgment on behalf of the client.122 The state is the opposing party in the work the defender performs, and the choices the plaintiff attacks come from lawyer and client, with no state official contributing to them. The function controls, whatever the employer: the Court noted that a public defender making hiring and firing decisions on behalf of the state may be a state actor.123 American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan reached a parallel result for a private insurer's decision to withhold payment from an injured worker, because no government actor had conspired with the insurer to cause the harm.124 The state's regulation of the insurers, discussed earlier, did not change that.
Government is generally under no constitutional duty to protect a person from harm inflicted by other private individuals.125 In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, a social worker assigned to a family had noted evidence providing a reasonable basis for concluding that a child was being abused by his father, yet the Court held that the agency did not deny the child due process when its social workers failed to protect him.126 The guarantees limit what government does to a person, so a failure to stop a private abuser leaves the violence the private actor's wrong and does not turn it into the state's. The Court identified situations in which responsibility remains: when government takes an individual into custody, due process requires it to assume responsibility for the individual's safety, and a state that would "selectively deny its services to certain disfavored minorities" would violate equal protection.127 Concerted action is a third route, because DeShaney left undisturbed the cases finding state action in conspiracies between public and private actors, so that a police officer who releases a prisoner at a time and under circumstances that allow private persons to harm the prisoner joins in the harm.128 Without such an agreement, an omission stays an omission, as in Castle Rock v. Gonzales, where the police refused to enforce a woman's restraining order and the Court found no violation of procedural due process.129
The third step does the real work. The usual exam error is to label the defendant and the government joint participants because they are connected in some way, such as a license, a contract, or a shared building, and then to stop. The label supplies a conclusion without the cooperation that justifies it. A sound answer names which official did what in the challenged act and whether the private party sought or used that official's help.
Peremptory Challenges and Edmonson
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. holds that a private litigant's use of peremptory challenges in a civil case is state action. The Court applied the Lugar approach and rested its conclusion on a counterfactual: “[w]ere it not for peremptory challenges, there would be no question that the entire process of determining who will serve on the jury constitutes state action,” and the “fact that the government delegates some portion of this power to private litigants does not change the governmental character of the power exercised.”131 Because the strike is state action, the constitutional protection against racial discrimination governs it, and a litigant may not strike jurors on account of race.132 The case repays close study because it tests every part of the Lugar framework on facts in which the only official in the room is the judge.
Leesville Concrete, the defendant in a federal civil suit, used peremptory challenges to remove Black prospective jurors, and Edmonson, the Black plaintiff, objected that the strikes were racially discriminatory, invoking the principle associated with Batson v. Kentucky. The objection raised a threshold question. That an act violates the Constitution when a government official commits it does not answer whether the same act violates it when a private litigant or the litigant's lawyer commits it, because the protections of individual liberty and equal protection apply in general only to action by the government.133 Leesville was a private party, so the Court had to decide whether its strikes could be attributed to the government.
The first part of Lugar was easy to satisfy. The strikes rested on a federal statute: without that Act of Congress, Leesville could not have engaged in the alleged discriminatory acts.134 The Court added that peremptory challenges have no utility outside the jury system, a system the government alone administers, and that Congress itself has set the qualifications for federal jury service.135 The harm to an excluded juror therefore flowed from the exercise of a right the government created. That showing does not end the inquiry, because private use of a state-sanctioned procedure does not by itself amount to state action.136 With the statutory authorization clear, the Court turned to the second part of Lugar: whether a private litigant in all fairness must be deemed a government actor in using peremptory challenges, an inquiry the Court called often factbound.137
The Court's own list of relevant considerations starts with the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits.138 Its reasoning also answers two further questions: whether the litigant performs a governmental function, and whether the government's participation produces the injury. Those three questions organize the rest of this subsection.
Reliance on governmental assistance is the first. Cases have found state action when private parties make extensive use of state procedures with “the overt, significant assistance of state officials.”139 Jury selection supplies that assistance at each step. A federal clerk summons the jurors from their employment or other pursuits; the jurors must travel to the courthouse and report where the court and its officers direct; and every summoned juror receives a statutory per diem whether or not selected.140 In the courtroom, the judge oversees the exclusion of jurors for cause and so determines which jurors remain eligible for peremptory strikes, allocates challenges among multiple parties, and, when a lawyer exercises a challenge, advises the juror that he or she has been excused.141
The litigant supplies only the preference to remove a juror; the court gives it effect. That division explains the Court's reliance on Burton, where a restaurant leasing space in a building owned by a state parking authority refused to serve a Black customer.142 By enforcing a discriminatory peremptory challenge, the Court said, the court “has not only made itself a party to the [biased act], but has elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the [alleged] discrimination,” and in doing so the government has created the legal framework governing the challenged conduct.143 The reasoning echoes the symbiotic-relationship and judicial-enforcement cases earlier in this chapter.
The second question is whether the litigant exercises a governmental function, and here the Court reasoned from the election cases. When a government confers on a private body the power to choose the government's employees or officials, the private body is bound by the constitutional mandate of race neutrality, a principle that at least a plurality of the Court had recognized in Terry v. Adams.144 In Terry, a private organization, the Jaybird Democratic Association, held whites-only elections to select candidates for the Democratic primary in a Texas county; its candidate was certain to win the primary, and the Democratic candidate was certain to win the general election.145 The principle applies with even greater force to jury selection. A peremptory challenge may serve a private interest, but the objective of jury selection is to determine representation on a governmental body, and the delegation that occurred in Terry without legislation occurs here through explicit statutory authorization.146
Polk County v. Dodson does not stand in the way. Dodson treated a government employee as a private actor because of his purpose and functions. In ordinary civil litigation the government is not a party, so no adversarial relation exists between it and the private litigant, and in jury selection the government and the litigants work for the same end.147 A private litigant therefore becomes a government actor for the limited purpose of using peremptories, because the selection of jurors is “a unique governmental function delegated to private litigants by the government and attributable to the government for purposes of invoking constitutional protections against discrimination by reason of race.”148
The function reasoning also shows how exclusivity operates in practice. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. found state action where a private entity exercises powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State, and it found none in a utility's cutoff of service because supplying utility service is not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.149 The jury system is different: peremptory challenges have no utility outside it, and the government alone administers it.150 Edmonson thus draws on both the public function route and the court's entanglement in the strike, an overlap that state action cases commonly show.151
The setting of the injury points the same way. If race-based strikes were permitted, persons could be required by summons to be put at risk of open and public discrimination as a condition of their participation in the justice system, and the injury to excluded jurors would be the direct result of governmental delegation and participation.152
The Court then held that the civil litigant could assert the excluded jurors' rights, a question of third-party standing that is separate from attribution. A litigant may raise a claim for a third party if the litigant has suffered a concrete, redressable injury, has a close relation with the third party, and faces some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect its own interests; the Court held all three requirements satisfied in the criminal context and in the civil context as well.153
The majority drew an express limit around its holding. In most civil cases, it said, the initial decision whether to sue at all, the selection of counsel, and any number of ensuing tactical choices in discovery and trial “may be without the requisite governmental character to be deemed state action.” Peremptory challenges are different because litigants who take part in selecting jurors serve an important function within the government and act with its substantial assistance.154
The majority's wording rewards attention. It said that such ordinary litigation decisions “may” lack governmental character, not that they always do, so the analysis attaches to the particular act challenged.
Three Justices dissented. Justice O'Connor, writing for the dissent, objected that “not everything that happens in a courtroom is state action,” and argued that the government was not responsible for the acts of private individuals acting on behalf of private clients.155 The disagreement was over how to describe the challenged act. The majority saw a governmental function delegated to private litigants; the dissent saw private individuals pursuing their clients' ends. An exam answer should say which description it adopts and why.
Georgia v. McCollum tested Edmonson against a party whom the government itself is prosecuting. The Court relied on Edmonson to find that defense counsel's strikes were state action: the defendant in a Georgia criminal case relies on the state's jury selection system, and by enforcing a discriminatory peremptory challenge the court elects to place its power, property, and prestige behind the discrimination.156 Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred only because he felt obliged by what he thought was the Court's erroneous decision in Edmonson. Justice Thomas, concurring, wrote that Edmonson precluded a different result, but he voiced “general dissatisfaction with [the Court's] continuing attempts to use the Constitution to regulate peremptory challenges” and warned of a slippery slope: “Today, we decide only that white defendants may not strike black veniremen on the basis of race. Eventually, we will have to decide whether black defendants may strike white veniremen. Next will come the question whether defendants may exercise peremptories on the basis of sex.”157
McCollum shows what the Edmonson finding rests on. The defendant's strikes are attributed to the government because the defendant relies on the state's jury selection system and the court enforces each strike, and Edmonson described the litigant as a government actor only “for the limited purpose of using peremptories.”158 The attribution reaches the act of striking jurors and no further.
Two errors recur in exam answers. One recites the courtroom setting and stops. The other reasons that a jury is a governmental body and so every lawyer in the courtroom is a state actor. A complete answer ties the strike to the court's assistance and to the delegated power over the jury, and it separates the strike from the litigant's other choices. Where a problem presents a dissenting view of the facts, the dispute is over how to describe the challenged act: as the litigant's private decision or as a governmental process the litigant sets in motion.
Entwinement
A nominally private organization becomes the state for constitutional purposes when public institutions and officials are so thoroughly mixed into its membership and operation that the private label no longer describes what the organization is. In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association the Court put it this way: "The nominally private character of the Association is overborne by the pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in its composition and workings."161 The joint-participation cases asked whether an official and a private party worked together on one deprivation. Entwinement asks what the organization itself is made of. Two decisions about athletic associations mark its boundaries: NCAA v. Tarkanian came first and shows what entwinement is not, and Brentwood shows what it is.
In Tarkanian, the National Collegiate Athletic Association, a voluntary body of public and private universities, found that the University of Nevada, Las Vegas basketball program and its coach had broken NCAA rules.162 The NCAA put the university on probation and ordered it to show cause why further sanctions should not follow unless the university removed the coach from all coaching duties during the probation.163 The university removed him, and he claimed that the NCAA's hearing procedures denied him due process. By a vote of five to four, the Court held that the NCAA was not a state actor.164
The majority rested that result on several features of the relationship. It found no delegation from the university to the NCAA, because the university remained free to accept the coach's claim of innocence, refuse to discipline him, and withdraw from the association at any time.165 The university acted against the coach to avoid sanctions on its own athletic program, and the dismissal, the final act, was the university's own.166 The NCAA could not be treated as a stand-in for Nevada, since its rules came from a membership of hundreds of institutions, most with no connection to that state.167 And the two bodies were adverse on the question that mattered. The university had defended the coach and thought punishing him unfair, while the association acted as the agent of its member institutions, including the university's competitors, who wanted its rules enforced evenhandedly.168
Each of those facts bears on whether the state stands behind the sanction. A national association's rules are written by members from across the country, so a state university that follows them complies as one member among hundreds, and the state is no more the author of those rules than any other state with a member school. A university that may leave at any time keeps the choice to stay, which makes the association's pressure the kind any private organization puts on its members, and attributing the outcome to Nevada would charge the state with a decision it did not make. Adversity completes the picture, because an association that presses a state university to discipline an employee the university has defended hardly looks like the state's agent. The four dissenters nonetheless saw an ordinary case of joint activity between a state university and a private body, and a symbiotic relationship was arguable too.169 A finding of state action would also have brought a wide array of NCAA activities under constitutional scrutiny, so part of what divided the Court was how far constitutional litigation should reach.170
Brentwood presented the opposite arrangement. The Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, incorporated under state law, regulated interscholastic athletics among its members, which were virtually all of the state's public high schools, about 290 of them, and 55 private schools.171 A rule of the State Board of Education from 1972 to 1996 expressly designated it as the supervisor of public high school athletics, and the later rule simply recognized its value to member schools.172 In 1997 the Association declared Brentwood Academy, a private member, ineligible for the playoffs, placed it on probation, and fined it for sending recruiting materials to prospective athletes.173 The Court, again by five to four, held that the Association's regulatory activity should be treated as state action because state school officials were pervasively entwined in its structure.174
The majority's evidence ran in two directions. Entwinement up from the members consisted of three features:
- Public schools made up 84 percent of the membership, represented by their officials acting in an official capacity to provide an integral element of secondary public schooling.175
- Superintendents, principals, vice-principals, and teachers of those schools devoted official working time to running the Association.176
- The public schools let the Association charge admission at interscholastic games, a substantial source of its funding.177
Entwinement down from the state consisted of two:
- Members of the State Board of Education held ex officio status on the Association's governing bodies.178
- Association employees, though paid from dues and event revenue, were eligible for the state employee retirement system.179
The Court summed up the record this way: "The entwinement down from the State Board is therefore unmistakable, just as the entwinement up from the member public schools is overwhelming."180 In the Court's account, public school officials performed essentially everything the Association did apart from purely ministerial tasks, so that no recognizable Association would exist without them.181 That is why the private label failed. A corporate charter says who holds title to the organization, while attribution asks who is acting, and when public officials acting in their official capacity on public time do nearly all of the work, the organization is the public schools acting collectively. Treating its sanctions as private would let a state run a public program through a nominally private body and escape the limits that would bind the program if the state ran it directly.
The majority reached that conclusion without finding a public function and without finding that the state commanded or encouraged the sanction against Brentwood Academy. The case therefore rests on the close-nexus question from earlier in this chapter: state action may be found only if there is "such a close nexus between the state and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the state itself."182 Entwinement is how that nexus was shown. The Court required neither an agreement to deprive anyone of a right nor a mutually beneficial arrangement, and the degree of entwinement alone sufficed.183
Both associations governed athletics among public and private schools and sanctioned a member, so a mechanical comparison points toward Tarkanian. The facts that moved the answer concern who stood behind the organization. The Tennessee association operated within a single state, which made its relationship to that state more clearly defined, and public schools of that state held 84 percent of its membership, gave it their officials' working time, and let it charge admission at their games.184 When it sanctioned Brentwood Academy, public school officials were doing the sanctioning. The NCAA's members were spread across the country, and one state university's tie to it was a voluntary membership that the university could end. The Court also rejected the Association's warning that a finding of state action would set off a flood of federal civil rights suits against similar organizations, because courts of appeals that already treated such associations as state actors had seen no flood.185
The vote was close in both cases, and the Brentwood dissent shows why the doctrine still draws criticism. Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, objected that the Court had never before found state action based on mere entwinement, and that earlier cases had reached a private organization only when it performed a public function, was created, coerced, or encouraged by the government, or acted in a symbiotic relationship with it.186 He added that he was "not prepared to say that any private organization that permits public entities and public officials to participate acts as the State in anything or everything it does."187 His worry is the one that keeps every connection in this chapter from sweeping too widely. The majority answered it with the qualifier in its own holding, that entwinement "to the degree shown here" requires treating the organization as public.188 Brentwood therefore supports a finding of state action only where public participation is as pervasive as it was there.
The two board seats resemble the ex officio places the State Board of Education held in Brentwood, and the plan approval and quarterly reporting show the state's oversight reaching into the organization's ordinary work.189 A clinic with no official on its board and no county review of its plans, paid under an ordinary services contract, would present only the relationship the funding cases treat as private, because a state that buys a provider's services has not thereby made the provider's decisions its own.190
An answer that says only that the organization has some public members or some state oversight skips the question the cases ask, which is whether the public side is pervasive enough to overbear the private label. A strong answer counts the share of public members, says in what capacity they act, and identifies the state's formal role in the structure. It then compares those facts with Brentwood on one side and Tarkanian on the other, where a state institution was one voice among hundreds and could leave. Because the Court split five to four both times, an answer that acknowledges the contested facts and states which view it adopts and why will earn more than one that merely announces a result.